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Notwithstanding Singapore‘s economic success, it remains puzzling that Malays 
have been persistently overrepresented amongst the working poor since independence. 
Singapore state representatives and many scholars typically employ culturalist 
explanations to understand this. A minority have adopted the structuralist perspective that 
historically traces the social and economic impediments to Malay social mobility. 
  
 This dissertation explores the intricate relationship between structure and cultural 
milieu in restricting the intergenerational mobility of working poor Malay families. It 
seeks to identify persisting structural factors that limit intergenerational mobility amongst 
working poor Malays. It asks how these are associated with the cultural practices and 
beliefs of not only Malay working poor families, but also of social service practitioners 
and Malay leaders. 
  
 I maintain the following. First, the factors underlying the concentration of in-
work poverty amongst Malays are not predominantly cultural, but structural in nature. 
Singapore‘s economic transformation posed particular consequences for Malays who, for 
historical reasons, were already concentrated in lower-paying occupations. Second, 
working poor Malay families are not just constrained by the lack of finances. The dearth 
of social and cultural resources, and the inclination to identify ‗race‘ rather as the biggest 
impediment to their upward mobility, are equally critical influences. Third, all three 
groups of actors continuously straddle between structural and cultural explanations to 
comprehend why the working poor are disproportionately Malays. Their conversational 
uses of ‗structure‘ and ‗culture‘ however, depart from scholarly discourses. By actively 
pursuing their self-interests, via habitus, each group indirectly ends up reaffirming the 
status quo. 
  
 This study synthesizes the culturalist and structuralist comprehensions of 
development, and qualitatively documents the ramifications of burgeoning social 
inequalities in Singapore, widely regarded as Southeast Asia‘s and East Asia‘s success 
story. With regard to the intricate relationships between culture and structure, it proposes 
that each concept achieves it full analytical potency only in tandem with the other. 
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Drawing linkages between ‗local‘ experiences of inequality and ‗global‘ economic trends 
such as regionalization and the shift from manufacturing to services, this dissertation 
sheds light on the complex intersections between the institutions of ethnic relations and 
inequality, and how social actors culturally mediate them. Furthermore, this dissertation 
adds to the long-standing debate whether ‗habitus‘ ― as a system of socially learned 
beliefs and dispositions ― offers sufficient space for the transformation of social 
relations, or mechanistically reproduces those very relations. Finally, this thesis also 
departs from the emphasis normatively placed on working poor families. The interpretive 
attempt to make sense of the ‗clashes‘ in cultural practices and beliefs, especially when 
working poor families encounter middle-class individuals in social service institutions, 
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CHAPTER ONE: CULTURE, STRUCTURE AND INTERGENERATIONAL 
POVERTY 
 
1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Culturalist and structuralist explanations have emerged to explain why 
poverty persists. Yet, they generally view ‗culture‘ and ‗structure‘ as independent 
and mutually exclusive concepts. Whereas culturalist theories end up blaming the 
victims, the structuralist framework is more plausible for it emphasizes the 
significance of institutional processes that are beyond an individual‘s control. 
However, structuralist arguments often overlook the cultural mechanisms that are 
involved in limiting intergenerational mobility amongst the poor. They neglect to 
explain how structures entrenching poverty are culturally mediated by, 
reproduced or transformed through, different social actors. 
Bourdieu‘s cultural reproduction theory addresses these gaps, and 
effectively bridges the contrived opposition between ‗culture‘ and ‗structure.‘ 
However, it is criticized for having strong echoes of structural determinism 
(Swartz 1977: 555; Garnham and Williams 1980: 223; Gorder 1980: 344; 
Brubaker 1985: 759; Wacquant 1987: 81; A. King 2000: 427). Whilst Willis 
(1977) and MacLeod (1995 [1987]) present a challenge to the circumscribed 
space for agency in Bourdieu‘s work, they remain inadequate for detailing the 
‗clashes‘ in habitus — knowledge, dispositions and values that are gained through 
one‘s cultural history ― that transpire when the poor encounter middle-class 
social actors in welfare institutions. 
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Employing an analytical framework that synthesizes the structuralist 
perspective of poverty and cultural reproduction theories, I investigate how 
‗structure‘ and ‗culture‘ interact and their ramifications for in-work poverty. 
Selecting in-work poverty amongst Malays in Singapore as a case study, this 
dissertation has two key empirical queries. What are the structural factors 
accounting for limited intergenerational mobility amongst working poor Malays 
in different historical periods? How do the cultural milieu, consisting of practices 
and belief systems, of working poor Malay families, social service practitioners 
and Malay leaders, alleviate or contribute to the concentration of in-work poverty 
amongst Malays? 
Accordingly, I maintain the following.  
First, the concentration of in-work poverty amongst Malays is not purely 
an economic issue, but the cumulative consequence of the complex intersections 
between political, economic, and educational institutions, as well as residential 
and occupational arrangements in Singapore. As stratification principles altered in 
different historical periods, barriers to Malay mobility correspondingly varied, 
and snowballed to aggravate Malay relative poverty today.  
Second, the lack of economic, social and cultural capital within working 
poor Malay families are often intertwined, and cumulatively snowball to constrain 
their upward intergenerational mobility. These families have developed a 
‗habitus‘ or the ‗cultural milieu,‘ which identifies ‗race‘ rather than the lack of 
economic resources, as the biggest obstacle to their upward mobility. Hence, their 
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aspirations and projected assessment of attainable success, tend to be constrained 
by an externally and internally imposed 'racial‘ glass ceiling. 
Third, I will reveal that all three groups of actors discussed continually 
straddle between structural, cultural and individual-level explanations, to make 
sense of in-work poverty and Malay underdevelopment. The clashes in habitus 
that occur when working poor Malay families meet middle-class social service 
practitioners, directly shape the outcomes of the former‘s welfare application. 
Viewing structure as ‗neutral‘ mechanisms, middle-class social actors frequently 
failed to recognize their implicit roles in reproducing inequality. By actively 
pursuing their self-interest via habitus, each group indirectly ends up reaffirming 
the status quo. 
 
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.2.1 The Sociological Significance(s) of In-Work Poverty 
Notwithstanding a host of technical debates, measurements of poverty try 
to capture absolute and relative poverty (Roach and Roach 1972; Townsend 1979: 
40; Ropers 1991: 35; Spicker 1993: 5; Rowntree 1997 [1902]: 86-87; Schiller 
2004: 17-18). Absolute poverty refers to the minimum subsistence level that is 
imperative for survival (World Development Indicators (WDI) 2009: 36). Spicker 
(1993: 21) highlighted: 
If there is a principal deficiency in the idea of an ‗absolute minimum‘, it 
is the failure of the concept to take into account positional goods. 
Positional goods… [which refer to goods that are valued because of their 
social desirability] are in their very nature determined by a pattern of 
social relationships, and not by an interpretation of the need for certain 
types of core commodities. This implies that an adequate definition of a 
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social minimum cannot be solely ‗absolute‘, but must include some 
criteria which are relative to the society in which it is applied. 
 
Contrastingly, relative poverty is ―a condition of material and social existence that 
is far below the average requirements‖ of a particular society (Ropers 1991: 35). 
According to the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), relative poverty constitutes households with an income that is less than 
half of the median income of all households (OECD 2001: 41; OECD 2005: 2). 
Thus, relative poverty is a more rigorous assessment of economic growth and 
inequality in affluent nations (Hannan 1973: 7; Schiller 2004: 17). 
In-work poverty has gained increasing scholarly attention recently. The 
intellectual origins of scholarship on in-work poverty can be traced to Engels‘ 
(1950) seminal analysis of the working class in England. The institutionalization 
of the working class as ―an integral, permanent‖ feature of modern society and 
their worsening standard of living, were the direct consequences of 
industrialization (Ibid: 12). Therefore, the ‗working poor‘ concept is a response to 
the historical emergence of a specific type of relative poverty in an urban setting. 
Meyers and Lee (2003: 178-180) defined the working poor to include: 
…all persons with poverty level incomes and earned income, whether 
from full- or part-time work, year-round or part-year... For a large 
proportion of working-poor families, poverty is not the result of low 
work effort… The poverty of working-poor families is associated most 
strongly with low earnings and high levels of family need… Their 
situation is influenced primarily by family size (more working poor have 
children than the non-poor), number of workers, and characteristics of 
earners. 
 
Working poor families in the United States (Pearce 1984; Edin and Lein 1997; 
McLanahan and Kelly 1999) and OECD countries such as Sweden, Japan and 
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Korea (Keese et al. 1998; Asplund and Persson 2000) are more likely to be 
populated by low-income females, including single mothers. As opposed to 
middle-income or high-income families, working poor families are more 
vulnerable to ―substantial stressors‖ (Dyk 2004: 122). These include incurring 
additional childcare and transportation costs (Newman and Lennon 2004: 119), 
restricted access to social services (Rubin 1992: 101), lower educational 
accomplishment (Coltrane et. al. 2004: 179) and the greater likelihood of 
substance abuse (Seccombe 2000: 1098). 
A disproportionate segment of the working poor constitutes the ethnic 
minorities, such as the Aboriginal communities in Australia (Cornell 2006), 
Blacks and Hispanics in America (Kain 1969; Danziger and Gottschalk 1993; 
Karoly 1993; Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1999; Wertheimer 1999), as well as 
North American Indians and Inuits in Canada (Noel and Laroque 2009). When 
history is factored in, some ethnic groups — African Americans for instance — 
consistently experience limited upward mobility more than others (Seccombe 
2000: 1095; Jennings and Kushnick 2001). Cultural explanations were evoked to 
explicate the differential economic achievements of different ethnic groups 
(Loury 1985; Sowell 1981; Harrison and Huntington 2000; Rao and Walton 
2004). Yet, instances of upward mobility amongst members of disadvantaged 
ethnic groups challenge the ‗cultural‘ argument, which uncritically assumes the 
―uniformity of experience‖ (Spicker 1993: 65). 
Arguably, vulnerable employment is the most important characteristic of 
the working poor. In-work poverty problematizes the presumption that full 
6 
 
employment alone is sufficient (Vedder and Gallaway 2002: 49; Shipler 2004: 39; 
WDI 2009: 35). The quality of employment affects one‘s access to social security, 
income protection and effective coverage under labour laws (Stewart 1974: 50; 
Kazis and Miller 2001; WDI 2009: 38). In retrospect, explanations that fault 
laziness as causing poverty are inapplicable to the working poor (Andreb and 
Lohmann 2008: 1; Meyers and Lee 2003: 179; National Council of Welfare, 
Ottawa 1978: 345). Rather, structural dynamics — labour market conditions 
(Marlene and Mergoupis 1997: 707), the strength of labour unions (Turner 2001: 
360) and state employment policies (Clymer et al. 2001: 170; Rangaranjan 2001: 
103) — are more significant. 
After examining cross-national studies, the next section turns to the 
specific case of in-work poverty in Singapore and how it has assumed a 
disproportionately Malay composition. 
 
1.2.2 Periodizing Poverty in Singapore 
Poverty was concentrated amongst local Singaporeans in the 1950s, 
arguably due to neglect under colonial rule (K.S. Goh 1956). Between the 1970s 
and 1980s, Singapore intensively industrialized, earning labels such as ‗Newly 
Industrialized Country‘ (NIC) and ‗Asian Tiger‘ after unparalleled economic 
growth (Jones 1993; Goodman and Peng 1996; Kwon 1998; Ku and Jones 2000; 
Walker and Wong 2005). During this period, absolute poverty rates aggravated 
initially. Studying poor Chinese, Cheah (1977: 19) argued that blaming the poor‘s 
individual and cultural flaws justified the lack of public aid for poverty. The 
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relocation from villages to flats affected low-income families, as burgeoning 
household expenses annulled small wage increments (Hassan 1977: 47). Social 
work reports affirmed that there will always be groups struggling to keep pace 
with society‘s progress (Kuo 1976; Lee and Tan 1979; Singapore Council of 
Social Service 1980, 1987). These early inquiries into poverty in Singapore 
exemplify Engels‘ thesis that industrialization institutionalizes the working poor 
as a permanent aspect of modern society. 
Since the 1990s, the intensification of income inequality replaced the 
plummeting of absolute poverty (Pillai 1993; Tang 2000; Soon and Ong 2001; 
Singapore Department of Statistics (DOS) 2002; Yap 2003; Mendes 2007; 
9/11/2007 Reuters; Asher and Nandy 2008; 1/7/2008 ST). Compared to middle-
income and high-income workers, the lowest 20% of income earners experienced 
an almost doubled inflation rate at 1.6% (24/8/2009 CNA; 25/8/2009 ST), as food 
and housing prices soared in 2009 (21/1/2009 ST). Although the real monthly 
household income of all deciles fell in 2009 due to a global recession following 
the Lehman Brother‘s bankruptcy, the margin for the lowest 10% income earners 
was the largest — 3.5% (DOS 2010: 5). Asher and Nandy (2008: 54) suggested 
that if the OECD‘s definition of relative poverty is applied, almost a quarter of 
Singapore‘s population will be in relative poverty. Whilst the rich are becoming 
richer, the poor are clearly becoming poorer in Singapore (21/8/2007 ST; 
10/9/2007 ST; 2/2/2008 ST; 14/2/2008 ST; 15/8/2008 ST; 14/9/2008 ST; 
2/5/2009 ST; 17/6/2009 ST). 
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Poverty in Singapore is highly ‗racial‘ as Malays are overrepresented in 
lower income categories (Pang 1975; Chiew 1991; W.K.M. Lee 2001; 15/9/2007 
ST; 19/12/2007 ST). This claim will be substantiated by statistical tables in 
Chapter 3. Malays, especially the elderly, are increasingly vulnerable to poverty 
(Chen and Cheung 1988; Blake 1992; W.K.M. Lee 1995). Part-time or freelance 
workers who do not receive Central Provident Fund (CPF)
2
 benefits are also 
disproportionately Malays (W.K.M. Lee 2001; Ramesh 1992). In only granting 
entitlements to those productively employed in the market, the CPF is a 
‗particularist‘ social insurance (L.Y.C. Lim 1989; Holliday 2000; Ramesh 2000; 
Ramesh and Asher 2000). Now that part-time or freelance work no longer ensures 
CPF contributions, Malays are especially affected. Although the Workfare 
Income Supplement (WIS)
3
 scheme was temporarily introduced in 2007 to help 
low-income workers, it is ―essentially a means-tested, restricted-use… delayed 
cash grant‖ (Asher and Nandy 2009: 56). The feasibility of financing retirement 
entirely through the CPF is also doubted (Ramesh 2000; Aspalter 2001; Schmidt 
2005; 23/2/2008 ST; 27/2/2008 ST). To summarize, the social insurance system 
in Singapore mainly caters to the middle-class, and leaves out the poor — 
                                                          
2 CPF is a system of social insurance. Working Singaporeans and their employers make monthly 
contributions to the CPF: (i) Ordinary Account - used to buy a home, pay for CPF insurance, investment and 
education (ii) Special Account - for old age, contingency purposes and investment in additional retirement 
plans (iii) Medisave Account - for hospitalization expenses and medical insurance. 
3 The Workfare Income Supplement (Workfare) Scheme provides incentives for older low workers to find 
and stay in work, while helping them to save for their longer term needs. Workfare complements the changes 
to the CPF scheme on 1 July 2007 where the employer's CPF contribution rate increased by 1.5 percentage 
points. This CPF increase did not apply to older low wage workers to help them cope with wage stagnation 
and structural unemployment. Instead, they received a reduction in employer CPF contributions. Workfare 
compensates these reduced CPF contributions. 
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employed or not — who arguably need it most. The prevalence of vulnerable 
employment and rising income inequality today implies that lower-income 
Singaporeans — who are disproportionately Malays — have less access to labour 
protection and social security. 
Studies of in-work poverty have three shortcomings, though. First, most 
works are primarily depicted statistically. Whilst useful for assessing larger 
trends, statistical analyses do not directly capture the experiences of in-work 
poverty (Seccombe 2000: 1096) or explain how structural and cultural factors 
affect in-work poverty (Valentine 1968: 6). Second, analyses of the racialization 
of poverty often overlook the heterogeneous socio-economic circumstances 
amongst different members of an ethnic minority. Third, the empirical focus on 
the poor has failed to situate them in relation to social service institutions, 
embodied by social service workers and community leaders, who are charged 
with alleviating in-work poverty. 
 
1.2.3 Cultural and Structural Explanations for Malay Economic 
 Underdevelopment 
Malays in Singapore are recognized to be economically marginal in state 
discourses. PM Lee Hsien Loong observed that the community was plagued by 
dysfunctional families, which promoted other ‗evils‘ — high divorce rates, the 
proliferation of single parents and teenage pregnancy: 
We often see families who have over-committed themselves financially 
― for instance those who have been extravagant in doing up their homes 
using renovation loans, or bought expensive furniture or large-screen TV 
sets on hire purchase. The ones with the most serious problems have 
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bought homes which are larger than they can afford, and taken 
mortgages which they are then unable to pay... While families who live 
beyond their means come from all races, quite a few are Malay families. 
(National Day Speech 2008) 
 
Here, state discourses reduce Malay social ‗dysfunctionality‘ to their economic 
status. Culpability for their economic malaise resides within individual or cultural 
flaws, thereby casting the Malay community in a depressing light (Clammer 1985: 
131; Sharifah Alwiyah 1991). Whilst praising Malay socio-economic progress, 
some Malay leaders declared that the community ―has shaken off much of the 
lethargy and psychological burdens of the past which had… prevented the 
community from making real efforts to progress‖ (Abdullah 1993: 4). Pegging 
onto these views, the local media proliferated beliefs that associate Malays with 
dysfunctionality (Suriani 2004). The most recent moral panic on poor Malays as 
possessing a ‗problematic culture and lifestyle‘4 is especially relevant (6/12/2009a 
BH; 6/12/2009b BH; 7/12/2009 BH; 9/12/2009 BH; 11/12/2009 BH; 12/12/2009 
BH; 13/12/2009 BH). 
Some scholars consume and produce culturalist elucidations of Malay 
economic underdevelopment. Many cited that Malay customs and religion are 
averse to change, hampering their progress (Wilkinson 1957; Parkinson 1967; 
Tham 1983). Ow (1999: 214) listed the lack of life skills, drug addiction and 
family dysfunction as crucial factors exacerbating Malay underdevelopment. 
Others postulated that Malays have a lower ―need for achievement‖ (Chiew 1994: 
                                                          
4 The reports revealed homeless Malay families living by the beach, and postulated that they were culturally 
predisposed to such a lifestyle. A moral panic ensued as concerned observers wrote to Berita Harian. These 
ranged from inculcating the right Islamic values into poor Malays, overconsumption amongst Malays, 
changing the ‗mindsets‘ of the poor to the questioning of Malay leadership. 
11 
 
255) or faulted working-class Malay parents‘ uninterested attitudes in their 
children‘s education (Wan Hussin Zohri 1990). 
S.H. Alatas (1977) argued that Malays were reluctant to work for the 
Europeans during colonial rule, since employment under the latter was less 
rewarding than traditional agrarian labour (Ibid: 55). Serving an ideological 
function, the ‗lazy Malay myth‘ legitimized the colonial rulers‘ exploitation of 
native resources (Hirschman 1986; Shaharuddin 1988). Similarly, Suriani (2004) 
asserted that stereotypes of Malay backwardness today are socially constructed 
and imposed, rather than natural and hereditary. These racial typecasts possessed 
a stabilizing function, and contributed to the ―moral formation‖ of modern 
Singapore (Kamaludeen 2007: 310). Although these studies focused on 
deconstructing Malay stereotypes, they also alluded to structural explanations. 
The structuralist standpoint is valuable for it departs from individual-level 
and culturalist explanations that uncritically blame Malays, and redefines a 
racialized ‗trouble‘ of limited intergenerational mobility as an ‗issue‘ resulting 
from class inequalities. For instance, Salaff (1988) indirectly refuted the cultural 
deficit thesis by demonstrating that poor Chinese have similar cultural practices 
and beliefs as poor Malays. On the other hand, Tania Li (1989) highlighted three 
pertinent structural impediments to Malay mobility. First, Malays were excluded 
from impermeable Chinese entrepreneurship networks. Second, they suffered 
structural unemployment after the British armed forces withdrew in 1971. Third, 
their position worsened with the implementation of the meritocracy ideology, 
which conceals the structural forces engendering poor Malays. However, Li (Ibid: 
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50) also claimed that ‗internal‘ household relationships hindered Malay 
aspirations to accumulate wealth. By conceptually separating cultural practices 
from structure, and analyzing Malay householding practices without necessarily 
appreciating them as a consequence of the family‘s structural location, certain 
segments of her book ironically ended up subscribing to the cultural deficit 
theory. 
In contrast, Lily (1998) does greater justice to the structuralist perspective. 
Whilst the cultural deficit thesis normalizes the tendency to blame Malay culture 
(Ibid: 51), the multiracialism ideology prescribes that Malays engage in ‗self-
help‘ efforts to alleviate their structurally-conditioned economic 
underdevelopment. These two ideologies essentially justify the state‘s 
overarching non-welfarist stance towards poverty. Refining Li‘s and Lily‘s 
arguments, K.J. Lee (2006) revealed that Malay marginality is not a historical 
constant. In the early 1950s, local Malay incomes were generally on par with 
local Chinese wages, with local-born Malays faring better than Chinese 
immigrants (Ibid: 176). Malay economic status began worsening acutely between 
1966 and 1972, due to the loss of Malay occupational niches in law enforcement 
and the armed forces, and the migration of the tiny educated Malay elite to 
Malaysia (Ibid: 182 and 186). 
Other structuralist accounts emphasized political factors. When Singapore 
separated from hinterland Malaya in 1965, the shift to ethnic minority status 
reduced the political bargaining position of Malay Singaporeans (Bedlington 
1974; Betts 1977). Amorphous Malay leadership in the early independence years 
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worsened Malay malaise (Ismail 1974). Mendaki — a state-supported self-help 
Malay organization — faced problems of insufficient funding, the dearth of 
qualified labour (Wan Hussin Zohri 1990) and the occasional lack of engagement 
―with its own constituency… although it has been constant in values and it 
articulates the deepest sentiments of the Malay/Muslims‖ (Zainul Abidin 1992: 
11). 
Excluding K.J. Lee, the ‗flat‘ rendition of history in most works assumes 
that the impediments to Malay mobility and the political economies framing 
Malay economic development remain stagnant across time. The literature often 
overstates the lack of economic resources as the prime factor inhibiting Malay 
mobility, at the expense of neglecting social and cultural capital. Moreover, most 
studies privilege either the culturalist or structuralist explanation. Whilst the 
former is reminiscent of biological determinism, the latter tends to overlook how 
structures are culturally mediated by social actors. Although Li‘s and Lily‘s 
analyses straddle between the two, they do so without necessarily theorizing about 
the relationship between structure and culture. 
 
1.2.4 Contributions to Knowledge 
This thesis makes two modest theoretical contributions. On one level, it 
applies the decomposition of different capital forms ― economic, cultural and 
social ― from the cultural reproduction theory, to understand how advantages and 
disadvantages are culturally transmitted within a working poor family. However, I 
problematize the assumption that subsequent generations are necessarily passive 
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receivers of the merits and demerits accumulated by their parents or grandparents, 
as ‗culture of poverty‘ arguments and some cultural reproduction theories 
appeared to assume. On another level, this study synthesizes the structuralist 
perspective of poverty and the cultural reproduction theory, to explicate how 
structure and culture interrelate via habitus (cultural milieu), to affect the 
intergenerational (re)production of in-work poverty. It interprets the cultural 
practices and worldviews of social actors as having ‗elective affinity‘ with their 
social positions within structures. Consequently, this dissertation adds to the long-
standing debate whether ‗habitus‘ ― as a system of socially learned beliefs and 
dispositions ― offers sufficient space for the transformation of social relations, or 
mechanistically reproduces those very relations. I shall discuss the above-
mentioned theories and debates at greater length shortly (Chapter 2). 
In addition to culture, this thesis also explicates the spectrum of structural 
factors that contribute to the racialization of in-work poverty, and how they vary 
across different historical periods. Although I began by highlighting the ‗racial‘ 
nature of in-work poverty, the factors underlying the concentration of in-work 
poverty amongst Singaporean Malays are in effect, structural in nature. Whilst 
‗local‘ policies are important, ‗global‘ trends such as regionalization and the shift 
from manufacturing to services, are especially crucial in understanding in-work 
poverty today. Departing from the normative view of structures as abstract and 
neutral, I argue that structures are also embodied by social actors. The relational 
matrix of unequal socio-structural positions assumed by different social actors in 
social services, also affect in-work poverty. Thus, this study is highly relevant to 
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scholars interested in ethnic relations and/or stratification, for it sheds light on the 
complex intersections between the institutions of ‗race‘ and inequality in the case 
of Southeast Asia and East Asia, with particular reference to Singapore. 
As experiences of poverty become more complex, the qualitative method 
adopted in this study adds depth to quantitative data on poverty and 
intergenerational mobility, by engaging in ―thick description [of] …routine and 
problematic moments and meanings in individuals‘ lives‖ (Denzin and Lincoln 
2008: 5–6). Although my fieldwork began with Malay households, subsequent 
data collection included other family members living in separate households to 
better understand significant intergenerational mobility patterns. My study also 
departs from the empirical emphasis normatively placed on working poor 
families. It includes two other significant groups of social actors — social service 
practitioners and Malay community leaders ― who are either administering or 
formulating programmes to alleviate in-work poverty. The interpretive attempt to 
make sense of the ‗clashes‘ in cultural practices and beliefs, especially when 
working poor families encounter middle-class individuals in social service 
institutions, and vice-versa, is another significant empirical contribution of this 
thesis. As Willis (1996 [1976]: 251) postulated, the close links between 
methodology and epistemology in qualitative research hold potent explanatory 
power: 
What I am arguing in the context of ‗qualitative‘ methods, is that 
significant data are collected not through the purity of scientificism of its 
method, but through the status of the method as a social relationship, and 
specifically through the moments of crisis in that relationship and its to-
be-discovered of what is/what is not shared: the contradictions within 
and between these things (emphasis added). 
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1.3 METHOD PLURALISM 
To answer the two queries stated earlier in the chapter, a plurality of 
methods is employed. A main advantage of method pluralism is that method 
triangulation is achieved (Bell and Newby 1977: 10). I have executed two 
methods — archival research and qualitative in-depth interviews ― to best 
understand the social processes underlying the intergenerational reproduction of 
poverty. Although some divergences are to be expected, the historical overview 
that I have obtained from archival research will be corroborated by the oral 
histories narrated by my informants, and vice-versa: 
The combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical 
materials, perspectives… in a single study is best understood, then, as a 
strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to any 
inquiry (Flick 2009: 231). 
 
The very objective of engaging method pluralism is to maximize the strength of 
each method whilst minimizing its weaknesses. The key is to achieve a balance 
between techne ― ―which consists of the lessons of experience of trial and error, 
of clever skills refined through diligent practice‖ and episteme — ―which 
embodies awareness of the known, of the knower and of knowing‖ (Gouldner 
1967: 267–273), to attain data that is authentic and richly textured for explicating 
why reverberations or contradictions between actors‘ experiences and objective 
conditions occur (J. Mason 2002: 7; Adler and Clark 2008: 303). 
 
1.3.1 Archival Research and In-Depth Interviews 
To achieve the first objective, I capitalized on the multiplicity of 
secondary sources including government reports, statistical analyses, newspaper 
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articles as well as historical archives pertaining to poverty and Malays in 
Singapore. Archival research allowed me to trace how specific structural factors 
affected the life chances of working poor Malays, as Singapore‘s political 
economy underwent major changes. In doing so, I set the historical context for 
comprehending the concentration of in-work poverty amongst the Malays in 
Singapore today. 
A criticism of archival research is that its scrutiny may be as arbitrary as 
qualitative methodology, thereby raising doubts about its validity (Singleton and 
Straits 2005: 389; Adler and Clark 2008: 370–371). To preempt any 
inconsistencies, I employed a hybrid of the ‗statist historical institutionalist‘ and 
‗social conflict‘ approaches5, as the guiding principle to analyze the shifting 
structural impediments to Malay mobility in four distinct periods in Singapore‘s 
political economy: (i) British Indian rule [1819-1867] (ii) Singapore as Crown 
Colony [1867-1965] (iii) industrializing Singapore [1965-1997] (iv) the transition 
to knowledge-based economy [1997 onwards]. Details of these ‗political 
economy‘ perspectives shall be elaborated later (Chapter 3). The year 1819 was 
chosen as the starting point, for it corresponded with the conventional wisdom 
that this was the year in which Raffles founded modern Singapore. Although four 
periods have been identified, greater empirical emphasis was dedicated to the 
latter two periods, as it was technically unfeasible to trace the entire series of 
events dating back to 1819. Moreover, the years after Singapore‘s independence 
                                                          
5 Statist historical institutionalist and social conflict approaches are subsumed under theories of political 
economy. Political economy is the study of the relationship between political and economic processes, and 
how they affect development. 
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in 1965, have greater immediate relevance in affecting working poor Malays 
today. 
To achieve the second aim, semi-structured in-depth interviews were 
conducted with three groups — working poor Malay families, social service 
workers and Malay political leaders. By working poor Malay families, I am 
referring to those which fulfill these three criteria: (i) possess at least one 
employed family member (ii) possess existing family members from at least two 
generations (ii) have a monthly household income of $1500 and below, or a per 
capita household income below $450. The final criterion is based upon two 
considerations. 
First, these income figures are official measures of a welfare applicant‘s 
eligibility. The DOS estimates that a family of four requires $1040 or $260 per 
head for expenditure on basic needs (23/11/2007 ST). Ministry of Community 
Development, Youth and Sports‘ (MCYS) guidelines state that households with 
monthly incomes below $1500 should be given public assistance (MCYS 2004). 
Second, the criterion meets OECD‘s indicator of relative poverty, as $1500 is far 
below half of Singapore‘s national median household income, $3830 (General 
Household Survey (GHS) 2006: 26). Out of the sixteen families interviewed, only 
one had a monthly household income which lies marginally above $1500 ($1620). 
The remaining fifteen families possessed monthly household incomes below 
$1500. The average income per capita for each household is below $300, placing 
them in the bottom 20% of Singapore‘s employed households (Ibid: 28–29). 
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Semi-structured in-depth interviews were useful for uncovering a myriad 
of personal accounts of everyday life and work — both past and present. They 
have sufficient ‗fluidity‘ to ―probe deeply, uncover new clues and open up new 
dimensions of a problem‖ (Burgess 1982a: 107). Oral accounts also offset the 
partiality in written historical sources, and ―provide(s) a subjective assessment of 
institutional processes‖ (Burgess 1982b: 133). Consequently, I was able to 
discover the cultural processes that contributed to limited intergenerational 
mobility in working poor Malay families, even as they struggle to escape from 
their poverty. 
 
1.3.2 The Interpretive Significance(s) of Different Informants and Cross-
 Class Interviewing 
Initially, my research focused on working poor Malays. However, the 
challenges that they experienced when applying for welfare, necessitated the 
inclusion of social service workers in my study. By indirectly comparing the 
narratives of working poor Malay families against that of social service 
practitioners, I was able to detect some contradictions. Rather than dismiss them 
as ‗errors,‘ I analyzed these inconsistencies (Whyte 1982 [1960]: 176) as 
mirroring the divergent habitus of actors from different structural positions. I 
purposively sampled nine Malay and four non-Malay social service workers from 
both state and Malay-Muslim organizations. First, I wanted to account for the 
existence of national bodies and non-Malay social service workers that helped 
working poor Malays. Second, my initial fieldwork revealed how social service 
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practitioners of different ethnicities had varying views about Malay 
underdevelopment. Subsequently, I interviewed Malay political leaders as they 
are significant players in concocting welfare programmes for working poor 
Malays. My methodological decision was driven by an awareness of the state‘s 
multiracialism policy, which encouraged ‗racial‘ self-help groups and leaders to 
address community issues (Hill and Lian 1995: 107). Six out of twelve identified 
community leaders consented to being interviewed. 
Although including the three groups stemmed from an initial concern to 
have a ‗representative‘ sample, I realized that the ―process of saturation‖ was 
crystallizing when my fieldwork went beyond ―traditional sample 
representativity‖ (Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame 1981: 187–188). Several themes 
― the pains of deprivation, the stigma of welfare, or the chastising of the 
‗undeserving‘ poor — kept appearing, as one life story confirmed and 
complemented the previous account. Taken together, these fifty-one oral accounts 
illuminated the same set of cultural processes and socio-structural relations 
governing the reproduction of intergenerational in-work poverty, which 
constituted a solid body of evidence. 
Language was also a critical factor affecting my fieldwork. Interviews 
with working poor Malay families (secondary education or below) were 
conducted in Malay, as they were more familiar with this language. As I tended to 
speak a mix of English and Malay, I faced difficulties initially to converse in 
Malay during the entire interview session. Subsequent interviews gave me ample 
practice to ask questions in a way that was most comprehensible to my working 
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poor informants. This initial language ‗glitch‘ made me more conscious of my 
ontological position as an English-speaking university student. For instance, I felt 
disheartened whenever I encountered young school ‗drop-outs.‘ Although it was 
easy to blame their parents‘ ‗uninterested attitudes,‘ conscious reflection and 
earlier fieldwork notes reminded me of my epistemological biases, and the need 
to interpret the data from my informants‘ viewpoint (habitus).  
Interviews with social service practitioners and Malay leaders (university-
educated or diploma holders) were conducted in English or a mix of Malay and 
English. Whilst it was linguistically easier to interview these two groups, I faced 
greater ‗resistance.‘ When I enquired about the limited extent of upward mobility 
amongst Singaporean Malays, some would challenge my claims, or argue that 
‗most Malays have moved forward since 1965.‘ My question will be accepted and 
duly answered only after statistical findings were presented. Yet, there are other 
informants who will nod in agreement when I asked that question. Such 
differential responses eventually sensitized me to the varying conceptions of 
poverty and Malay underdevelopment in Singapore today. 
My fieldwork lasted between May 2009 and January 2010. I made at least 
two trips to each Malay household. As these families were financially burdened, it 
would be insensitive to conduct the interviews during my first visit without 
hearing their woes. The return visit also allowed me to observe their family 
practices and inquire after their family histories in greater detail. With social 
service practitioners and Malay leaders, their proficiency in English greatly 
facilitated the one-off interview sessions. Each interview generally lasted between 
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two to three hours. To minimize distortions, I retained the Malay terms used by 
my informants when transcribing the interviews. They were translated into 
English only when I was extracting data for my thesis, although I kept some 
Malay slangs for added authenticity. 
With regard to the organization of chapters, I have opted for a thematic 
approach. As this dissertation aims to elucidate the interrelationships between 
‗structure‘ and ‗culture‘ in constraining the upward intergenerational mobility of 
working poor Malay families, it is only prudent to arrange subsequent chapters 
around these two concepts for consistency and clarity. 
  
1.4 PROSPECTUS 
Operating thematically, this dissertation proceeds to describe the 
analytical framework. A synthesis of the structuralist theory of poverty with 
cultural reproduction theory will be used to comprehend how ‗structure‘ and 
‗culture‘ interrelate and affect in-work poverty (Chapter 2). To explicate why the 
working poor in Singapore are disproportionately Malays, I will chart the shifting, 
yet cumulative, structural impediments that limit the mobility of working poor 
Malays, as Singapore‘s political economy evolved (Chapter 3). After setting the 
historical context entrenching Malays in in-work poverty, the next two chapters 
explain how cultural processes and belief systems contribute to in-work poverty. 
First, I will proceed to analyze the cultural mechanisms that govern the 
intergenerational transfer of economic, social and cultural capital within working 
poor Malay families (Chapter 4). Next, I will detail the divergences and 
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similarities in the habitus of three groups of social actors — (i) working poor 
Malay families (ii) social service workers (ii) Malay-Muslim political leaders — 
as they attempt to make sense of Malay socio-economic malaise (Chapter 5). 
Finally, this dissertation concludes by recapitulating the primary findings and 
charting possible directions for future research (Chapter 6). 
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CHAPTER TWO: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter has two objectives. First, it reviews theories of poverty and 
cultural reproduction, to extrapolate relevant insights for understanding how 
‗structure‘ and ‗culture‘ may interrelate to affect the intergenerational 
reproduction of in-work poverty. Second, it presents an analytical framework that 
synthesizes the structuralist perspective of poverty and the cultural reproduction 
theory. Employed in the ensuing chapters, this analytical lens will inform my 
analyses of the (i) structural processes and cultural mechanisms underlying 
intergenerational mobility within working poor Malay families (ii) intricate links 
between the cultural milieu and structural positions of working poor Malays, 
social service practitioners and Malay leaders, and their consequences for in-work 
poverty. 
 
2.2 THEORIES OF POVERTY 
Classified into four sub-domains — individualistic, culturalist, situational 
and structuralist, theories of poverty have divergent speculations about the origins 
of poverty, and the policies aimed at alleviating it. 
 
2.2.1 Individualistic and Genetic Explanations 
The individualistic perspective states that humans are born unequal. Thus, 
socio-economic inequalities mirror either genetic or behavioural inequalities. 
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The genetic rendition is rooted in Social Darwinism. Applying the rule of 
natural selection to socio-economic progression, Social Darwinists postulated that 
social stratification mirrored the ‗survival of the fittest‘ (Darwin 1998 [1859]; 
Spencer 1969). Whereas successful individuals advanced due to their biological 
superiority, the poor were impoverished due to smaller brain sizes (Holmes 1936: 
126) or low cognitive ability (Terman 1916; Heim 1954; Burnham 1985; Modgil 
and Modgil 1987; Jensen 1998). Herrnstein and Murray (1994) even argued that 
early welfare programmes in America for poor children were futile, given their 
intellectual deficit. The genetic explanation has validated eugenic state policies 
that curtailed the sexual reproduction of the poor, in countries such as America 
(Ropers 1991: 127) and newly independent Singapore (Tremewan 1994: 56). 
The second variant attributed poverty to pathological behaviour, by 
analyzing somatic features. For instance, ―excessively thick, protruding lips‖ 
marked ―slothfulness and an unenterprising disposition‖ (McCormick 1921: 7-8). 
Directed particularly to African-Americans, this ‗academic‘ claim reveals the 
thinly disguised racism and class bias of White classifiers towards the group. 
Some claimed that poverty occurred because of indolence (Marshall 1970), 
especially followers of moralistic and right-wing views. Originating in English 
Poor Laws that predated the welfare state (Handler 1995), the behavioural 
argument is resuscitated by neoliberal economists to justify limited aid for the 
poor today. Negative media images of the poor dating back to the Middle Ages 
(Golding and Middleton 1982) and the state‘s fear of instilling the ‗crutch 
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mentality‘ amongst welfare recipients today in the United States (O‘Connor 2000) 
and Singapore (23/2/2008 ST) echoed this. 
The individualistic explanation is problematic for four reasons. First, it 
distracts attention from the structural arrangements and discursive patterns that 
reproduce poverty: 
Dependency is an effect of discursive practices rather than a condition of 
their possibility. The work and family ethics that gave rise to this 
historical discourse developed with industrialism and, since their advent, 
have been rooted in a denial of the contradictory relationship of the 
market to such norms. The market enforces traditional notions of self-
sufficiency and family relations to sustain itself; however, it operates in 
ways radically indifferent to people's ability to achieve these goals 
(Neisser and Schram 1994: 42). 
 
Second, poverty is erroneously reduced to biological differences (Labov 1972; 
Lewontin, Rose and Kamin 1984). Third, conclusions derived from ‗intelligence‘ 
tests are disputable for they assess achievement, not genetic endowment (Wilson 
1996 [1987]: xvi). Fourth, as this perspective overlooks categorical inequalities, it 





2.2.2 Culture of Poverty Thesis 
 Advocates of the culturalist view concur that the poor lead a particular 
lifestyle, which deters their escape from poverty, although there are varieties of 
similar arguments. 
In his ethnographic study of poor families in Mexico and Puerto Rico, 
Oscar Lewis (1962, 1966, and 1970 [1966]) discussed three significant links 
                                                          
6 An exception to this claim is the wealthy Chinese minority class in Indonesia. 
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between culture and poverty. First, poverty was distinguished from the subculture 
of poverty. Whilst the former denoted material privation, the latter referred to a 
way of life amongst a small segment of the poor, which constituted four broad 
aspects: (i) little involvement in key social institutions (ii) minimal organization 
outside the family (iii) an absent prolonged childhood (iv) intense feelings of 
inferiority and helplessness (Lewis 1970 [1966]: 70-72). Hence, the alleviation of 
economic hardship may not necessarily eliminate the poor‘s conditioned lifestyle 
(Ibid: 79). Second, the culture of poverty was a positive adaptation to their 
marginality within a capitalist and stratified society: 
It represents an effort to cope with feelings of hopelessness and despair 
which develop from the realization of the improbability of achieving 
success... (Ibid: 69) 
 
Third, the culture of poverty will replicate itself, once entrenched in a family. 
Emulating their parents, poor children lacked the psychological aptitude to 
embrace opportunities for upward mobility. Lewis‘ latter two points nonetheless, 
conflated contradictory logics. Whilst the former was a socially grounded act, the 
latter insinuated personal pathology. Furthermore, the limited empirical 
applicability of the culturalist argument singles out those with ‗impoverished‘ 
cultures as undeserving of assistance. 
Diverging from their anthropological formulation, subsequent applications 
of the culturalist framework perceived culture as a genetic trait, or as an 
independent entity of ranked values. 
Under the first rendition, culture had assumed biological underpinnings. 
For instance, Murray (1999: 23) alluded to ‗lower-class forms‘ or the ‗underclass‘ 
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in Britain, whereas Banfield (1974: 211) conjectured that social service 
institutions in America ―can neither change nor circumvent this cultural obstacle 
[or the poor].‖ Despite noting the significance of centuries of slavery in 
fragmenting the Negro family institution in the United States, Moynihan (1996 
[1965]: 25) emphasized that: 
...at the centre of the tangle of pathology is the weakness of the [Negro] 
family structure... [It] will be found to be the principal source of most of 
the aberrant, inadequate, or antisocial behaviour that did not establish, 
but now serves to perpetuate, the cycle of poverty and deprivation. 
 
What began as a historical consequence of structural racism was now racialized as 
an inherent quality of Negro families. In actuality, Negro families were compared 
to white middle-class families; the more divergent they were from the standard, 
the more dysfunctional they appeared (Bryant and Coleman 1988: 255). Rejecting 
Moynihan‘s argument, some postulated that African family patterns were not 
totally destroyed during slavery (J. King 1976; see Mathis 1978).  Rather, they 
helped Negroes to cope with hardship. Others have criticized Moynihan‘s 
emphasis on single-mother families for ignoring the remaining 75% of ―Negro 
families which are stable and bi-parental‖ (Staples 1969: 204). 
Rejecting structural factors — colonialism, dependency and racism — as 
unsatisfactory explanations for poverty (Harrison 2000: xv), the second variant 
opined that the poor should aspire towards an ‗ideal‘ culture. Economically 
backward societies were those insistent on practising ‗traditional‘ [ie. non-
Western] cultures (Etounga-Manguelle 2000; Grondona 2000; Montaner 2000), as 
these cultures were disinclined towards progress. Rao and Walton (2004: 10) 
succinctly challenged this belief as being Eurocentric: 
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Culture here is the enemy — a voice from the past that inhibits societies 
from functioning in the modern world. Max Weber‘s thesis… is often 
evoked, incorrectly, as the distinguishing progenitor of this perspective. 
In fact, Weber… was not outlining a causal relationship between 
Calvinism and capitalism, but merely demonstrating that historically 
there was an ―elective affinity‖ between them. This is a more subtle 
argument that does not reduce into practical diagnosis… that infusing 
more Calvinist values into non-western cultures would improve their 
potential for growth. 
 
In other words, the ‗ideal‘ culture perspective uncritically viewed culture as an 
independent causal variable that dictated economic progress. The problem with 
this view is that structural factors are dismissed altogether. 
To summarize, the (sub-)culturalist perspective has four shortcomings. 
First, the attributes associated with the culture of poverty describe poverty, and 
not a distinctive culture (Stack 1974: 24). Many opposing studies found no 
evidence of an ‗impoverished culture‘ amongst the poor (Little 1965; Mangin 
1967: 71; Brown and Madge 1982). Second, the focus on the poor neglects the 
―cultural patterns among the affluent that, deliberately or not, keep their fellow 
citizens poor‖ (Gans 1969: 216). Thus, the culturalist argument has been abused 
to deviantize the poor (Harvey and Reed 1996: 466). Third, the presumption that 
culture is static, implicitly supports policies that consider welfare redundant (H. 
Lewis 1971). Finally, ‗culture‘ is viewed as an explanans, rather than an 
explanandum (Valentine 1968: 15; Roach and Gursslin 1967: 386). Although the 
culturalist framework demonstrates the importance of cultural factors in shaping 
poverty, ―there remains some confusion about how it matters‖ (Rao and Walton 
2004: 3), as exhibited by the multifarious treatments of ‗culture‘ earlier. 
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Moreover, the cultural processes governing the intergenerational transmission of 
poverty are left unexplained. 
 
2.2.3 Structuralist Perspective 
The structuralist framework stresses the importance of institutional 
processes and broader factors that lie beyond the individual‘s control. It theorizes 
the social reproduction of poverty, or the ―replacement of the relationship 
between classes [that] is necessary for the continuance of capitalism‖ (Willis 
1981: 49). 
Functionalists asserted that poverty was not incidental, but fundamental to 
the structure of society. Poverty persisted because it performed positive functions 
that contributed to social order (Davis and Moore 1945; Tumin 1953; Gans 1969). 
For instance, poverty produced jobs ―that serve[d] the poor or shield[ed] the rest 
of the population from them‖ (Gans 1972: 279), and preserved the status of the 
rich (Waters 1994: 337). Keeping wages minimal ensured that capitalist trade 
flourished, benefitting the affluent (Schwartz 1955). 
Conflict theorists faulted the system, rather than the poor (Miliband 1969; 
Ryan 1971; Matras 1975). Pointing to class, not race, Wilson (1996 [1987]: xvii) 
blamed the ―disappearance of work‖ and the ―social isolation of the inner-city 
environment‖ for producing poverty amongst American Blacks. The conflict 
approach is rooted in Karl Marx‘s (1965) seminal theory of surplus value. 
Capitalism, by virtue of its highly competitive structure, necessitated the 
extraction of ‗surplus value‘ from lower-income labourers, to increase capitalists‘ 
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profits. Consequently, such exploitative relationships entrenched inequality and 
poverty as inerasable features of society. As absolute poverty declined due to 
modernization and economic growth, the U-hypothesis
7
 (Kuznets 1955, 1966) 
initially watered down Marx‘s thesis. The period after the 1970s however, 
witnessed an inequality upswing when both matured economies (Rodrik 1998; 
Moller et al. 2003; Moran 2005) and developing nations such as Brazil, Finland 
(Fishlow 1972), Uganda, Sudan and Afghanistan (Sen 1983) experienced 
worsening income gap and poverty. 
Departing from the emphasis on industrialization, deindustrialization 
theorists observed how deindustrialization
8
 exacerbated poverty and inequality 
after the 1980s in areas such as Buffalo, New York  (Fine and Weiss 1998), 
Atlanta, Boston, Detroit and Los Angeles (Moss and Tilly 2001). Studying the 
wave of plant closings and the decline of manufacturing in the United States 
through the late 1970s and early 1980s, Bluestone and Harrison (1982: 6–12) 
defined deindustrialization as the ―widespread, systematic disinvestment in the 
nation‘s basic productive capacity.‖ ‗Local workers‘ become increasingly 
vulnerable to erratic economic fluctuations (Newman and Massengill 2006: 426), 
when ‗global capital‘ flight transcended borders to search for the lowest 
production costs. As employers optimized the ―spatial or global arrangement of 
their operations,‖ relocation ―control(s) workers and limit(s) their demands‖ 
                                                          
7 Income inequalities initially worsen, before declining in the advanced phases of economic development. 
8 The term ‗post-industrial‘ was consciously avoided so this thesis does not stray into the debate about its 
empirical applicability. Not all countries have fully embraced industrialization (Stearns 1984). Moreover, 
industry remains at the core of capitalist accumulation; services are increasingly automated and highly 
dependent on industrial growth (Bluestone 1984). 
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(Brady and Denniston 2006: 303). Thus, deindustrialization undermined the old 
postwar social contract between unions, labour and the state (Bluestone and 
Harrison 1982; Alderson 1999). 
The transition to deindustrialization also spelt deteriorating employment 
conditions (Lichter and Eggebeen 1994; Morris and Western 1999), arguably 
disadvantaging low-wage workers the most (Ehrenreich 2001). In Europe, 
occupational paths become increasingly polarized with the switch from 
manufacturing to service industries (Gustafsson and Johansson 1999; Alderson 
and Nielson 2002). In Lake County, Indiana, the growth in service jobs did little 
to offset the detrimental impact of lost steel jobs (Brady and Wallace 2001). 
Looking at statistical data from 1970 to 1997 for fourteen advanced capitalist 
democracies
9
, Moller et al. (2003: 25) explains why: 
The manufacturing sector is typically characterized by higher average 
wages and a more equal income distribution than the service sector. 
Therefore the transfer of jobs from manufacturing to services produces a 
larger share of low-wage jobs and greater poverty. 
 
Globalization and rising international interdependence between economies also 
meant that the wages of low-income employees are especially susceptible to 
downward pressures (Andreb and Lohmann 2008). As domestic manufacturers 
faced heightened international competition, it became harder to maintain similar 
employment levels (Brady and Denniston 2006). New employment opportunities 
for lower-educated workers mainly emerged in the form of part-time, 
                                                          
9 The fourteen countries were classified into three main groups. Social Democratic Welfare Regimes include 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. Christian Democratic Welfare Regime consists of Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Switzerland. Liberal Welfare States comprises Australia, Canada, United 
Kingdom and United States. 
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subcontracted and temporary positions. Such jobs have irregular schedules and 
high turnover rates (Castro et al. 1993; Presser and Cox 1997; Hipple 1998). In 
Washington, job advertisements for low-educated and low-skilled applicants were 
insufficient (Pease and Martin 1997: 559). Menial jobs received countless 
applications and were swiftly filled, despite their little remuneration and fringe 
benefits. Moreover, ineffective labour unions weakened their bargaining powers 
(Seccombe 2000; Milkman and Voss 2004). 
The structuralist view is relevant for underscoring that institutional 
processes engendering poverty are not static but vary across time. However, the 
emphasis on social reproduction leans towards determinism, for it ―works through 
passivity and through its agents ‗bearing‘ structure‖ (Willis 1981: 52). 
Structuralist arguments tend to be dismissive of cultural milieu (habitus), when it 
is the very prism through which individuals experience their lived realities. 
Moreover, they do not necessarily illuminate how people inhabit, negotiate and 
elude those regularities (Webb et al. 2002: 35). 
 
2.2.4 Gaps in Theories of Poverty 
Each theory of poverty possesses strong ideological underpinnings. Apart 
from the structuralist perspective, most theories operate within a ―hegemonically 
safe ideological space‖ that faults individual or cultural flaws and glosses over 
conclusions that ―require large structural shifts in wealth and power‖ (Harvey and 
Reed 1992: 293). Poverty theories generally have two limitations. 
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First, they neglect to explain how cultural practices and beliefs are 
intergenerationally transmitted to restrict upward mobility amongst the poor. Seen 
―as a map of behaviour... [and not] a map for behaviour‖ (Peterson 1979: 159), 
culture is applied in a descriptive, rather than an analytical mode. Second, by 
construing ‗culture‘ and ‗structure‘ as opposites, poverty theories overlook the 
interconnections between the two ― that ―culture is part of social structure‖ 
(Hays 1994: 58), and that structure is cultural because it possesses a ―symbolic 
dimension‖ (Polietta 1999: 66). Consequently, the enabling features of structure 
for individual practice (through cultural milieu), and the understanding that 
structures are created by and through social actors, are neglected (Hays 1994: 61). 
Cultural reproduction theories, therefore, are particularly useful for 
addressing these gaps. Unlike poverty theories, they are better equipped for 
theorizing the links between culture and structure, instead of viewing them as 
separate concepts. Whilst poverty theories view poverty as an end status outcome, 
cultural reproduction theories, by virtue of presenting a processual model, lend 
the framework for understanding intergenerational mobility processes. Through 
perspectives on cultural reproduction, one understands how different types of 
resources are intergenerationally transmitted within families, to reproduce 
poverty. Cultural reproduction arguments also depart from the culture of poverty 
thesis, which uncritically assumes that younger family members passively 
reproduce the cycle of poverty. Even if subsequent generations of working poor 
families end up impoverished, cultural reproduction theories acknowledge that 
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they are active social agents who unwittingly regenerate social inequality, through 
their habitus. 
 
2.3 CULTURAL REPRODUCTION THEORY 
2.3.1 Capital, Habitus and Misrecognition 
Pierre Bourdieu is renowned for pioneering cultural reproduction theory 
(Harker 1984; Brubaker 1985; A. King 2000; Gartman 2002), through his study of 
Kabylia in Algeria and elite school systems in France, Britain and America. Three 
important concepts permeate his theoretical version ― ‗capital,‘ ‗habitus‘ and 
‗misrecognition.‘ 
Capital refers to: 
accumulated labour (in its materialized form or its ‗incorporated‘, 
embodied form) that when appropriated on a private, that is, exclusive, 
basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social 
energy in the form of reified or living labour (Bourdieu 2001: 96). 
 
As capital provides access to scarce rewards and may be transmitted across 
generations, it creates unequal intergenerational mobility outcomes. Critiquing the 
emphasis on economic capital or financial resources, Bourdieu highlighted the 
importance of ‗cultural capital‘ and ‗social capital.‘ 
Cultural capital equates to ―legitimate culture‖ that was most valued in 
society (Lamont and Lareau 1988: 157). It exists in three modes, embodied as 
disposition; objectified as cultural goods; and institutionalized as educational 
certification. As it is employed in cultural capital, ‗culture‘ denotes values and 
temperament that are arbitrarily ranked as ‗superior.‘ Unlike economic capital, 
cultural capital can only be expended after one decodes its meaning (Brubaker 
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1985: 757). Hence, holders of cultural capital have ―cultivated dispositions‖ that 
appreciate and understand such codes (Ibid). Not only can they process 
information more efficiently (Lee and Bowen 2006: 197), they exhibit greater 
familiarity within their respective cultural fields (Sullivan 2007). Here, 
Bourdieu‘s cultural capital model strongly parallels Bernstein‘s (1981) theory of 
linguistic codes. According to Bernstein (Ibid: 331), codes refer to principles that 
govern the different possibilities of selection and combination of words, that 
varied across class. Middle-class students usually perform better than working-
class students because their far more elaborate ‗codes‘ are highly rewarded in 
school
10
 (Harker and May 1993: 172). In short, the differential ownership of 
cultural capital and/or codes shapes the unequal educational attainment of 
children from different class background. 
Social capital consists of the ―aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources‖ that can be mobilized through social networks (Bourdieu 2001: 103). 
Two factors influence the degree of social capital possessed by an individual: (i) 
the volume of network connections that one can successfully marshal (ii) the scale 
of capital owned by one‘s contacts (Ibid). The more social capital one possesses, 
the greater are the benefits and/or disadvantages accumulated by families or 
individuals through their ties with others (Portes 2000: 2). 
                                                          
10 Bernstein distinguishes restricted from elaborated codes. Whilst restricted codes are based on specific 
experiences, elaborated codes are detailed and can be easily understood without prior knowledge. Bernstein 
posits that middle-class students employ a mix of elaborated and restricted codes whereas working-class 
students tend to use mainly restricted codes. 
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Two other key points should be noted. First, social capital and cultural 
capital are disguised derivations of economic capital (Bourdieu 2001: 106). 
Refining Bourdieu‘s theory, Portes (1998: 4) argued that although the ownership 
of social and cultural capital produced outcomes that are reducible to economic 
capital, the processes underlying these alternative capital modes are dissimilar. 
When compared to economic transactions, exchanges involving cultural and 
social capital are less transparent and more ambivalent (de Graaf and Kalmijn 
2001). Whilst the former provides immediate access to goods and services, the 
latter requires greater personal time and effort dedicated to their acquirement, 
with higher risks of failure. Many quantitative studies from the status attainment 
paradigm
11
 have affirmed this (DiMaggio 1982; de Graaf 1986; Katsillis and 
Rubinson 1990; Western 1994; P. Mason 2007). 
Habitus denotes: 
a system of durable, transposable dispositions… principles which 
generate and organize practices and representations that can be 
objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious 
aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order 
to attain them (Bourdieu 1977: 72). 
 
Simply put, habitus refers to an individual‘s ‗subconscious‘ worldview, bodily 
hexis (embodied cultural capital) and experiences which are accumulated and 
internalized across time. Partly composed of cultural capital, the habitus can be 
interpreted as a subjective, though not as a psychological, system of perception 
schemes shared by members of the same class (Jenks 1993: 14). Notwithstanding 
its resilience across various contexts, the habitus is ―oriented to the practical‖ 
                                                          
11 The status paradigm model measures intergenerational mobility or ―status differences between parents and 
children in a family‖ (Chiew 1991a: 184). Refer to Appendix for an elaboration. 
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(Webb et al. 2002: 41). Although the knowledge and disposition permitted social 
actors to respond creatively to everyday situations, those responses are largely 
influenced by their social location and cultural history, or ―where and who [they] 
have been‖ (Ibid: 44). 
 Together, capital and habitus explain how poverty is intergenerationally 
reproduced. The ―subjective hope of profit tends to be adjusted with the objective 
probability of profit‖ (Bourdieu 2000: 216). Thus, actors altered their expectations 
in accordance to their structural locations in society. Through their habitus, poor 
families will suggest their anticipation of failure, in their actions and beliefs. As 
they lack various types of capital, poor families struggle to attain upward 
mobility. Consequently, those with minimal capital are often less ambitious or 
more ‗satisfied‘ with their lot (DiMaggio 1979: 1465; Webb et al. 2002: 23). Such 
depressed aspirations, though pragmatic, ironically contribute to the reproduction 
of inequalities. 
Bourdieu (2001: 45) also highlighted the importance of ‗misrecognition‘ 
in buttressing inequality. On one level, the poor ―are accomplices in their own 
destiny‖ when they, via their habitus, misrecognize the poverty they were 
structurally subjected to as ‗natural‘ (Ibid). On another level, misrecognition 
unmasks the seemingly ‗disinterested‘ action of actors as the struggle for power 
within a ‗field‘: 
[The field is]... a gaming space in which those agents and institutions 
possessing enough specific capital to be able to occupy the dominant 
positions... confront each other using strategies aimed at preserving or 




In effect, social actors, particularly those in dominant positions, are ―ensuring that 
the field and its practices‖ reflected their own values or habitus (Webb et al. 2002: 
26). The concept of misrecognition is pertinent for it suggests that the patterning 
of structural inequalities is intertwined with how social actors culturally 
understand and inhabit their lived realities, often without their realization. 
 
2.3.2 Critiques and Merits of Bourdieu’s Cultural Reproduction Theory 
One major criticism of Bourdieu‘s cultural reproduction theory focused on 
its heavy leanings towards structural determinism
12
 (Swartz 1977; Garnham and 
Williams 1980; Gorder 1980; Willis 1981; Wacquant 1987; A. King 2000). 
Willis‘ (1977) ethnographic study in Birmingham presents a challenge to the 
circumscribed space for contestation and subjectivities in Bourdieu‘s work. 
Drawing on the complexities and contradictions of cultural experiences, Willis 
argued that working-class lads‘ resistance in school, though liberating in the 
short-term, led to poor educational performance and ironically relegated them to 
blue-collar jobs. 
Later, MacLeod (1995 [1987]) revealed how two groups of working-class 
boys in a low-income ‗housing project‘ in America — White lads from the 
‗Hallway Hangers‘ and Black lads from the ‗Brothers‘ — ended up embodying 
distinctive cultural orientations. Despite their initial lower class positions (history 
of Black inequality), the ‗Brothers‘ nurtured higher aspirations than the ‗Hallway 
                                                          
12 Bourdieu has also been criticized in other ways. Some argued that ‗habitus‘ appears to be too 
‗subconscious‘ a concept that leans towards individualistic characteristics, and neglects to give adequate 
attention to the social context surrounding the social actor‘s action. 
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Hangers.‘ MacLeod explained this as stemming from differences in the length of 
their stay in the neighbourhood and their ethnic experiences. As their families had 
been residing in the low-status housing project for almost three decades, boys 
from the ‗Hallway Hangers‘ failed to see any possibility of upward mobility, or of 
relocating to a better neighbourhood. Through peer networks, these boys 
developed ‗levelled aspirations‘ — pitching their aspiration realistically to match 
their expected occupational outcomes and class positions. In comparison, the 
families of the ‗Brothers‘ had only lived in the estate for less than decade. As the 
‗Brothers‘ were not subjected to slavery like their ancestors formerly were, they 
were more optimistic about the possibility of upward mobility. Here, MacLeod‘s 
work is especially significant, for it extends the class-based frontiers of the 
concept of ‗habitus‘ to include other equally critical influences such as ethnicity 
and residence. 
Although these refinements are valid, this does not mean that Bourdieu‘s 
cultural reproduction theory becomes obsolete. Rather, it is useful for 
understanding how culture and structure are interrelated. Through ‗habitus‘ for 
instance, Bourdieu effectively bridges the contrived opposition between the 
‗subjectivism‘ of culture and ‗objectivism‘ of structure (which had clouded other 
theories reviewed earlier): 
Social life is materially grounded and conditioned, but material 
conditions affect behaviour in part through the mediation of individual 
beliefs, dispositions and experiences. Social life exists only in and 
through the symbolically mediated experience and action of individuals, 
but these individuals have been formed under definite material 
conditions of existence, and their every activity... depends on social facts 




As the social interface mediating between practices and structures, being shaped 
by the latter and regulating the former, the habitus is synonymous to an actor‘s 
cultural milieu. It must be clarified that the notions ‗cultural milieu‘ and 
‗culturalist‘ differ extensively. Whilst the former appreciates an actor‘s practice 
and beliefs as concurrently reflecting and contributing to his/her social location 
(Peterson 1979: 141), the latter locates causal explanation in a group‘s unalterable 
way of life. Viewed in this manner, the cultural milieu of social actors 
corresponds to the way social structures are arranged. Filtered through the cultural 
milieu (habitus), practices are not as unstructured or random, whilst structures are 
not as permanent and rigid, as they are often presumed (Nash 1999: 433). Though 
practice, culture and structure should not be confused as substitutes for each other, 
Bourdieu‘s theorizing about habitus reveals how the three are intricately 
interwoven and not diametrically opposed. 
A graver limitation of the cultural reproduction theory in my opinion, is its 
narrow empirical focus on either the upper half (Bourdieu 1996 [1989]) or the 
lower half of the class structure (Willis 1977 and MacLeod 1995 [1987]). Hence, 
it is inadequate for detailing the outcomes that transpire when ―individuals‘ 
strategic use of knowledge, skills, and competence... [encounter] institutionalized 
standards of evaluation‖ (Lareau and Weininger 2003: 569). Furthermore, it is 
inadequate for explaining the specific structural factors underlying the persistence 
of racial inequality across generations (Roscigno and Ainsworth-Darrell 1999; 
Driessen 2001). Finally, cultural reproduction theories were framed, albeit 
limited, by the post-World War Two period in Western countries. Hence, they are 
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not directly applicable to Southeast Asian or East Asian countries such as 
Singapore, which have different historical peculiarities. 
 
2.4 TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS: THEORIZING THE LINKS BETWEEN 
 INTERGENERATIONAL POVERTY AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTION 
From the critical review of the different theories, two main points 
emerged. 
First, theories of poverty and cultural reproduction are largely viewed as 
independent of each other. Within and between themselves, the artificial 
separation of the two theories indirectly contributes to the contrived divide 
between ‗culture‘ and ‗structure,‘ when these two concepts are intricately 
interconnected. With regard to culture, Hays (1994: 165) maintained that: 
...culture must be understood as a social structure if the term is to be 
consistently applied. Culture is a social, durable, layered pattern of 
cognitive and normative systems that are at once material and ideal... 
internalized in personalities, and externalized in institutions. Culture is 
both the product of human interaction and producer of certain forms of 
human interaction. Culture is both constraining and enabling. Culture is a 
social structure with an underlying logic of its own [emphasis added]. 
 
With regard to social structure, Hays argued that it constitutes two interrelated 
elements: (i) systems of social relations (ii) systems of meanings. Whilst the 
former represented ―patterns of roles, relationships and forms of domination,‖ the 
latter stood for ―culture [which includes] the beliefs and values of social groups, 
their language [and] forms of knowledge‖ (Ibid). On one level, structuralist 
theories of poverty and cultural reproduction theories generally concur that 
‗structure‘ refers to entities that are beyond an individual‘s control. The 
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application of Hays‘ metatheoretical prototype nevertheless, reveals that the 
former was theorizing about the ‗systems of social relations‘, whilst the latter was 
theorizing about ‗meaning systems‘. Notwithstanding these subtle differences, the 
analysis of social reproduction in the former clearly complements the study of 
cultural reproduction in the latter, for they eventually emphasize the significance 
of structural factors. 
Second, ‗culture‘ has been utilized in multiple and conflicting ways, 
across different theories. The culturalist analysis of poverty alone, espoused three 
different definitions of culture: (i) way of life (ii) genetic attribute (iii) 
independent entity of ideal values. Cultural reproduction theorists used culture in 
two distinct fashions. In the case of cultural capital, culture referred to values and 
dispositions that are arbitrarily claimed as superior and imposed by a dominant 
group onto a subordinate group. Habitus, or cultural milieu, indicated a principled 
system of meanings and dispositions mediating between practices and structures, 
being influenced by the latter and regulating the former. 
To resolve the theoretical confusions clouding culture, Kane (1991: 54–
55) differentiated two forms of ‗cultural autonomy‘ — analytic and concrete: 
Analytic autonomy… posits the complete and independent structure of 
culture; it is conceptualized through the theoretical, artificial separation of 
culture from other social structures, conditions, and action. To find the 
analytic autonomy of culture, ―we must bracket contingency… and treat 
action as if it were a written text‖ (quoted from Alexander 1987: 296). 
This text, with its intrarelational logic of symbolic elements, patterns, and 
processes, is the structure of culture. 
 
Concrete autonomy, referring to historical specificity, establishes the 
interconnection of culture with the rest of social life. Whereas analytic 
autonomy of culture is sought apart from material life, concrete autonomy 
must be located within, and as part of, the whole social life. In this sense 
the autonomy of culture is relative. This relativity, however, does not 
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diminish the independent nature of culture because just as culture is 
conditioned materially, in turn it ―inform[s] the structure of institutions, 
the nature of social cooperation and conflict, and the attitudes and 
predispositions of the population… [Culture] is constitutive of social 
order‖ (quoted from Sewell 1985: 161). 
 
Both modes of cultural autonomy are interrelated, and must be established in any 
adequate historical analysis (Kane 1991: 55). The analytic autonomy mode 
counters cultural reductionism by positing that culture is structural. It also 
establishes the independence of cultural forms before they can be assessed. The 
concrete autonomy mode accounts for the ―historical specificity‖ of the cultural 
forms, and consequently avoids ―determinative and hierarchical analyses of 
culture‖ (Ibid). 
Applying Kane‘s metatheoretical model to the various applications of 
culture, it becomes clear that culturalist conceptions of poverty lean heavily 
towards analytic autonomy, given their artificial treatment of culture as an 
independent entity that is isolated from structure. Hence, they fall short of 
assessing the historical specificity of the cultural forms that they seek to 
understand. In contrast, cultural reproduction theorists establish the two modes of 
cultural autonomy in their analyses. For this very reason, I will use the cultural 
reproduction theory to understand (i) the cultural processes governing the 
intergenerational transmission of resources (ii) the ideological beliefs of social 
actors, in regenerating in-work poverty. 
The analytical framework which I am proposing, synthesizes the 
structuralist perspective of poverty and the cultural reproduction theory. Whilst 
the former illustrates the dynamism of institutional processes in engendering 
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poverty, the latter elucidates how social actors culturally inhabit and mediate 
these structures. In doing so, a theoretical synthesis of structure and culture is 
successfully achieved (Figure 1). With regards to intergenerational mobility, the 
cultural reproduction model specifies the different capital forms, and details how 
these resources are intergenerationally transmitted to reproduce the status 
outcomes of subsequent generations (Figure 2). 
 









To conclude, this chapter has achieved two objectives. 
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The first two sections extrapolated relevant insights from theories of 
poverty and cultural to understand how culture and structure interrelate to affect 
the intergenerational reproduction of in-work poverty. I have unpacked and 
categorized the diverse meanings assumed by ‗culture‘ and ‗structure‘ across 
these paradigms. Other significant concepts that explained the reproduction of 
inequality — capital, habitus and misrecognition — were elaborated. 
The third section presented an analytical framework that synthesizes the 
structuralist perspective of poverty and the cultural reproduction theory. In doing 
so, I have demonstrated how the contrived opposition between the ‗subjectivism‘ 
of culture and ‗objectivism‘ of structure can be narrowed. 
With this analytical lens, the following three chapters will examine 
Singapore‘s political economy (Chapter 3) and three groups of social actors 
(Chapters 4 and 5) to illuminate the processes and mechanisms — both structural 
and cultural — which shape the reproduction of in-work poverty. If properly 
explicated, Singapore‘s economic development, as well as the experiences of 
working poor Malay families, social service practitioners and Malay leaders, bear 
on intergenerational poverty more directly than any sociological theory ever 




CHAPTER THREE: A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF THE 
SOCIAL REPRODUCTION OF IN-WORK POVERTY AMONGST MALAYS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Employing a hybrid of the ‗statist historical institutionalist‘ and ‗social 
conflict‘ perspectives from the political economy paradigm, this chapter outlines 
the structural barriers to Malay mobility in four distinct periods of Singapore‘s 
political economy. These constitute British Indian rule [1819-1867]; Singapore as 
Crown Colony [1867-1965]; industrializing Singapore [1965-1997]; and the 
transition to a knowledge-based economy [1997 onwards]. By tracing their socio-
economic position since 1819, I aim to set the historical context for understanding 
why Malays are overrepresented in in-work poverty today. 
I maintain the following. First, impediments to Malay mobility do not 
remain stagnant across different historical periods. Rather, these accumulated 
structural hurdles compound Malay relative poverty today. Second, the 
disproportionate composition of Malays in in-work poverty transcends sheer 
economic technicalities. Instead, it is a historical consequence of the complex 
intersections between residential and occupational arrangements, as well as 
political, economic, and educational institutions. 
 
3.1.1 Political Economy Analysis and its Merits 
‗Political economy‘ scrutinizes the interactions between politics and 
development, by examining structural processes and institutions (Mill [1885] 
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2009; Phelps 1985; Roseberry 1998; Trentmann 1998; Leftwich 2002, 2005; 
Payne 2006). Consequently, the study of political economy complements the 
structuralist understanding of poverty. Distinguished through their presumptions 
about the nature and pertinence of politics in affecting economic changes, three 
broad camps — neoclassical, historical institutionalism and social conflict ― 
have emerged (see Rodan et al. 2006). 
Neoclassical theorists assume that markets are ―universally efficient 
mechanisms… [which create] the greatest wealth for society‖ (Ibid: 2). Extending 
neoclassical ideas, neoliberalism is an ideological credo that advances policies 
buttressing market growth, such as the ‗Washington Consensus‘ (see Williamson 
1990; 2004–2005). Neoliberals view politics as encumbering economic 
advancement (Crouch 2005: 441; Leiva 2006: 348). However, their overemphasis 
on economic technicalities neglects issues of state accountability and citizenry 
equality (Brown 2006: 704–705). Their presumption of ‗universal‘ prescriptions 
also overlooks the conditions unique to nation-state economies (Lie 1997: 344; 
Chang and Grabel 2004–2005: 287). 
Historical institutionalism argues that economic activities and state 
policies are ―contingent on time and space‖ (Radice 2000: 736). Following Max 
Weber‘s interpretive tradition, institutions emerge from ―historically evolved 
pathways‖ (Rodan et al. 2006: 4), or path dependence. Rejecting a historically-
deterministic approach, path dependence involves ―tracing a given outcome back 
to a particular set of historical events, and showing how these events are 
themselves contingent occurrences that cannot be explained on the basis of prior 
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historical conditions‖ (Mahoney 2000: 507–508). Advocates of statist historical 
institutionalism in particular, emphasize the government‘s ability to promote 
economic progress through effective intervention (see Bernard 1996; Huff 1999; 
Sinha 2003) and strategic alliances with capitalists (Evans 1995). 
Social conflict theory reveals how contesting interests underlie the 
development of capitalist economies (Dahrendorf 1958). It scrutinizes the 
―distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and 
the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time‖ 
(Collinson 2003: 3). Hence, state policies and key institutions should be 
contextualized within ―broader patterns of social and political power‖ (Rodan et 
al. 2006: 7). Socio-economic vulnerability is a consequence of powerlessness, and 
not merely due to flawed economic prescriptions or historical continuities. 
To guide my analysis, I have employed a hybrid of statist historical 
institutionalism and social conflict theory. The merits of blending these two 
viewpoints are manifold. First, it appreciates the historical emergence of 
stratification principles, which are presupposed to be ‗neutral‘ and ‗natural.‘ 
Second, this approach highlights how economic policies and processes are 
intertwined with the maintenance of power relations, to shape the life chances of 
working poor Malays throughout different phases of Singapore‘s political 
economy. Thus, it ―historicize[s] sociological analyses: anchor[ing] them in 
another time and place‖ (Tilly 1988: 709). Third, it reinterprets the patterning of 
‗racial‘ inequality as a consequence of systemic struggles and processes ― both 
‗local‘ (occurring in nation-states) and ‗global‘ (occurring in the international 
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arena). Applying this guiding principle, the next four sections of this chapter will 
detail the shifting structural barriers to mobility amongst working poor Malays in 
Singapore. 
 
3.2 BRITISH INDIAN RULE, 1819-1867  
Given its strategic position between the Bengal opium fields and China, 
Singapore secured the East Indian Company‘s (EIC) tea and opium trades with 
China (Huff 1994: 168; Trocki 2006: 182). Possessing Singapore would help to 
check the burgeoning influence of the Dutch (Wong 1978: 51; Trocki 2006: 13). 
By seeking Temenggong Abdul Rahman‘s consent and recognizing ‗political 
recluse‘ Tengku Hussein as the Sultan of Johor, Stamford Raffles of the EIC 
founded Singapore as a British settlement on 30
th
 January 1819. The Malay socio-
economic position deteriorated henceforth. Their exclusion from profitable 
dealings involving opium, pepper and gambier, and their political defeat by the 
EIC, manifested in peripheral residential patterns.  
 
3.2.1 Malay Exclusion from Strategic Economic Alliances 
The EIC ruled Singapore indirectly through opium revenue farmers, who 
were often compradors to Western merchants. This coalition ousted Malay 
involvement in Singapore‘s lucrative opium trade (Trocki 2006: 182-183), which 
formed half of its revenue until World War II (Turnbull 1989: 114). Pepper and 
gambier plantations mushroomed as these were the only crops that could be 
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cultivated on Singapore‘s soil (Turnbull 1989: 44). Thus, opium, pepper and 
gambier formed the crux of Singapore‘s economy. 
Given their proficiency in English and dialects, Chinese Baba(s) became 
compradors, facilitating Western merchants in local dealings (Wong 1978: 59). 
With enough capital to bid for the rights to sell opium, they became opium 
revenue farmers. On the other hand, Teochews controlled the pepper and gambier 
plantations (Turnbull 1989: 44), given their cultural advantage in agriculture. As 
these occupations were dominated by other ethnic groups, Malays were 
precluded. Instead, many remained as farmers or fishermen in the traditional 
economy (Huff 1994: 177). Rather than be exploited coolies for British rulers 
with low wages, they maintained their own jobs (Hirschman 1986: 345). Thus, 
current images of Malays as lacking economic drive were ideological 
constructions to legitimate their economic marginalization under colonialism 
(Alatas 1977: 24). 
 
3.2.2 Malay Political Decline with the Rise of Western Hegemony 
After Singapore was recognized as a British settlement in the 1824 Anglo-
Dutch Treaty, Malay rulers became politically obsolete (Trocki 1979: 54). 
Thereafter, the British sought to expel them by withholding their stipends 
(Turnbull 1989: 28). Under financial duress, the Temenggong and Sultan Hussein 
endorsed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on 3
rd
 August 1824, ceding 
Singapore‘s sovereignty to the EIC (Ibid). 
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Malays also lost their customary incomes. Whereas the EIC‘s ‗free trade‘ 
policy ended their privileges to collect duties (Ibid: 16), the migration of 
inexpensive Chinese male coolies (Saw 1969: 38) supplanted Malay control over 
debt bondage labour. Eventually, Malays resorted to ‗piracy‘ (Turnbull 1989: 41) 
— the freelance surveillance of Singapore‘s waters (Trocki 1979: 56). Between 
1819 and 1836, Malays and British struggled for political control. Fearing that 
this turbulence would arrest economic growth, the British co-opted Temenggong 
Ibrahim in 1836 as the ‗unofficial‘ policeman to patrol Singapore‘s waters (Ibid: 
67). With this alliance, peace returned. However, the Temenggong was increasing 
British supremacy at the expense of Malay feudalism in Singapore (E. Lee 1991: 
256; Trocki 2006: 55). The introduction of two warships in the 1830s ― ‗Wolf‘ 
and ‗Diana‘ (Turnbull 1989: 41), accelerated British dominion, reducing their 
reliance on the Temenggong (Trocki 2006: 26). 
To reduce the costs of preserving law and order, Raffles segregated the 
population according to their communities in 1822 (Cangi 1993: 172). Whilst the 
Temenggong, his men and the orang laut [sea people] were moved to the west — 
along the coast between Tanjong Pagar and Telok Blangah — to clear the harbour 
for commerce (Turnbull 1989: 20), Sultan Hussein and his descendants were 
displaced to Kampong Glam in the east, where they sank into disrepute (Ibid: 
13)
13
. The town plan reflected the hierarchical emerging division of labour; the 
                                                          
13 The area around Rochor was bustling though. It became a ‗second port‘ where many Bugis merchants and 
their followers settled. 
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less ‗relevant‘ a particular community was to the economy, the further it was from 
Singapore‘s bustling centre (Cangi 1993: 175). 
 
3.3 SINGAPORE AS CROWN COLONY, 1867-1965 
Responding to European merchants‘ demands for an improved 
administration, Singapore became Crown Colony‘s capital in 1867 (Turnbull 
1989: 78)
14
. With the shift from comprador to financial capitalism, two main 
changes occurred. First, political reigns transferred from a trading company (EIC) 
to a modern bureaucratic administration in London. Colonial bureaucrats 
controlled the opium trade in 1910 (Ibid: 114), dislodging the Baba opium 
revenue farmers. Second, with the opening of the Suez Canal in November 1869 
(Ibid: 83), improved communications (Ibid: 90) and the intensified use of 
steamships after the 1860s (Ibid: 76), Singapore‘s economy expanded to 
incorporate shipping, rubber, petroleum and tin (Huff 1987: 306). These 
industries were dominated by European capitalists. Although Malays tried to 
adjust to these structural changes, their employment, income and residential 
patterns were depressed by colonial educational policies plus Western capital and 
technology. 
 
3.3.1 Negligent Colonial Education Policies 
Education was negligible during British Indian rule. Although Singapore 
was still a colony, the rise of a modern bureaucratic administration in 1867 
                                                          
14 The Crown Colony was comprised of Malacca, Penang and Singapore. 
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necessitated educational expansion (Gopinathan 1991: 269) as English-speaking 
professionals were required to manage its bureaucracy (Tan 1997: 304). Colonial 
educational policies arrested Malay development nonetheless
15
. 
Initially, only Malay aristocrats could access elementary English 
education (Stevenson 1975: 144; Tham 1983: 95). Consigned to vernacular 
schools, the Malay masses were taught to be fishermen or agriculturalists to 
diffuse political dissent (Stevenson 1975: 58; Shaharuddin 1988: 45). The 
disadvantages of Malay economic depression under British Indian governance 
also carried over, for most could not afford expensive English education (Roff 
1967: 26). Illiterate in English, Malays were barred from governmental posts, 
which were controlled by the English-speaking
16
. 
Fearing religious conversion by Christian missionaries who pioneered 
English-instructed learning, Malays resisted English education (Roff 1967: 26; 
Gopinathan 1980: 178). Malay teachers also worried that their livelihoods were 
jeopardized (Sharom and Wong 1971: 7). As their schools remained rudimentary 
due to the insufficient supply of certified teachers and financial constraints 
(Stevenson 1975: 85 and 90), graduates of Malay schools remained handicapped 
(Turnbull 1989: 116). In sum, the severe lack of access to English schools and 
underdeveloped vernacular education dampened Malay employment prospects. 
 
                                                          
15 Schools that conducted their lessons in Chinese were also badly affected. The English-speaking Babas 
were best placed to benefit from colonial educational policies, which emphasized literacy in English. 
16 Jobs as clerks, interpreters or translators were dominated by English-speaking persons, including Jawi-




3.3.2 Western Capital and Technology 
In 1881, Malays dominated three occupational sectors, forming 53.0% of 
the labour force in rural production, 62.7% in the maritime industry and 33.1% in 
government service (Tham 1983: 33). Their forte in rural production and maritime 
jobs was partially due to their cultural knowledge of Singapore‘s natural resources 
or nautical skills (Ibid: 34), and partly a consequence of poor education. Their 
concentration in government service can be attributed to the colonial bureaucrats‘ 
maintenance of a façade of Malay political participation (Ibid: 55). 
In 1921, two trends were symptomatic of Malay occupational immobility. 
First, Malays stagnated in jobs which did not require much qualifications or 
management expertise, such as drivers or office-boys (Ibid: 48). Second, the 
Malay niche in rural production was eroded by mass-produced durables, an 
outcome of the alliance between Western capital and technological progress (Ibid: 
40). In 1874, Malay merchants had insufficient resources to purchase ―square-
rigged vessels‖ that were popular amongst Chinese and Western traders (Wong 
1978: 60). By the 1900s, Western steamships outmoded Malay and Chinese 
vessels alike (Ibid: 68). 
The above structural changes dampened Malay incomes. To cope with 
rising land prices, Malays shifted to poorer urban areas (Roff 1967: 35). In 1901, 
only 13.6% of Singapore‘s urban residents ware Malays (Huff 1994: 58).  In 
1911, this figure declined to 10.8% before falling to 7.9% by 1921 (Ibid: 58). 
Incidentally, the dismal residential arrangements coincided with Malay 
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concentration in low-paying jobs and the irrelevance of Malay rural produce 
during the period of industrialization. 
By 1957, Malay occupational and residential patterns improved modestly. 
Their representation in the armed and police forces had risen to 82.1% and 71.3% 
respectively (Table 1). Cultural continuity persisted in maritime occupations; 
Malays formed 30.7% of fishermen and 23.4% of deck-crews. They also 
dominated government-service jobs as office boys (55.3%) and gardeners 
(62.2%). The proportion of Malays living in urban areas had returned to 1911 
figures — 11.0% (Table 2), mirroring their occupational (re)stabilization. In 
contrast, rural areas such as Katong (27.5%) and the Southern Islands (69.1%) 
were highly populated by Malays (Table 2). Whilst Katong denoted the eastern 
districts that Malays occupied historically, Southern Islanders primarily engaged 
in fishing and poultry rearing (1957 Census of Population (COP) 1964: 93), jobs 
that were culturally dominated by Malays. Hence, rural housing patterns had 
strong continuities with the ‗racial‘ blueprint of Raffles‘ Town Plan and Malay 
occupations. 

















Number of Employees % of 
Malays Total Malay 
Armed Forces 8154 6693 82.1 
Policemen 4834 3446 71.3 
Gardeners 5123 3189 62.2 
Office Boys 5439 3039 55.3 
Fishermen 4494 1378 30.7 
Deck Crews 8922 2089 23.4 
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 Rural Districts 






13.6  11.0  14.2 12.9 8.1 27.5 69.1 
 
* Southern Islands referred to Pulau Blakang Mati (renamed Sentosa today) and St. John‘s Island. 
 
Source: 1957 COP (1964: 92). 
 
To extrapolate, the cumulative effects of poor educational opportunities, 
occupational immobility and low incomes when Singapore started to industrialize, 
depressed Malay mobility. Malays adapted to these structural changes by 
(re)gaining stable employment in 1957. Their predominance in the armed forces 
in this period is especially noteworthy. Although the wages were paltry, their 
strong social support networks embedded in ‗Malay‘ residential areas — and 
affirmed through anecdotal Malay maxims such as gotong-royong
17
 (Parkinson 
1967: 34–35; Wilder 1968: 158) — had a compensatory effect, albeit to a limited 
degree. 
 
3.4 INDUSTRIALIZING SINGAPORE, 1965–1997 
Singapore‘s expulsion from Malaysia on 9th August 1965 marked a critical 
shift in her political economy. After two decades of decolonization, the People‘s 
Action Party (PAP) led by English-educated Baba professionals
18
, assumed 
political control of Singapore (Turnbull 1989: 288; Tremewan 1994: 101). Ousted 
from its Malayan hinterland, Singapore abandoned the earlier emphasis on 
                                                          
17 It refers to the practice and ideology of working together as a community to overcome adversity. 
18 The first generation of successful leaders comprised of Lee Kuan Yew (lawyer), Toh Chin Chye 
(physiologist) and Goh Keng Swee (economist). 
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import-substitution for export-oriented industrialization, in partnership with 
international capital and multinational corporations (Grice and Dradakis-Smith 
1985: 348; Chng et al. 1988; Rodan 1989). Mass education was extended, with 
particular emphasis on English and technical expertise (Gopinathan 1974: 43). 
 
3.4.1 ‘Local’ and ‘Global’ Structural Changes – Entrenchment of Malay 
 Relative Poverty 
Malay educational and income standings deteriorated between 1966 and 
1972, due to the snowballing effects of three ‗local‘ structural factors. First, the 
community‘s intelligentsia class drained when a substantial number of educated 
Malays moved to Malaysia (Lily 1998: 253). Second, the retreat of British troops 
in 1971 during decolonization caused structural unemployment
19
 (Chang 1968: 
765), overwhelmingly amongst Malays, as they used to be present in large 
numbers within the armed forces (K.J. Lee 2006: 187). Third, state resettlement 
practices between the 1970s and early 1980s that aimed to eradicate urban slums 
(Grice and Dradakis 1985: 350) uprooted Malay employment patterns and social 
networks, thereby ingraining Malay relative poverty. 
The inaccessibility of the flats from the sea disrupted Malay occupations 
and incomes, especially for full-time fishermen or wage-earners who wanted to 
reduce food expenditure through fishing (Chew 1982: 51). The dispersion to 
different neighbourhoods also upset Malay support networks (Ibid: 53). Although 
                                                          




housing was provided for, new employment opportunities were not guaranteed 
(Ibid: 52). Furthermore, disposable household incomes shrank as living costs 
soared during early independence (Hassan 1977: 47). This coincided with the 
sharp increase in income inequality after 1980 (Islam and Kirkpatrick 1986: 33). 
In tandem with Singapore‘s ‗global‘ move to an export-oriented 
industrialization, the manufacturing sector thrived between 1960 and 1982 (Rigg 
1988: 340). This corresponded with the widespread proletarianization of Malays. 
In 1980, Malays had the highest proportion of workers in manufacturing (36.4%) 
compared to Chinese (29.1%) and Indians (26.7%) (1980 COP [Economic 
Characteristics] 1981: 55). Similarly, Malay women workers trebled from 14.3% 
of the total Malay female population in 1970 to 38.3% in 1980, registering the 
largest increase (Ibid: 3–4). Although incomes as production workers were 
modest, the household expenses in working poor Malay families were alleviated 
to some degree. 
In 1985, Singapore suffered its ‗first‘ global recession20 since 
independence. The economic downturn aggravated due to Singapore‘s lagging 
productivity, costly wage rates and high dependence on American demand 
(16/9/1985 BW; 23/9/1985 NYT; 26/9/1985 NYT; 6/11/1985a FT; Rigg 1988: 
345). In particular, the manufacturing sector contracted by 6.9% and 3.4% in 1985 
and 1986 respectively (Rodan 2006: 146). Unemployment peaked at 6.5% in 1986 
                                                          
20 The electronics industry in Singapore was most affected by the economic slump in United States, her 
biggest trading partner. Although other newly-industrializing countries were also affected, the impact on 





, as numerous factories slowed production or shifted elsewhere 
(6/11/1985b FT). Given their overrepresentation in blue-collar manufacturing 
jobs, Malays were especially affected. 
 
Table 3: Employed Malays and Chinese by Mean Monthly Income, 
1966, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1990, 1995 
 
Year 1966 1973 1974 1979 1980 1990 1995 
Malay to Chinese 
Income 83.9 68.8 65.4 70.4 65.2 70.1 63.3 
        
Malay Average 
Growth for Period - 2.2 8.3 7.7 13.5 10.5 8.3 
        
Chinese Average 
Growth for Period - 5.2 13.9 6.1 22.4 9.7 10.5 
 
Source: (K.J. Lee 2006: 177). 
 
The negative repercussions of these ‗local‘ and ‗global‘ structural changes 
reflected in Malay income trends. The average Malay income was 83.9% of 
Chinese income in 1996, a year after independence (Table 3). Back then, Malays 
still possessed geographically-embedded support networks, as affirmed by a state 
report on identified ‗Malay‘ settlement areas in 1967 (Yeh et al. 1970). By 1973, 
the Malay to Chinese income ratio fell drastically to 68.8% before sliding to 
65.4% in 1974. Between 1974 and 1995, the income inequality between Chinese 
and Malays was increasing steadily, especially at the higher end of the income 
scale (K.J Lee 2006: 179). This paralleled Malay concentration in lower-paying 
jobs, and their failure to make inroads into higher-paying occupations. 
 
 
                                                          
21 This figure is still low compared to most countries. 
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3.4.2 Multiracialism and Meritocracy 
The state‘s endorsement of multiracialism after independence caused 
difficulties which were more significant in quantity and quality for Malays 
(Bedlington 1974: 74; Betts 1977: 291). Although the similarities between 
Chinese, Malay and Indian cultures were occasionally highlighted, the 
preservation of Chinese schools and Mandarin language implied that Chinese 
values were emphasized (Gopinathan 1980: 182). The ‗equality‘ rhetoric in 
multiracialism ironically disempowered ethnic minorities, by precluding any 
assertion of racial inequality as violating the policy‘s very logic (Chua 2005a: 59). 
Multiracialism forestalls debates about structural inequalities (Chua 2007: 917), 
including the educational and occupational hurdles faced by Malays. 
Between 1963 and 1965, the PAP upgraded Malay schools, in light of a 
merger with Malaysia (Ahmad 1964: 113; Tan 1997: 305). Singapore‘s expulsion 
from Malaysia in 1965 however, abruptly ended Malay educational expansion 
(MacDougall and Chew 1976: 296; Wan Hussin Zoohri 1987: 184; Tan 1995: 
342). English became the de-facto working language, alongside a mother tongue 
under the 1976 bilingualism policy (Gopinathan 1974: 58). In line with 
Singapore‘s industrialization, technocratic expertise was emphasized in Science 
and Mathematics. Although Malay streams still existed, there were severe 
shortages of textbooks and teachers who taught these areas (Ahmad 1964: 111; 
Athsani and Ridzwan 1971: 18). By 1987, English became the core medium of 
instruction in all government schools. Career opportunities favoured the English-
speaking (Gopinathan 1980: 176; Turnbull 1989: 301). Whilst the English-
62 
 
speaking minority benefitted from the ‗neutral‘ privileging of English in the 
meritocratic education system, non-English speaking persons, including numerous 
Malays, were disadvantaged by this policy (MacDougall and Chew 1976: 299). 
Impermeable Chinese businesses ousted Malays through selective 
employment practices (Shahrom and Wong 1971; Lily 1998: 109-110). Job ads 
often offered high positions to non-Malays, whilst low-paying jobs — amah(s) or 
driver(s) — demanded Malay workers (Sharifah Zahra 1979: 71). Although 
Malay language is an important aspect of the community‘s identity both in policy 
and practice (Hill and Lian 1995: 94), it became increasingly irrelevant for 
securing employment. Fluency in Chinese was occasionally expected, leaving the 
ethnic minorities disadvantaged (Athsani and Ridzwan 1971: 18; Rahim 1998: 
110). In 1980, English-speaking persons had the highest average incomes — $937 
(1980 COP [Income and Transport] 1981: 42). Compared to their Chinese-
speaking counterparts ($407), Malay-speaking ($348) and Tamil-speaking ($328) 
persons registered lower mean incomes. 
In the 1970s, Malay males within conscription age were not called up for 
National Service (NS) despite being registered for four years (Bedlington 1974: 
74; Ismail 1974: 57; Betts 1977: 244). This delay affected their employment, for 
companies preferred recruiting those who had completed their NS (Hussain 1970: 
59). As the state feared Malay ‗extremism‘ (Hussin 2002: 43), Malay recruits 
were relegated to the lower administrative rungs or barred from promotion (Betts 
1977: 242; Ismail 1974: 58). Others ended up in part-time or freelance jobs, with 
significantly lower wages (Rahim 1998: 109). Compared to pre-independence 
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1957 figures, Malay representation in jobs concerning national security fell from 
82.1% to less than half of the workforce by the 1980s
22
 — 12.9% (Table 4). 
Table 4: Distribution of Malays in Occupations Related to Defence, 1980 
 
Occupation Type Chinese Malays Indians Others Total 
Police, Security and 
Prisons 
76.6 11.8 8.8 1.8 100.0 
Fire Fighting Services 32.1 64.7 2.6 0.6 100.0 
Defence Services 75.4 12.9 9.8 1.9 100.0 
 
Source: Derived from 1980 COP [Economic Characteristics] (1981: 98). 
 
The multiracialism ideology also recast structural inequality as a Malay 
‗trouble.‘ Although the establishment of Mendaki in 1982 is a significant 
milestone in Malay leadership, it implied that Malay underdevelopment is a 
‗racial‘ rather than a historical-structural concern. The fixation with equal racial 
representation culminated in 1989, when neighbourhoods with high Malay 
representation were problematized as threatening national integration (7/1/1989a 
BH; 7/1/1989b; 14/1/1989 BH; 31/1/1989 BH; 31/1/1989a ST; 31/1/1989b ST; 
9/6/1989 BH). Dispersed during resettlement, Malays had responded by 
relocating to eastern areas (Chih 2002: 1363), in attempts to resurrect lost social 
capital. The Ethnic Integration Policy imposed by the Housing Development 
Board (HDB) in 1989 ended such adaptive efforts, spelling unfavorable 
consequences for ethnic minorities (Lai 1995; 24/9/2009 ST). 37.5% of Malays 
were affected by the policy compared to about a quarter of Chinese and Indians 
respectively (Chih 2002: 1358). Moreover, Malay political leadership was 
amorphous. The lack of unity in Malay organizational response to the 
                                                          
22 Table 4 shows that Malays were concentrated in the fire fighting services in 1980. During this period, fire 
fighters were exceptionally poorly paid. 
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community‘s educational and employment issues rendered Malay demands 
ineffective (Ismail 1974: 66). Malay politicians faced the dilemma of having to 
affiliate with the PAP to be effective, and yet risking the loss of community 
support (Ibid: 113). A Malay leader openly affirmed his ―double burden‖ of 
juggling the national agenda with community interests (25/2/1991 ST). The 
multiracialism ideology also translated into the national ‗self-help‘ policy, 
denoting that each ethnic community should first seek help from their ethnic 
members before the state. This institutional measure adversely affected the Malay 
community as it circumscribed the pool of financial resources as well as social 
networks available to the Malays in Singapore. The dearth of funds, qualified 
labour (Wan Hussin Zoohri 1987: 193) and volunteers (Sidek 1989: 53) in Malay 
organizations hampered the smooth implementation of ameliorative programmes. 
 
3.5 THE TRANSITION TO A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, 1997 ONWARDS  
 The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis caused Singapore‘s economic growth to 
plummet from 8.4% in 1997 to 0.4% in 1998 (Rodan 2006: 149). Unemployment 
peaked at 4.3% in 1998, registering a record of 29,100 retrenchments (Ibid). The 
recession confirmed Singapore‘s globalized economy (Huxley 2002: 164), and 
increasing vulnerability to erratic economic cycles (3/1/2010 TWSJ; 3/1/2010 
AFP) and other global afflictions ― terrorist attacks in 2001, Bali bombings in 




Whereas political power remained with the PAP, the crisis formalized the 
transition to a knowledge-based economy (KBE). Knowledge and innovation 
became the key determinants of corporate competitiveness and national 
development (Ministry of Trade and Industry [MTI] 1998; Coe and Kelly 2000: 
417). Volatile working conditions and worsening income inequality stemming 
from these structural changes, affected working poor Malays adversely. 
 
3.5.1 Foreign Labour Policy and Regionalization 
 Foreign labour policy in Singapore is two-pronged; highly-qualified 
experts and temporary, inexpensive workers are employed (Yeoh and Khoo 
1998). In 2006, 30% of working persons in Singapore were foreigners (Ministry 
of Manpower [MOM] 2008: 2). Foreign labour can induce socio-political 
tensions, especially if locals observe that their job opportunities are circumscribed 
(Pang and Lim 1982: 555). In fact, the share of job openings seized by locals 
shrank from 45% in 2004 to 37% in 2006 (Faizah 2008: 53). 
Many locals lamented the continual recruitment of ‗foreign talent‘ despite 
the 1997 recession. However, the state insisted upon its necessity to maintain 
Singapore‘s competitiveness (16/3/1999 ST). In 1990, 85% of unskilled foreign 
workers worked in the manufacturing, construction and services sectors (Hui 
1997: 114). By 2000, the number of foreign workers in low-skilled jobs had risen 
to 450,000, compared to 150,000 in 1988 (Coe and Kelly 2000: 416). Although 
inexpensive foreign workers kept business costs competitive, they indirectly 
depressed the incomes of low-skilled local employees. As the former often 
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willingly ―accept (or are unable to contest) conditions of work that include shift 
work, overtime and few fringe benefits‖ (Coe and Kelly 2000: 416), employment 
conditions for the latter, who are disproportionately Malays, followed suit. 
Regionalization also aggravated the plight of low-educated labour in 
Singapore. Less productive sectors are relocated offshore, to minimize costs and 
concentrate on business services (Hui 1997: 111–112), research and high-
technology production (Coe and Kelly 2000: 417) — signs of a rebooting of the 
industrial strategy. Such strategies cultivate the development of a localized 
transnational economy within Southeast Asia, with Singapore as its trading hub 
(Dent 2003: 257; Chong 2007: 959). 
Structural unemployment became highly visible in 2004 due to the 
transition to a higher-skilled labour force (Rodan 2006: 152). In manufacturing, 
3.1 manual workers were displaced for each industrial machine (S.I. Goh 1993: 
8). Between 1991 and 2001, the share of employment for services rose from 65% 
to 74% (Figure 3). For manufacturing, it fell from 28% to 19%. Identifying 
manufacturing and services as Singapore‘s ―twin engines of growth‖ (MTI 2001: 
17), the 2001 Economic Review Committee (ERC) report maintained: 
With the shift towards services, new capabilities and knowledge will 




Figure 3: Sectoral Share of Employment, 1991 and 2001 
 
Source: (MTI 2001: 17) 
 
As Singapore‘s economy is ‗moving up‘ to value-added, technology 
intensive activities, and ‗moving out‘ low-income assembly work (Perry 1991: 
140; Yeoh and Khoo 1998: 181), manual workers are the most vulnerable 
employees today. Compared to professionals and workers in services, they 
consistently registered the highest number of workers who were either retrenched 
temporarily or had their work-week reduced between 1998 and 2008 (Table 5). 
Between 2001 and 2003, all occupational groups had significant surges in work 
displacement. However, manual workers registered 8252, 3676 and 2296 lay-offs 
between 2001 and 2003 respectively — doubled of the other two groups. To 
simply attribute this finding to ‗global‘ occurrences — 2001 World Trade Centre 
bombings, 2002 Bali bombings and 2003 SARS epidemic — is to neglect the 
structural shift from manufacturing to services as the fundamental cause. How this 
‗class‘ phenomenon has come to assume an ‗ethnic‘ dimension today, is 




Table 5: Workers Laid-Off Temporarily or Put on Short Work-Week  
































            






















































Sources: MOM Labour Market Reports (1998 to 2008). 
 
Table 6: Workforce by Occupation by Ethnic Group, 2000 and 2005 
 
Workforce by Occupation Chinese Malays Indians 
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 
Production, Technical & Managerial 46.2 47.3 23.4 21.2 43.3 46.8 
Clerical, Sales & Service 25.2 27.4 36.2 38.9 29.2 28.7 
Production Workers, Cleaners & 
Labourers 
24.8 21.8 38.2 36.9 23.3 20.5 
Others 3.8 3.4 2.3 3.0 4.3 4.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: GHS 2005 [Transport, Overseas Travel, Households and Housing 
Characteristics] (2006: viii). 
 
The changes in global-local employment trends corresponded with 
depressed Malay occupational patterns (Table 6). First, Malays were 
overrepresented in lower-end jobs such as production workers, cleaners and 
labourers in 2005 — 36.9%, compared to 21.8% of Chinese and 20.5% of Indians. 
Second, the rise in Malay representation in service-related jobs from 36.2% in 
2000 to 38.9% in 2005 is accompanied by the falls in the ratio of (i) Malay 
professionals from 23.4% to 21.2% (ii) Malay blue-collared workers from 38.2% 
to 36.9% — during the corresponding period. Nonetheless, the fall in the 
proportion of Malay professionals (2.2%) is greater than the decline in the 
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proportion of Malay blue-collared workers (1.3%). This suggests that more Malay 
professionals were sliding into service sectors over the five years, which generally 
had lower wages. 
 
3.5.2 Malay Under-representation in Higher Education 
As the state enhanced the national educational system whereas Mendaki 
spearheaded educational assistance for Malays, the community has demonstrated 
considerable improvements in education. In 2005, most Malays have attained 
secondary qualifications and below — 44.3%, followed by secondary education 
— 30.1% (Table 7). First, the proportion of Malays with secondary education and 
below fell from 82.2% in 2000 to 75.1% in 2005. Second, the proportion of 
Malays with upper secondary education and above rose from 17.8% in 2000 to 
24.8% in 2005. In the higher echelons of education however, the Malays are 
underrepresented. 5.2% of the Malays are polytechnic graduates as opposed 8.9% 
of the Chinese and 6.1% of the Indians. The figures for university graduates are 
gloomier. In contrast to 17.7% of Chinese and 25.1% of Indians, 3.4% of Malays 
attained university education. 
Table 7: Non-Student Population by Highest Qualification Attained 




Chinese Malays Indians 
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 
Below Secondary 42.1 38.7 50.1 44.3 38.4 31.0 
Secondary 23.2 20.0 32.1 30.8 26.4 22.1 
Upper Secondary 15.0 14.8 12.9 16.2 15.6 15.8 
Polytechnic 7.0 8.9 2.9 5.2 3.1 6.1 
University 12.6 17.7 2.0 3.4 16.5 25.1 




Source: GHS 2005, Socio-Demographic and Economic Characteristics (2006: viii). 
 
Table 8 shows the percentage of Primary One cohort students who are 
admitted to post-secondary institutions
23
 in each ethnic group. Although Malays 
have demonstrated a significant upsurge in post-secondary admission from 66.4% 
in 1999 to 83.5% in 2007, this has been consistently lower than that of other 
communities from 1999 to 2007 (Table 8). In 2007, 83.5% of the Malays are 
enrolled in post-secondary institutions as compared with 95.8% of the Chinese 
and 89.3% of the Indians. 
Table 8: Percentage of P1 Cohort Admitted to Post-Secondary 
Education Institutions, 1999 to 2007 
 
Ethnicity/Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Chinese 82.4 88.4 90.2 91.4 93.0 94.2 95.1 95.4 95.8 
Malay 66.4 70.0 74.6 76.2 79.4 80.0 82.6 83.6 83.5 
Indian 64.6 74.9 77.7 80.1 84.2 87.4 87.9 88.7 89.3 
Total 78.2 83.8 86.2 87.6 89.3 90.9 92.5 92.5 92.9 
 
Source: 2009 Education Statistics Digest (ESD) (2010: 55) 
 
Table 9: Percentage of Pupils with at least 5 ‘O’ Level Passes by Ethnic Group, 
1999 to 2007 
 
Ethnicity/Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Chinese 81.2 82.6 84.3 84.6 85.9 86.5 84.8 86.3 85.4 
Malay 49.0 52.8 56.5 58.0 59.0 59.3 63.2 60.3 59.4 
Indian 65.5 66.2 70.3 71.3 73.5 73.7 72.9 75.0 72.6 
Others 72.4 75.8 74.7 76.6 80.9 77.2 78.6 76.5 81.3 
Total 76.3 77.8 80.0 80.0 81.6 82.7 81.1 82.0 80.8 
 
Source: 2009 ESD (2010: 53) 
 
The quality of Malay educational qualifications is relatively weak. Table 9 
reveals that slightly more than half of the current population Malay pupils have at 
least 5 ‗O‘ Level passes in 2007 — 59.4%. Thus, an overwhelming 40.6% of 
                                                          
23 These include Junior Colleges, Centralised Institute, Polytechnics, ITE, LASALLE College of the Arts, 




Malay pupils do not have this certification, when compared to Chinese (14.6%) 
and Indian (17.4%) students. Assuming that they do not pursue higher education 
and immediately commence work, non ‗O‘ Level holders are limited to low-
paying manual jobs. When we look at post-secondary Malay students, the bulk of 
them are enrolled in the Institute of Technical Education (ITEs) — 48.6%, with 
fewer students pursuing polytechnic education — 28.6%, and even lesser students 
in the universities — 5.4% (Table 10). 
Table 10: Percentage of Malay P1 Cohort in Post Secondary Education, 2005 
 
Type of Post Secondary 
Education 
Percentage of 
Malay P1 Cohort 
Technical Education 48.6 
Polytechnic 28.6 
Local Universities 5.4 
Total 82.6 
 
Sources: Progress of the Malay Community in Singapore Since 1980 (2000: 5-6) 
and 2008 ESD (2009: 55). 
 
In summary, Malays have demonstrated considerable adjustment to an 
English-based curriculum, judging by their encouraging entry into post-secondary 
education. However, the overwhelming entry of Malay pupils into the lower 
echelons of the educational ladder reinforces the proletarianization of the 
community, for it relegates them to lower-paying jobs. 
 
3.5.3 Limited Malay Intergenerational Mobility and In-Work Poverty 
 Today 
After 1997, income inequality and in-work poverty have intensified. 
Between 2000 and 2009, the income ratio of the top 20% to the bottom 20% of 
the population has consistently widened for the first 8 years, peaking at 13.2 in 
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2007 (Figure 4). In contrast to the 2.1% rise experienced by the population, the 
lowest decile earned $1150 ― a 2.1% contraction in their average monthly 
household wages from 2000
24
 (Table 11). Earning an average of $2060 in 2005, 
the next decile (11th – 20th) experienced no growth in its monthly household 
income during the same period. 
Table 11: Average Monthly Household Income in Lowest 20% Employed  
Households, 2000, 2004 and 2005 
 
Decile Average Household Income ($) Average Annual 
Change from 2000-2005 
(%) 
2000 2004 2005 
Total 5410 5750 6010 2.1 
1
st
 – 10th  1270 1140 1150 -2.1 
11
th
 – 20th  2060 2010 2060 0.0 
 
Source: GHS 2005, Socio-Demographic and Economic Characteristics (2006: 28-29). 
 
Figure 4: Gini Coefficient among Employed Households, 2000 to 2009 
 
Source: Key Household Income Trends, 2009 (2010: 7). 
 
                                                          
24 There are more recent statistics of the average monthly household income in the lowest 20% employed 
households (see Key Household Income Trends 2009). However, this report does not delineate the average 
monthly household income by ethnic group. Hence, I employed General Household Survey 2005 for it 
presented statistics by income decile and ethnic group. 
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Table 12: Average Monthly Per Capita Household Income from Work 
in Lowest 20% Employed Households, 2005 
 
Decile Per Capita Household Income  
from Work ($) 
Average Annual 
Change from  
2000-2005 (%) 2000 2004 2005 
Total 1570 1750 1820 3.0 
1
st
 – 10th  290 280 270 -1.3 
11
th
 – 20th  490 490 510 0.6 
 
Source: GHS 2005, Socio-Demographic and Economic Characteristics (2006: 28-29). 
 
Table 12 provides a better representation of in-work poverty, given that 
household income statistics are weighed against the number of dependents. 
Looking at the average monthly household income per capita, the lowest decile 
obtained an average of $270 in 2005, a 1.3% fall since 2000. The second lowest 
decile had $510 in 2005, registering a rise of 0.6% from 2000. This appeared 
dismal next to the 3.0% growth experienced by the general population. 
Malays are disproportionately represented amongst these working poor 
households (Table 13). Interestingly, Malays have the smallest percentage of 
unemployed households (7.8%) compared to other ethnic groups. Yet, they have 
the largest proportion of employed households in the lowest per capita income 
brackets — suggesting the concentration of Malays in in-work poverty. 6.4% of 
Malays earned below $250, as opposed to 2.4% of Chinese and 3.4% of Indians. 
Similarly, 19.3% of Malays received between $250 and $499, in contrast to 8.1% 
of Chinese and 10.3% of Indians. Moreover, Malays are underrepresented in the 
highest per capita income categories. Only 3.9% of the Malays possessed per 
capita income of above $2500, in comparison to 19.9% of the Chinese and 15.3% 
of the Indians. 
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Table 13: Distribution of Selected Categories of Per Capita Monthly Household  
Income from Work by Ethnic Group, 2005 
   
Per capita Monthly Household 
Income from Work ($) 
Total Chinese Malays Indians 
    
No Working Person 10.1 10.5 7.8 9.3 
Below 250 2.9 2.4 6.4 3.4 
250 – 499 9.5 8.1 19.3 10.3 
500 – 749 11.8 10.9 18.8 12.3 
… … … … … 
Above 2500 18.0 19.9 3.9 15.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: GHS 2005, Socio-Demographic and Economic Characteristics (2006: 166). 
 
Malays have the smallest average household income at $3440 as compared 
to Chinese ― $5630 and Indians ― $5170 (Table 14). Malays also have the 
lowest median household income at $2830, compared to $4000 and $3730 for 
Chinese and Indians respectively. As the median household wages of Malays 
were lower than their average household wages, one may infer that most Malays 
were concentrated in the lower end of the income spectrum. As of 2005, 67% of 
Malay households fell below the national median (Rafiz 2007) and 34% or 41,000 
Malay households fell within the lower 20% of the distribution (Suriati 2007). 
When the average incomes of different ethnic groups are charted over the years, 
Malays persistently registered the lowest income hike between (i) 1980 and 1990 
— $1350 (ii) 1990 and 2000 ― $902 (iii) 2000 and 2005 ― $292 (Table 15). As 
stratification rigidifies across the decades, it appears that mobility outcomes are 
increasingly ‗racially‘ significant. 
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Chinese 5630 4000 
Malays 3440 2830 
Indians 5170 3730 
Others 8500 5590 
Total 5400 3830 
 
Source: GHS 2005, Socio-Demographic and Economic Characteristics (2006: 26). 
 
Table 15: Monthly Household Income from Work by Ethnic Group, 




Average Household Income 
($) 
 Difference ($) 






Chinese 1213 3213 5219 5630  2000 2006 411 
Malays 896 2246 3148 3440  1350 902 292 
Indians 1133 2859 4556 5170  1726 1697 614 
Others 3225 3885 7250 8500  660 3365 1250 
Total 1228 3076 4943 5400  1848 1867 457 
 
Sources: 1990 COP [Households and Housing] (1992: xiv); 2000 COP [Households and 
Housing] (2001: xiv) and GHS 2005, Socio-Demographic and Economic Characteristics 
(2005: 26). 
 
Taken together, these findings indicate that Malays are more vulnerable to 
in-work poverty today than other ethnic groups, and that the degree of their 
intergenerational mobility is sharply limited across the years. With the onset of 
globalization and regionalization in Singapore‘s case, employment alone is 
insufficient for overcoming in-work poverty. Whilst local community self-help 
groups are significant, they are no longer adequate for ameliorating the plight of 
the needy, who are increasingly vulnerable to both ‗local‘ and ‗global‘ structural 
changes in Singapore‘s political economy. With its small population and weak 
financial health, the community lacks the capacity to amass enough funds to help 
the poor in their midst (Chua 2007: 920). Despite intensified national assistance 
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through Workfare Income Supplement (WIS) and Skills Programme for 
Upgrading and Resilience (SPUR), volatile working conditions and aggravated 
income inequality disadvantaged the working poor, who are disproportionately 
Malays by now (as a consequence of historical events and structural processes). 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
To recapitulate, this chapter has applied a combination of the ‗statist 
historical institutionalist‘ and ‗social conflict‘ perspectives. Consequently, a 
comprehensive structuralist analysis of limited Malay mobility through four 
historical periods of Singapore‘s political economy was achieved. Three pertinent 
points can be extrapolated. 
First, the principles of stratification varied across different historical 
periods. Whilst participation in opium, pepper and gambier cultivation under 
British Indian rule was important, proficiency in English was crucial to gain entry 
into higher ranks within the civil service when Singapore was a Crown Colony. 
Technocratic expertise became markedly important in industrializing Singapore, 
whereas knowledge-based employees are highly sought after, after the Asian 
Financial Crisis. I have shown that impediments to Malay mobility 
correspondingly altered across time, and cumulatively snowballed to aggravate 
Malay relative poverty. As opposed to accounts privileging economic factors, I 
have revealed that Malay overrepresentation in in-work poverty today stems from 
the historical intersections of political, economic and educational structures, as 
well as residential and occupational patterns. 
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Second, I have shown that Malays attempted to adapt to these structural 
changes throughout Singapore‘s evolving political economy, which is a clear 
departure from culturalist views of ‗Malay poverty.‘ As soon as they had 
exhibited positive signs of readjustment, new structural changes occurred to 
constrain Malay mobility outcomes. Moreover, I have revealed that the socio-
economic fates of Malays are increasingly less tied to local structural factors, than 
they are to global processes. For working poor Malays today, their vulnerability to 
regionalization and the structural transition to service jobs are especially marked. 
Third, it is imperative to reiterate that the research question in this 
dissertation is not to deny absolute upward mobility, but to problematize the 
circumscribed extent of mobility experienced by Malays. Although many Malays 
have progressed, my archival analysis has shown that the entrenchment of ‗class‘ 
inequalities in the later years of independent Singapore has assumed an ‗ethnic‘ 
dimension. Thus, the Malay community in Singapore presents itself as an 
interesting case study for investigating the links between in-work poverty, ‗race‘ 
and intergenerational mobility. 
Now that we have recognized the historical, political and economic 
elucidations for the institutional processes which have impeded the 
intergenerational upward mobility of working poor Malays, it is timely to analyze 
how cultural milieu and ideological phenomena contribute to this phenomenon. 
The next chapter examines how the intergenerational transmission of economic, 
social and cultural capital (or the lack of thereof) shapes the habitus of, and 
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CHAPTER FOUR: MECHANISMS OF CULTURAL REPRODUCTION IN 
WORKING POOR MALAY FAMILIES 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Drawing insights from thirty-two in-depth interviews with sixteen working 
poor Malay families, this chapter has two objectives. First, it aims to illuminate 
the diverse continuum of economic, social and cultural capital within working 
poor Malay families. Second, it asks how each of these resources is 
intergenerationally transmitted, to constrain the upward mobility of ensuing 
generations. In answering these questions, I will reveal the role of the habitus 
(cultural milieu) in affecting their aspirations and expected mobility outcomes of 
working poor Malays. 
Although I have adopted a thematic analysis, this is not to denote that the 
data is neatly delineated into three concepts ― economic, social and cultural 
capital. First, I will show that the lack of each resource within working poor 
Malay families is often interrelated, and cumulatively snowballs to limit the 
degree of their intergenerational upward mobility, if not prevent it altogether. 
Second, subsequent generations in working poor Malay families, are not 
necessarily passive receivers of the advantages and/or disadvantages accumulated 
by their parents and grandparents. Contrary to culturalist elucidations of poverty, 
they are active social actors who implicitly influence their status outcomes via 
their habitus. Third, these families have acquired a habitus that singles out ‗race‘ 
rather than the lack of finances, as the biggest hurdle to their upward mobility. 
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Hence, their ambitions and estimation of achievable success tend to be limited by 
a 'racial‘ glass ceiling. 
 
4.2 ECONOMIC CAPITAL 
4.2.1 Monetary Strategies for Coping with Poverty 
 The shocking humility of modest meals in a ‗middle-class Singapore‘ — 
rice served with eggs and soy sauce — became a staple observation during my 
home visits: 
Out of budget always happens lah. Like sometimes, we only eat maggi, 
sometimes we and the kids don‘t eat. Or me and hubby don‘t eat. (2G, 
F2) 
 
The indifferent acceptance of these meals as a ―normal [fact of] life‖ (3G, F2) 
denotes the pragmatism adopted by working poor Malays to cope with escalating 
living costs and overstretched household incomes. Their attempts to save for 
‗rainy days‘ are thwarted: 
The month ends, the salary also ends. We don‘t get to keep anything… 
Apa boleh buat? [But what can we do?] We are hard-up people. (2G, F1) 
 
Enough or not, we still have to survive on that $1000 income for 6 
persons. How do we even save? Even if we do try our very best to save, 
later on in the month, we will still have to take the money out for our 
[necessary] expenses! It‘s just too tight… (2G, F14) 
 
Given the lack of savings, the temporary absence of regular income due to 
retrenchment aggravates their poverty: 
For 3 months, I never work. That was really a critical time, water and 
electricity bills not paid, conservancy charges not paid. If I have money, 
I must prioritize between utility bills, food expenses and then school 
money. Right now, we are better [because I got a job], but it‘s hard to 




To minimize their spending, poor Malays resorted to creative measures  — 
travelling the distance for cheaper food items and postponing wet market trips 
until late morning to trade off ―fresh(er) fish for lesser prices‖ (2G, F15). Female 
engagement in casual work such as tailoring, catering services, babysitting jobs 
and baking, provides considerable supplementary income. These ‗covert‘ female 
entrepeneurs were merely emulating their own mothers, suggesting that informal 
employment amongst Malay women in working poor families, has been present 
for quite a while. As such work is subjected to particular structural conditions: (i) 
volume of social networks to attract potential clients (ii) frequency of public 
holidays and festive seasons, the promise of remuneration is irregular. 
The way handouts are distributed also spells unintended, detrimental 
consequences for their self-esteem: 
Sometimes I‘m shy to use the food coupon. My friend will know that I‘m 
not that rich. So I usually buy food at very late times… I don‘t like 
people to see. (3G, F9) 
 
I am grateful for the food coupons... (hesitates) Just that maybe if we get 
real money, better. When we pay using coupon, other people also can 
see. I wait until got no people, then maybe I buy. Whenever I buy, I pay 
fast-fast and leave. (3G, F15) 
 
As they were indirectly identified as welfare recipients through food coupons, 
some children strategized ― delayed their use of coupons until late into the 
recess, or avoided recess altogether ― to mitigate the stigmas of poverty. The 
children‘s status frustration noticeably heightens within the ‗field‘ of the school: 
Sometimes, my friends bring MP4 or PSP to school. I just see. If you say 
[whether] I want, I want lah. But I know I can‘t afford it. Sometimes, 





As their more affluent peers display their luxury goods, the family‘s relative 
poverty is accentuated. Given the disjuncture between his class location and 
consumerist desires, one may infer that F9 is structurally predisposed to theft. 
Though seemingly ‗hypothetical‘ at this juncture, one mother highlighted this as a 
real concern: 
I see the kids, I scared later they hungry or jealous when they see people 
eat or play things during recess. Like pitiful right? So our mind is like, 
we don‘t know what they will do? What if they steal from their friends or 
steal from the canteen? The counsellor never think about that. (2G, F2) 
 
Although she minimized the risks of a criminal record by withdrawing her 
children from school when the family lacks money, this ironically contributes to 
poor educational performance. The bulk of working poor parents however, 
insisted on sending their children to school: 
I always put my children‘s education as priority. Even if we [parents] 
don‘t eat, we let them go to school first. (2G, F8) 
 
Most will be quick to interpret this discrepancy as stemming from parental 
attitudes when the critical distinction between these two groups lies in housing. 
Whereas F8 possessed stable dwelling, F2 frequently shifted residence. Without a 
permanent address, families like F2 have difficulties when procuring schools for 
their children. In the event that they relocate, new problems arise when their new 
address is far away from their children‘s present schools: 
From Jurong East to Clementi, we have to send the kids to school… We 
don‘t even have enough money to take the bus, so problem lah. He 
skipped school. Why we never ask for transfer is because… We also 
know our place to live is not stabilized… My son‘s emotion is like 
disturbed. He complained to the school this and that… He want to change 
school. (2G, F2) 
 
Once, I sent my children to school in Macpherson all the way from 
Jurong [where I was living with my mother]… I worked at Changi then. I 
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wake the kids at 5am, we get out at 5.30am. Take a bus to Macpherson, I 
drop the kids, go to work at 7am. I tell the kids to hang around and wait 
for me until 3pm… Then we take bus 154 to go back to Jurong… In one 
day, I travelled for 4, 5 hours? I reach home at 6 or 7pm with the kids. We 
were sleeping all over the bus… We didn‘t have enough money. It was 
hell for me. (2G, F4) 
 
The ‗housing problem‘ is intertwined with these families‘ inability to pay 
their monthly household mortgages — a factor linked to unstable employment 
and low incomes, which will be explicated later. Unable to purchase flats, many 
mobilized their immediate social networks. Close friends or relatives temporarily 
let out available rooms to these families, often at lower rents. When the leasing 
time is nearing, coupled with the problem of overcrowding, these poor families 
constantly face the anxiety of being homeless overnight. Their subsequent address 
is determined by the ‗next best help available,‘ rather than the distance between 
home and schools. Given that additional expenses are incurred and time is 
exhausted when commuting, coupled with the damaging psychological effects, 
the costs of education far outweighed its benefits. 
 
4.2.2 Material Hardship Hampers School Performance 
The families‘ poverty also limits the educational resources available, 
thereby dampening their children‘s school performance: 
Sometimes, it‘s difficult that we don‘t have a computer at home. 
Sometimes, e-learning also must go back to school. People can do at 
home but I have to do at school. (3G, F5) 
 
If people do their projects on computers, I do by hand. So not that nice, 
then I get low marks. (3G, F13) 
 
All parents agreed that having a computer is imperative for their children‘s 
schooling success. Yet, only five families owned ‗hand-me-downs‘ computers, an 
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indication of the working poor‘s exclusion in the ‗field‘ of a knowledge-based 
economy.  
Table 16: Households with Personal Computer and Internet 
Subscription/Access by Income Quintile 
 






 – 20th  45.0 40.0 
21
st
 – 40th  63.3 63.8 
41
th
 – 60th  72.4 74.8 
61
st
 – 80th  80.3 83.5 
81
st
 – 100th  87.5 88.0 
 
Source: Report on the Household Expenditure Survey 2007/2008 (2009: 24). 
 
Between 2007 and 2008, the proportion with computers (45.0%) and Internet 
subscription (40.0%) remained the lowest amongst the bottom 20% of earning 
households (Table 16). Children without computers are especially disadvantaged 
since (i) the education system presumes that all families have computers and 
Internet access (ii) assignment grades are increasingly dependent on the ‗digital‘ 
quality of the student‘s work. 
In some cases, the culmination of material hardship leads to a family 
history of school attrition, as affirmed by the experience of first and second-
generation family members: 
When my pocket money also must struggle by myself… I give up on 
myself lah. I ever aim that if I pass my PSLE, I want to finish my O level 
and N level… But when I see all cock up, I said better stop. It‘s not 
worth that I continue. (2G, F2) 
 
Because I see my younger siblings are in school and they are still young, 
I sacrifice to work to help my mom. Thing is, my mother didn‘t tell me 
to stop. But I myself think that is best to stop. Because the fees were 
really expensive... (1G, F2) 
 
The dearth of economic wherewithal compels younger members of working poor 
families (who are second-generation parents today) to commit the logical 
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‗sacrifice‘ — quitting school to work — without their parents‘ coercion. Though 
disappointed, my informants concurred that they will maintain their pragmatic 
decisions to ‗dropout‘ considering the gravity of their family‘s poverty. In seeking 
to improve their families‘ finances in the short term, the trade-off for limited 
education relegated them to lower-end jobs. This pre-empts them from securing 
higher wages in the long term, thereby reproducing intergenerational poverty, 
which affects their children today. 
 
4.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL 
4.3.1 Working Poor Malays and Intergenerational Employment Patterns 
As Singapore‘s political economy evolved, different family cohorts 
tackled distinct structural challenges (although there are significant overlaps). 
For the first family cohort, many were self-employed as fishermen or food 
hawkers, jualan kat warung (F1). Others worked as rubber tappers, domestic 
maids to English families, kitchen helpers, religious teachers or deck-crew. 
Finding these jobs was easy as formal schooling was not required. Living in 
kampong(s) (villages) with easily accessible land plots, housewives especially, 
reared poultry or grew herbs and fruits — curry and pandan leaves, mangoes, 
rambutan and papayas — for self-consumption. Despite the small remuneration, 
living expenses were fairly manageable: 
In kampong no need to pay water bill, gas bill. No need to pay duit 
sampah [conservancy charges]. If we don‘t have a proper job also, still 
can go to the sea and catch fish. If living in flat, everything must pay. 





Last time, in kampong, prices were cheaper. Small pay also, still can 
survive. But in flat, you feel the ‗tight‘ situation [in budget]. Like 
kampong, don‘t need to buy everything… Even if you buy, it‘s cheap. If 
stay in flat, everything you have to buy. (2G, F7) 
 
Although my informants welcomed the improved sanitation standards in flats, 
burgeoning utility bills reduced their disposable incomes. 
Poor Malay families also depended on geographically-embedded racial 
ties in villages, which offered communally shared resources: 
In kampong, we [neighbours] shared what we had. Pinggan mangkuk 
[utensils], the food that we grew… When we shifted houses in the 1970s, 
the old neighbours and relatives still met, but not as often... (2G, F16) 
 
Although many Malay households tried to settle in the same or adjacent 
neighbourhood during urban resettlement in the 1970s, their spatial dispersion 
into separate blocks gradually weakened these social support networks, and 
capped their access to communal resources. 
Amongst second-generation members, there is some measure of 
occupational continuity. Based on their father‘s recommendations and 
occupational networks, Malay men often worked as deck-crew or drivers. 
However, many chose not to be fishermen due to the hazardous working 
environment. The most marked occupational change occurred amongst young 
Malay women ― colloquially called Minah Karan [Malay girls who work in 
factories]. Many entered the workforce as factory operators in the 1970s through 
the 1980s, paralleling the proletarianization of Malays: 
Later on, I decide to work at Singapore factory. At first, I work at a 
factory called NMB at Kallang, but pay was not that much… But [the 
job is] more stable than [that of] my parents, who sell food. [I] get about 





So after I stop school at 15 years old, I work at a factory. At NMB, they 
call us Minah Karan… The pay was not bad lah, working at factory has 
many benefits. Got CPF can buy houses. One month can get $400. With 
overtime, can get $600 you know! (2G, F7) 
 
For these women, being factory workers marked individual upward mobility in 
various ways: (i) drastic change from their mothers and grandmothers, who were 
full-time housewives (ii) having fixed salaries (iii) gaining CPF benefits to 
purchase a flat after marriage. With the incomes from female employment, most 
families could offset their costly living expenses, and accumulate modest savings. 
Interestingly, Malay women relied on their extended social ties ― ‗word of 
mouth‘ — for information on job vacancies, especially since they could not obtain 
employment ‗tips‘ from their mothers. They usually attended interviews in large 
groups, with other Malay female friends or relatives, and ended up in similar low-
paying occupations. 
In the late 1980s, low-skilled production workers were displaced by 
machines; capital was pitted against labour. The global recession in 1985 
depressed the manufacturing sector. As factories went bust, retrenchment amongst 
women was common. My second-generation female informants confirmed these 
structural changes: 
In the 1980s, the economy went down. So many people got cut. So at 
first, they throw many Malaysians, then Singaporeans. But at the end of 
the day, they never throw all Malaysians. Because they work bond with 
company, and their pay is lesser than us. They are cheaper. But 
eventually the production phased out and shut down. (2G, F7) 
 
The slight economic improvement that came with Malay female employment was 
short-lived, as the recession swiftly shoved these families back into poverty. 
Many working poor Malays faced severe financial setbacks during this period. 
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Their accumulated savings, if any, were exhausted with this crisis, echoing the 
experiences of the current generation. 
Moreover, the consequences of the government‘s foreign labour policy on 
local, lower-skilled workers resonate through the experiences of employed 
members of the second cohort and third-generation family members: 
Now got a lot of foreign workers in factory work or production line, and 
this affects our market because foreign workers have lower pay than 
us… They take in people from China and Sarawak, Singaporeans no 
chance lah… (2G, F10) 
 
If I don‘t have work last time, I can go to any cleaning company… 
Tomorrow, sure got work. But now, different! Interview first, and they 
can even tell you to wait for their call. Why? Because of foreign 
worker… (2G, F8) 
 
Local manual workers, especially in the manufacturing and cleaning industries, 
are crowded out by inexpensive foreign labour
25
. The myth that Malays are fussy 
about their jobs is also challenged. Instead, my informants blamed the profit-
making logic underlying capitalism as disadvantaging low-educated employees. 
I hear people criticizing our locals, especially Malays, that they are 
choosy about jobs and don‘t want to be cleaners. But it‘s not that. It‘s 
because the cleaning company itself finds it cheaper to employ foreign 
workers. For instance, to clean windows of high-rise buildings… If local, 
they want 1.2K at least. Work 5 or 5.5 days. But for instance 
Bangla[deshi] workers, they only get $900 and work 7 days a week. 
Company want to make profit, they take cheap one lah! They care about 
business, so it‘s not about locals being choosy… (2G, F8) 
 
Whereas local workers demand for higher wages, employers strive to minimize 
production costs, signifying the tussle between labour and capital. As these two 
classes have conflicting economic interests, working poor Malays, who are 
                                                          
25
 Currently, the MOM rules that for every full-time Singapore employee, the company can 
employ seven foreign workers (MOM website). 
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disproportionately concentrated in low-paying jobs, only stand to lose. The ability 
of employers to tap on the global labour supply for cheaper foreign labour 
aggravates their plight.  
Transient employment conditions also impinge on the subsistence of 
working poor families: 
The problems start when job condition began to change. Like from full-
time [dispatch rider], my company was switching to courier in 2002-
2003 there. Courier is based on commission. Like if one package is $10, 
they split 60-40. So one day, you get $6. If you make 4 deliveries, it‘s 
only $24. Then own bike, own petrol… It is tough lah. Courier service 
cheaper, they charge $5 per document not counting the area. Because 
company now, they know, if we employ full-timers, we must give MC 
leave, 7 days leave… So the company now is smart, they want to cut and 
cut cost. But what they cut is actually the people below, not the cost. 
(3G, F6) 
 
By pro-rating wages to demands, low-income earners, such as dispatch riders, are 
most disadvantaged as their livelihood is left solely at the mercy of the ‗free 
market.‘ Other informants underscored that contractual work is becoming a norm 
in low-skilled jobs within the cleaning, production and transportation sectors. 
Contractual employment is typically characterized by poorer working conditions 
― no medical benefits, no assurance of stable employment and no CPF. 
Furthermore, the 1997 crisis also intensified the regionalization wave, moving out 
low-skilled jobs to other countries at the expense of local working poor 
employees: 
The factory supplying, packing shampoo, detergent and body products, 
where I was working for 20 years, decided to close shop suddenly 
because of 1997 crisis. You know why? Because most of the factories 
went back to Malaysia where it‘s cheaper. They stop work in Singapore, 




Due to the absence or ineffectiveness of the workers‘ unions in advocating for 
their vulnerable positions, working poor Malays today are locked in a vicious 
cycle of ‗ephemeral‘ employment, which is structurally incapacitated for lifting 
their families out of poverty. 
Although retraining was acknowledged as important to remain employable 
in a knowledge-based economy, my informants also highlighted the blind spots of 
such schemes: 
It‘s not that I don‘t want to upgrade, but there are many things to 
consider. First, childcare? Who‘s going to take care of my children? 
Second, how about my transport cost? Even if subsidize, what about 
time? With 7 children, I‘m the sole breadwinner as a single mother. I can 
try to juggle, but I can also fall sick. By the time I come back, I will be 
really tired. At the end of the day, it‘s the money that is my immediate 
concern. Even then, after I get the certificate, what can I do? I still need 
to find the job. Taking the certificate won‘t give me a better job 
immediately. I still must search right? (2G, F9) 
 
Even when I take the certificate, which I have, when they see my age — 
40s… How to compete with young fresh graduates? (2G, F8) 
 
Whilst F9 (a single mother) was concerned about childcare costs and 
arrangements, F8 (a 40-year old married man from an intact family) had 
apprehensions about the possibility of being hired due to his age. Others 
problematized the rapid redundancy of skills-upgrading, as the competence 
required of workers today has escalated compared to previous cohorts, and over a 
few years: 
When my husband was a dispatch rider, they [the company] retrenched 
him because he got no class 3 [cannot drive]. Then he take class 3, and 
they call him back. Later on, they wanted class 4, and they retrenched 
him again for second time (laughs and shakes head). So my husband take 
class 4 to come back. Right now, he‘s taking class 5… [He‘s] not taking 




For low-skilled workers like F13, retraining does not necessarily mark any 
significant improvement in working conditions or wages. Rather, it merely 
safeguards their current employment by certifying that they have greater 
productivity for similar incomes (previously).  
A more noteworthy point is how ‗family structure‘ affects the volume of 
immediate social capital available to working poor Malays. As F8 can rely on his 
spouse to manage the household, he can, at the very least, contemplate attending 
retraining. In comparison, F9 lacks the equivalent social capital and is precluded 
from even this consideration. To summarize, whilst retraining appears 
straightforward (equipping low-skilled employees with greater productivity to 
secure higher wages), the actual implementation of retraining programmes 
amongst working poor families involves a more intricate consideration of other 
factors, including family structure and immediate social networks. 
Essentially, these narratives reveal two pertinent links between ‗class‘ ties 
(being poor) and the intergenerational employment patterns of working poor 
Malays. First, different generations of working poor Malays faced heterogeneous 
structural hurdles. By virtue of being employed in low-skilled and low-paying 
jobs, working poor Malay families today are increasingly vulnerable to both 
‗local‘ and ‗global‘ structural factors as Singapore shifts towards a knowledge-
based economy. Second, this recurring cycle of vulnerable employment offers few 
social contacts and limited useful information to subsequent generations for 
accessing better job opportunities. As younger members of working poor Malay 
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families are relegated to similar low-skilled occupations as their parents, the cycle 
of limited social capital indirectly regenerates itself. 
 
4.3.2 ‘Racial’ Ties and Habitus: The Baggage of being Malay-
 Muslim 
‗Racial‘ ties are also critical in shaping the habitus of the Malay working 
poor across all generations, to influence (i) the way they comprehend their 
depressed occupational outcomes (ii) their estimation of the probabilities of 
success. 
The first- and second- generations believed that they were precluded from 
employment openings due to their ‗race:‘ 
Bilingual means Chinese and English. Even when we do jobs like 
driving, factory, dispatch which got nothing to do with Chinese, they ask 
to speak Chinese for what also I don‘t know. (1G, F12) 
 
I tried calling for an interview for driver. They ask me for my race. I say 
Malay, then later they say ―Cannot, because we want to find Chinese.‖ I 
said: ―I can speak Chinese.‖ Then they ask me for my age, if above 35 
they don‘t want. I said I was below 35… After much talking, eventually 
they tell me I cannot perform my Friday prayers. So you see from there, 
it‘s not about Malays not wanting the job. But it‘s because some 
employer don‘t want Malays. (2G, F14) 
 
Clearly, the complex intersections of categorical inequalities — low-education, 
language and ‗race‘ — leave working poor Malays triply disadvantaged. First, 
their low qualifications structurally restrict their occupational opportunities to 
blue-collar jobs. Second, the inability to speak Chinese, a form of cultural capital 
in a Chinese working environment, infringes on the limited number of jobs that 
match their education. Even if they were fluent in Chinese, being Malay 
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discounted them as ‗unsuitable‘ for a Chinese working environment. Other 
informants racialized the continued policy of employing foreign workers, 
particularly from China, as reflecting the state‘s racial ‗bias‘ for Chinese, and 
discrimination against Malays: 
If China men come from China, and they can‘t speak orang putih 
[English], they can work here. Even if they cannot speak English, 
Singapore still wants [to employ them]. It‘s not racist uh, my Chinese 
friends who are from Singapore also say the same thing. (2G, F7) 
 
My informants generally believed that being Malay and Muslim, incurred 
negative stereotypes that are jointly owned by the community: 
[Why do you think most employers don‘t want Malays?] Simple. Either 
they think that we are terrorists. Or they think we are lazy. Or they don‘t 
like Malay men to go for Friday prayers… [Why terrorists?] Because of 
JI (Jemaah Islamiyah) bombings and all. (2G, F7) 
 
It appears that the inherited colonial typecast of lazy Malays still haunts the 
community today. The reference to the ―terrorists‖ label (F7) underpins how 
recent global occurrences ― the September 11th incident in 2001 and the Bali 
bombings on October 12
th
 2002 — affected working poor Malays. Although my 
informants were dissatisfied with the ‗unfair‘ treatment that Malays received, they 
would rather keep silent, citing (i) the political ‗powerlessness‘ of their minority 
status (ii) that their livelihoods were dependent on their ‗submission‘ to the state: 
The ones running this country are... them [Chinese]. So like it or not, we 
as a minority must follow. Our hands are tied. If we make noise, we can 
lose our jobs, or end up in the lock-up [jail]. (2F3) 
 
Amongst first-generation members especially, the social memory of being 
Malay-Muslim is explicitly linked to key historical events, such as Singapore‘s 
separation from Malaysia, the questioning of Malay loyalty and state resettlement 
policies in the 1970s: 
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Near independence that time, my late father used to say, if you want to 
have an easy life in Singapore, vote for Lee Kuan Kew, PAP. That is the 
advice I kept in my head from when I was 10 years old till today, that I 
am 54 years old. If Malays want to survive at all, we must follow under 
him. (2G, F4) 
 
 
It‘s an open secret that the gahmen [government] don‘t really like 
Malays. It‘s even an open secret in NS [National Service]. Right from 
day one, they say Malays cannot go ‗high‘ because of ‗national security‘ 
reasons… (1G, F8) 
 
Later on, after we separated from Malaysia, the gahmen [government] 
tried to break up Malay villages, separate us in flats everywhere… They 
didn‘t like us to be together, they always thought we would somehow 
revolt… (1G, F16) 
 
As a result of these historical milestones, first-generation Malay working poor 
become acutely conscious of their social status as ethnic minorities in post-
independence Singapore. These accumulated experiences and perceptions of 
racial discrimination, interact closely and reinforce each other, to shape the 
habitus of the subsequent generations of the Malay working poor even till today: 
I always tell my children… Because we are Malays, we must do two 
times the job to get one time the result. (F13) 
 
Embedded within this worldview, is the Malay working poor‘s anticipation of 
circumscribed upward mobility. Collectively owned stereotypes of Malay-
Muslims are deemed to be more significant than the lack of economic resources, 
in dampening their success. In other words, they have developed a habitus, which 
internalizes ‗race‘ rather than class, as the biggest obstacle to their upward 
mobility. 
Here, a crucial distinction must be made between ‗perceived‘ and ‗real‘ 
racial prejudice. Through their habitus, Malay working poor families realistically 
pitch the degree of achievable upward mobility with reference to their 
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accumulated social memory of being the Malay-Muslim minority. This 
intergenerationally transmitted racial memory (cultural capital) is in turn, 
continuously reinforced by their experiences as, and ties with, low-skilled Malay 
workers (social capital). They work together to shape the habitus of Malays, such 
that their aspirations and projected assessment of achievable success are 
circumscribed by a culturally and structurally imposed 'racial‘ glass ceiling. 
However, this is not to say that Malay working poor families have precluded 
themselves from achieving any absolute upward mobility. To some extent, they 
believe in meritocracy. For instance, all Malay working poor parents are very 
hopeful that their children will be better-off in the future. A closer scrutiny at their 
intergenerational family narratives however, reveals a certain degree of fatalism 
about the level of upward mobility that they may achieve, and even their 
anticipation of failure. These observations will be explained in the next section. 
 
4.4 CULTURAL CAPITAL 
4.4.1 Mismatched School Expectations and Parental Knowledge 
As working poor parents have limited education, they lack the necessary 
cultural capital to comprehend information proficiently, and are also less familiar 
with the educational expectations demanded of their children. This mismatch is 
prevalent in working poor Malay families, albeit in different ways for separate 
family cohorts. 
As they were illiterate, first-generation parents found it difficult to be 
actively involved in their children‘s education, indicating the disparity between 
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parental cultural capital and school expectations, rather than of ‗uninterested‘ 
attitudes: 
My mother, English also she don‘t know. She got go to school, but only 
up till primary. So want to help us in school also, cannot help. My 
parents… hand everything to the teacher. (2G, F6) 
 
You must understand… It‘s not that my parents don‘t care about whether 
we continue school or not, but it‘s because they really don‘t know much 
about education. They know, we go come home, we go to school, we do 
our homework. As long as children go to school, already very good for 
them! (2G, F8) 
 
Gender is also an important factor. First-generation Malay women normally did 
not undergo schooling due to the belief that belajar setinggi mana pun, 
perempuan tetap masuk dapur [Even if they study as much as they want, women 
will still end up in the kitchen]. 
I didn‘t get to go to school before because my grandma thought women 
should stay at home…  Of course I cried then. When I became a parent, I 
want all my kids to go to school. Even the girls… [Why?] If anything 
happens [divorce], they can support themselves… (1G, F3) 
 
For these women, their previous disappointments motivated them to ensure that 
their children had education, either in Malay-stream or English schools. 
With the emphasis on English after independence, some first-generation 
parents sent their children to English-medium schools to boost their chances of 
success. Others eventually switched their children from Malay to English schools. 
However, this strategy often met with limited success. As children from poor 
Malay families during this period lacked adequate tutoring or struggled with the 
language disruptions, their school performance was usually poor or mediocre. 
After successive failures, many eventually withdrew — either in their late primary 
or early secondary school years — to join the labour force as low paid employees. 
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Although second-generation parents had the privilege of learning English, 
they encountered different challenges: 
Now my children are the ones teaching me, not I teach them. That makes 
me feel really useless inside, because I can only supervise, but not 
actually help them in their homework. (2G, F5) 
 
Get ‗O‘ levels in the 1970s, considered good already you know. Can 
become teacher already, people look up [to you] already… Then in the 
80s, ‗O‘ levels become common, people look at ‗A‘ levels… But now 
don‘t know what level we have, maybe lift level? (laughs) So hard to 
catch up and keep track with children‘s pace… (2G, F8) 
 
As Singapore‘s education system rapidly expanded, second-generation parents 
found their knowledge increasingly outmoded. To cope with the changing 
educational field, it is common for middle-class parents in Singapore to engage 
tutors to assist in their children‘s education (ST 13/3/2010)26. 
Struggling with the dearth of financial resources however, my working 
poor informants are immediately frustrated: 
I think they require tuition. But we really, really can‘t afford it. I myself 
can‘t help them. I can only supervise… I can only encourage. (2G, F8) 
 
If they don‘t know their homework, it‘s hard sometimes because I only 
know Malay… So if they can do [their homework by] themselves, that 
would be good… What I can  do is to just sit with them… Moral support 
is all I can give. Not that we don‘t want tuition, but it‘s quite expensive. 
(2G, F10) 
 
At best, these parents can only ―encourage‖ their children to work doubly hard 
and with a bit of luck, perform in school. By leaving school grades to ‗chance,‘ 
possibilities of upward mobility are dismal, if not circumscribed for working poor 
Malays. This is especially so since the type of education that most of these 
                                                          
26
 Affirming the prevalent practice of engaging tutors in Singapore, Education Minister, Dr Ng 
Eng Hen, postulates that ―It's innate in our Asian culture.‖ 
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children were receiving — the EM3 stream (primary), Normal Academic or 
Normal Technical streams (secondary) or the Institute of Technical Education 
(post-secondary) — are closely affiliated with low-skilled and low-paid jobs. 
To compensate for their lack of cultural capital, better-connected parents 
sought occasional ‗free‘ tutoring from their higher-educated relatives (ITE 
students) living near their homes (F10). In contrast, less-connected parents can 
only depend on school teachers (F5 and F9): 
My first-born son, luckily he can do his homework. I see his 
mathematics very confusing lah… But I always say: ―If you don‘t know, 
ask your teacher in school to explain. Better to ask your teacher than to 
ask me because their studies is all ok.‖ (2G, F5) 
 
In studies, if I don‘t know the questions and answers, I will go ask my 
teacher or friend. I don‘t ask my parents… They also wouldn‘t know that 
much… (2G, F9) 
 
If really cannot [do], then they ask their cousin in the next block, who is 
an ITE graduate. (2G, F10) 
 
Clearly, there are limitations in both the quantity and quality of academic 
coaching that is available through these families‘ networks. Apart from housing 
problems and the absence of computers, this acute lack of relevant cultural 
capital, partially accounts for the weak school performances of children from 
working poor Malay families. 
At this juncture, one major question arises. What are the state and Malay-
Muslim welfare organizations doing to help these underprivileged children? My 
fieldwork revealed that most families were already receiving help from the 
‗Straits Times School Pocket Money Fund‘ (SPMF), which covered their 
children‘s basic school costs. Others obtained free books and uniforms from the 
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Ministry of Education (MOE), or were invited to collect used textbooks annually. 
Some of these families received financial assistance from Malay-Muslim 
organizations such as MUIS, AMP or LBKM, or had their children enrolled in 
Mendaki tuition classes. A few were granted bursaries from the Buddhist Lodge 
Foundation. Essentially, these national or community-level schemes offered 
learning resources (‗hardware‘) or tutoring (‗software‘). 
Another important yet understudied factor that indirectly contributes to 
Malay educational malaise lies in the unintended oversights of these assistance 
programmes: 
I can‘t afford to send my kids to tuition. For Mendaki classes, yes... I‘ve 
been offered Mendaki classes, but cannot make it lah... Yes, the class is 
free, but it‘s like... (pauses)... The tutors are... not as good as professional 
tutors that you pay outside. The way the tutors at Mendaki teach is sort of 
‗weak‘ and ‗slow‘... I don‘t even think they are paid, maybe that‘s why? 
(hesitates) It‘s like these volunteer tutors give the children questions to do, 
but that‘s about it. So even though my children went for Mendaki classes, 
there‘s no improvement... (2G, F7) 
 
We were under the MUIS Empowerment Partnership Scheme (EPS) for 
about 3 years. After 3 years, they look at our record and say that we are 
‗overdue.‘ But my kids are still growing, expenses are growing, it‘s just 
that my income is not growing. Maybe MUIS thinks that my family dah 
[is] closed case, that we are independent already, that we graduate 
already… (2G, F8) 
 
F7 highlighted that Mendaki tuition classes may be ineffective for helping weaker 
students. As these lessons are conducted in a large classroom with thirty to forty 
students, weaker pupils from poor families are shortchanged of the intensive 
coaching that they really need. Once the three year limit is reached, F8 is 
‗assumed‘ to be self-sustaining and is discontinued from EPS. However, almost a 
year after their ‗graduation‘ from the programme, this family, which has a gross 
household income of $1030 (an increase from $853 two years ago after retraining) 
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to support nine family members, had incurred outstanding debts on their 
children‘s school fees. Whilst the termination of assistance avoids welfare 
dependency, families like F8 demonstrate how it may lead to unintended long-
term consequences — regression and aggravation of poverty. Even after 
retraining, this family‘s income is still structurally incapacitated to meet their 
basic expenses. 
 
4.4.2 The Negative and Positive Uses of ‘Failures’ and ‘Successes’ in Family 
 Narratives 
Intergenerationally transmitted family narratives also influence the 
reproduction, or limited transformation, of intergenerational poverty in culturally 
meaningful ways: 
Easy said, my family comes from golongan orang susah [poor people]. 
Before me, my late father was poor. Before my late father, my 
grandfather also was poor. Then come to me, also not well-off… To me, 
why I become like this, it‘s my fate… [Do you think it‘s natural?] To a 
certain extent. Got the turun-temurun [inheritable/family tree] factor… 
But hopefully, my children will be not like us. I will send them to school 
all the way, and tell them school is important. (3G, F6) 
 
Misrecognizing poverty as ‗natural,‘ F6 has internalized the intergenerational 
experiences of hardship as part of his habitus. The continuous cultural production 
of poverty as a ‗constant‘ in family stories depresses, if not negate, F6‘s 
perception about his possibility of upward mobility. Alternatively, the habitus of 
working poor descendents can be conditioned through ‗positive‘ role modeling: 
Mother: I was in Normal Tech last time. Studies was so-so lah; I drop 
out halfway. Because my mother don‘t have enough money, I decide to 





Daughter: I got no more interest in studies, just simple as that. (pause) 
Because, I feel I want to help my mother. Our family situation is like 
this, so I plan to go work. Got KFC, got McDonalds… Can work there 
what… Now, I‘m waiting for my IC. Maybe I will work with my mother 
too (as a cleaner)? …If my mother can make it, I also can. 
 
Mother: She‘s like me lah, when I was younger. Can see lah that it‘s 
turun-temurun [it runs in the family]. Insyaallah [Hopefully], it won‘t be 
passed to the rest [of my children]… (2G and 3G, F9) 
 
The 16 year old eldest daughter viewed her mother‘s experiences — a 35 year old 
single-mother who works as a cleaner to raise seven children — as exemplary. 
The irony occurs when the daughter subsequently utilized this family narrative as 
the ‗ideal‘ benchmark for measuring her accomplishments. Following in her 
mother‘s footsteps, she withdrew from school and aspired to become a cleaner to 
support her family. The daughter‘s decision ‗baffled‘ me initially. Later, I made 
sense of it as being closely intertwined with how her family esteemed poverty as a 
means of gaining wisdom: 
Mother: When I was young, my world living with my own mother and 
father was already in hardship. So I teach my children to live life start 
from below, then can live easy... We must teach our kids start from 
below, not the top. Because if you live here (makes hand gestures 
denoting low), you can go up and even if you face hardship, you know 
how to live the hard way. But if you start here (makes hand gestures 
denoting high), very hard to adjust if you suddenly become poor. (2G, 
F9) 
 
Viewed through this habitus, the daughter sees the humbling experiences of 
hardship as accentuating her appreciation of future successes. Overarching her 
‗moral‘ outlook however, is still the pragmatic pursuit of immediate income 
through work, in lieu of education, to alleviate the family‘s poverty.  
More significantly, my ‗bafflement‘ unravels my middle-class 
assumptions. Whereas I had pre-imposed the view that education is the ‗best‘ 
means of attaining upward mobility, the case of F9 shows that it may not be the 
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‗best‘ recourse for working poor families. The daughter‘s sacrifice to quit school 
increases the family‘s income, and promises greater leeway for her siblings‘ 
upward mobility. Simply put, I was assessing F9‘s aspirations against my middle-
class expectations, rather than their realities. In retrospect, MacLeod‘s (1987) 
concept of ‗levelled aspirations‘ now appears problematic for it presumes that 
middle-class expectations are the ‗ideal‘ to work towards. Instead, it is necessary 
to assess the ‗starting points‘ of each poor family to make sense of the ‗ending 
points‘ that they aspire to. The pivotal difference between F6 and F9 lies in the 
way they made meaningful sense of intergenerational poverty. Whilst F6 
negatively employed poverty to rationalize his depressed status outcome today, 
F9 positively interpreted poverty as a maturing and moralistic experience. Both 
nevertheless, have the consequence of dampening the ambitions of future 
generations. In this instance, working poor Malays become accomplices in their 
own social destiny, by developing habitus(es) which misrecognize poverty as 
‗natural‘ (Bourdieu 1990). 
However, subsequent generations do not necessarily internalize 
intergenerational narratives about family failures without question, as culturalist 
explanations of poverty or some cultural reproduction theories may presuppose. 
When some of my informants strategically reframed ―bad experiences of the past‖ 
(2G, F5) as fables, they indirectly altered the habitus of poor families, thereby 
directing the upward mobility of younger members: 
I make myself as an example. I say: ―You all must study hard. Look at 
me. You don‘t tell me you all in the future, also want to be and live like 
this. Even for my son also, I teach him this. Let them know what hard 
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life is now… Even though we got problems or what, still we got our 
principles, still we have our discipline. (2G, F2) 
 
But now, I know the effects of having low education. For my children, I 
always tell them, advise them that they must get good education. That is 
how I educate them… I will give them the best resources I can for their 
school… They want to go university. (2G, F8) 
 
When repackaged in a positive manner, tales of failure serve as cultural 
mechanisms to propel their escape from the poverty cycle, although this may only 
last for as long as they are able to postpone employment. Capitalizing on the 
insights gained from their elders‘ mistakes, younger members of these families 
aspire to pursue higher education, unlike previous families. 
Whilst individual attitudes are commonly cited as the fundamental cause 
of such differences in educational aspirations, my fieldwork reveals that the 
quality of social capital owned by these families is a more pertinent factor. The 
proximity of social capital is especially important, for working poor Malay 
families subconsciously look to their immediate social networks, when forming 
their own ambitions. In short, the greater the similarity between the class position 
of working poor Malay families and their closest networks, the more likely it is 
that their children‘s aspirations will be constricted. In comparison, children from 
families that had immediate contacts who were more successful, tend to exhibit a 
wider variety of ambitions.  
Although my statistical analyses revealed the limited extent of upward 
mobility amongst Malays (Chapter 3), all of my informants believed in 
meritocracy to some degree. Their general ‗optimism‘ about upward mobility 
through education possibly stems from the significant improvement in living 
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standards — the transition from kampongs to flats, and the availability of better 
hygiene. However, if we were to recall the case of F9, the family is resigned to 
the fact that the eldest daughter has to ‗fail‘ for her siblings to succeed. Another 
mother also highlighted her reservations about her 11-year old eldest son‘s 
mobility outcome: 
For my children, if can, I really want them to have a better life. Even 
their father is [educated] until primary 6 only. So, he also doesn‘t want 
kind of life for them… But my first son is more ‗influence‘ to the father. 
He likes to delay-delay when it comes to education. The academic also 
like a bit slack… (2G, F2) 
In addition to ‗racial‘ barriers to job opportunities, my informants‘ beliefs in 
meritocracy are bracketed against the strong currents of their family ‗poverty‘ 
histories (ie. ‗tendencies‘ of previous generations). The position of a child in a 
family also exerts critical influence on one‘s likelihood for upward mobility. 
Normally, first-born children struggle the most. As they are the first amongst their 
siblings to experience and deal with their parents‘ hardships, they are more likely 




To summarize, this chapter has traced the intergenerational transfer of 
capital across three cohorts of working poor Malay families, in three broad 
spheres: (i) economic capital (incomes and housing) (ii) social capital 
(occupations and racial ties) (iii) cultural capital (education and aspirations). In 
conclusion, the ethnographic insights refine our comprehension of the conceptual 
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bridges between mechanisms of intergenerational mobility and in-work poverty 
on four levels. 
First, the concept of ‗in-work poverty‘ is only useful insofar as it describes 
a specific form of poverty within an urbanized and industrial setting. When the 
cultural reproduction model is applied however, poverty becomes much more 
layered and complex. The case of working poor Malay families confirms that 
poverty is not a uniform condition. In fact, experiences of poverty are necessarily 
heterogeneous, given these families‘ differential ownership of economic, social 
and cultural capital, or the lack of thereof. 
Bourdieu‘s (1990: 214) assertion that ―those who talk of equality of 
opportunity forget that social games are… not fair games‖ certainly rings true in 
Singapore‘s case. Although the practices of working poor families are strictly 
speaking not engineered, their struggle for upward mobility is severely 
handicapped, if not obstructed, by their unequal ‗starting points‘ — the lack of 
various capital forms, which is directly or indirectly transmitted across 
generations. Whilst the dearth of economic capital is significant, it has been 
overemphasized in studies of in-work poverty and Malay underdevelopment. 
Rather, I have shown that the lack of social and cultural capital is equally central, 
in shaping the status outcomes of ensuing generations in working poor families. 
Despite the close links between the three capital types, I have also illustrated that 
the intergenerational transmission of each resource is distinct. 
Third, the findings debunk assumptions that working poor Malays are any 
less interested in the chase for upward mobility. Even as they are actively 
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attempting to transform their habitus, my informants are shortchanged by the 
rapidly changing rules of the game within the ‗field‘ of Singapore‘s evolving 
political economy: 
It is like a never-ending chase… We chase and we chase, but it gets 
harder and harder. (2G, F14) 
 
By virtue of lacking the relevant capital types within each historical period, each 
cohort is continuously disadvantaged. Whilst absolute upward mobility is not an 
issue, the crucial point is that the degree of mobility realistically accessible to the 
Malay working poor, appears to be circumscribed by both structural factors — 
Singapore‘s political economy which defines the ‗field‘ and the criterion for 
mobility for each generation, and cultural milieu (habitus) — the dispositions and 
belief systems of these families, which are tied to their socio-structural locations. 
Fourth, it is important to underscore that this chapter‘s analysis of ‗cultural 
milieu‘ differs vastly from ‗culturalist‘ conceptions of poverty on three counts. In 
contrast to the presumption that social actors are passive heirs of poverty, my 
informants were proactively charting their own destinies, even when they 
anticipated failure. Whereas culturalist explanations view ‗culture‘ as a fixed and 
independent variable in engendering poverty, I have shown that inequality 
regenerates itself differently across different family units (space) and family 
cohorts (time), through the creative manipulation of family narratives. In fact, the 
habitus (cultural milieu) of working poor Malay families are closely affiliated 
with, and interdependent on, their social locations and experiences (who and 
where they have been). Finally, I have departed from the fixation on culture in 
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culturalist models, to include other equally crucial factors such as employment 
networks, racial ties and financial constraints, in reproducing poverty. 
At this juncture, the testaments of working poor Malay families serve as 
timely counter-narratives to check against the experiences of social service 
workers and Malay leaders. The next chapter aims to unveil some of the parallels 
and departures in discourses of in-work poverty between these three groups. 
Specifically, I will examine how these actors employ the terms ‗culture‘ and 




CHAPTER FIVE: DISCOURSES OF IN-WORK POVERTY AND MALAY 
ECONOMIC UNDERDEVELOPMENT —  THE RELATIONAL  
MATRIX OF POWER 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Based on in-depth interviews conducted with sixteen working poor Malay 
families, thirteen social service practitioners and six Malay leaders, this chapter 
has two objectives. First, it seeks to document the divergences in habitus between 
these groups, and the ramifications for intergenerational poverty. Second, it 
unravels how ‗culture‘ and ‗structure‘ have been discursively employed to 
understand in-work poverty and Malay economic underdevelopment. Whereas the 
previous two chapters have focused on working poor Malays, greater attention 
will be given to middle-class actors in this chapter. 
I will reveal that all three groups of actors continually straddle between 
structural, cultural and individual-level explanations, in their efforts to understand 
why the working poor are disproportionately Malays. The seemingly 
‗disinterested‘ actions and views of actors in dominant positions — social service 
practitioners and Malay leaders — reflect their middle-class habitus. Two 
implications result from this. The ‗clashes‘ in habitus that occur when working 
poor Malay families encounter middle-class social service practitioners, have 
direct influences on the outcomes of the former‘s welfare application. By actively 
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pursuing their self-interests via their respective habitus, each of these three groups 
indirectly ends up reaffirming the ‗field‘ of inequality in Singapore. 
 
5.2 MATRIX OF SOCIO-STRUCTURAL RELATIONS 
This section briefly details the (i) social service infrastructure in Singapore 
(ii) social background of middle-class actors from two other groups — social 
service practitioners and Malay leaders. 
 
5.2.1 Field: Social Service Climate in Singapore Today 
Social workers are specifically trained in social work. Established in 1971, 
the Singapore Association of Social Workers (SASW) explained the nature of 
social work: 
Social workers… are trained to make objective assessments, carry out 
interventions and mobilize resources to promote, support and strengthen 
the coping capacities of individuals and families. 
(7/6/1999 ST) 
 
SASW has set a social work degree as the minimum requirement to become a 
social worker (see Table 17). University graduates of related subjects (such as 
psychology) are also considered, albeit with differentiated job titles. Without a 
degree, others may serve as social work assistants or welfare officers. I will use 
the term ‗social service practitioners‘ to refer to these workers in welfare-related 
organizations
27
 that deal directly with working poor clients. 
                                                          
27
 These include voluntary welfare organizations (VWOs) and government statutory boards. 
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In 2006, there were about 380 social workers in Singapore. Even within 
this small number, only 85% are trained in social work (MCYS 2006). Although 
600 social workers are registered today, the figure cannot meet the growing 
demands for social services. It is estimated that Singapore will lack 60 social 
workers annually, for the next five years (10/3/2010 CNA). Due to heavy 
workloads
28
 (MCYS 2006; 20/1/2007 ST; 16/4/2008 ST) and low starting wages 
(between $1,800 and $2,400) (15/4/1993 ST), entry into this profession has been 
dwindling (23/11/1995 ST; 4/1/2002 ST) and attrition rates are high. In 2000, less 
than half of 100 graduating students in social work joined the profession 
(13/12/2000 ST). 
Table 17: Entry Requirements for Selected Occupations in the Social and 
Community Services Sector 
 




Degree in Social Work or Psychology 
National University of Singapore 
 
Social Work Assistant/Aide 
 
‗Diploma (Grade I) 
‗A‘ Level (Grade II) 
‗O‘ Level (Grade III) 
Singapore Institute of Management 
 
Marriage and Family 
Therapist 
 
Professional training in family and marital 
therapy at post-graduate level, including 250 
hours of supervised practical experience 





Degree in Psychology 
National University of Singapore 
                                                          
28
 In 2009, every caseworker has an average of 65 cases every month (12/6/2009 ST). They can 
only meet their clients monthly, which is inadequate as ‗dysfunctional families‘ require greater 
time and effort. In 2010, each social worker at a family service centre handles 40 to 50 cases on 






Diploma or Degree in Social work, 
Psychology and/or Counselling. Counselling 
experience and interest. 
Care and Counselling Centre 
 
Source: Social Service Career Choices, SASW website. 
 
This ‗bottleneck‘ in the supply of social workers possibly accounts for the 
recruitment of non-social work trained persons into social services (24/3/2009 
ST). To promote social service careers, MCYS introduced a pay hike for social 
workers by 14 to 16% (11/3/2010 ST). Apart from monetary considerations, a 
significant part of the problem resided in the occupation‘s lackluster status 
(19/4/1992 ST; 21/3/2010 ST). Despite introducing accreditation to 
professionalize social work in Singapore (1/4/2009 ST), it remains an unpopular 
job choice (17/3/2010 ST), and is often misconceived as ―dangerous,‖ ―volunteer 
work‖ or a ―job which is subjected to verbal abuse‖ (20/3/2009 AsiaOne). 
Currently, there is an acute shortage of Malay social workers to deal with 
needy Malay families
29
. The Minister in charge of Muslim Affairs, Dr Yaacob 
Ibrahim, commented: 
I can't force our undergraduates to take up social work ... They have to 
think about it (but) we need… more because our numbers (of 




Although 50 to 60 Malay students pursued social work degrees in the National 
University of Singapore (NUS) annually, many switched to teaching after 
graduation for higher salaries (18/1/2010 ST). In addition to mainstream social 
                                                          
29
 Malays formed a ―sizeable 40%‖ of the client base at Tampines Family Service Centre. 
However, the centre does not have any Malay social workers. Instead, non-Malay social workers 
who are fluent in Malay, handle Malay cases (11/3/2010 ST). 
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workers, asatizah (religious teachers) also counselled needy Malay families in 
their own capacities (MCYS 2005). Despite calls for greater public acceptance of 
the cross-cultural provision of social services, reservations about language 
barriers and the comfort levels that Malay clients have with non-Malay social 
service practitioners continued (18/1/2010 Today; 11/3/2010 ST).  
 Historical archives have shown that a plethora of Malay/Muslim bodies 
had already existed prior to Singapore‘s independence (Roff 1967; Ismail 1974; 
Wan Hussin Zohri 1987). In post-independent Singapore however, MUIS and 




Institutionalized as a statutory board in 1968, Majlis Ugama Islam 
Singapura (MUIS) or the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, served as the 
custodians of religion for Malay-Muslims (MUIS 2000). Part of MUIS‘ duties 
includes collecting zakat — personal taxes — for the community‘s development. 
In 2008, 32% of the zakat contributions (6.85 million) were allocated to the poor. 
Between 2004 and 2007, 400 needy families with young children participated in 
MUIS‘ Empowerment Partnership Scheme (EPS), aimed at helping them 
―become self-reliant‖ (MCYS 2008). 209 of these families have graduated, and 
were no longer deemed to be dependent on MUIS‘ assistance (Ibid). 
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 In 1968, there were 30 Malay/Muslim welfare organizations altogether  (Ismail 1974: 44). 
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Mendaki was established in 1982, to uplift the educational achievements 
of Malays
31
 through various educational assistance schemes (Mendaki 1986). 
Whilst the Tertiary Tuition Fee Subsidy (TTFS) offered subsidies for students 
pursuing higher education (from families with household incomes less than 
$3000), the Study Loan Schemes offered interest-free loans. Mendaki also held 
classes to boost the grades of Malay pupils under the Mendaki Tuition Scheme 
(MTS). In addition, it has a wing
32
 to enhance the employability of the Malay 
workforce through training and employment facilitation. 
Disdained by the performance of the Malay members of parliament
33
, the 
Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP) emerged in 1991, seeing itself as 
providing alternative assistance (AMP 1990: 16). In 2000, AMP proposed 
‗collective leadership‘ — compromising of only Malay leaders elected by the 
Malay community — to address the limitations of existing ones (AMP 2000). 
These debates gradually subsided after the state responded that such communal 
calls threatened national integration efforts (Suriani 2004). Today, AMP remains 
a partner in community self-help efforts, and provides financial assistance to 
needy Malays. 
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 This was after the 1980 census revealed the ―generally low socio-economic status of Singapore 
Malays‖ (Wan Hussin 1987: 189). 
32
 This wing is called Mendaki SENSE (Social Enterprise Network Singapore Private Limited). 
33
 Prior to AMP‘s emergence, the state had made allegations about the ―decreasing number of 





 October 2003, the Community Leaders‘ Forum (CLF) was 
established: 
Community-based organizations, such as Mendaki, should also provide 
programmes and services to fill the gaps that are unique to the 
community… Given the shrinking charity dollar, it would be 
worthwhile… to also leverage on national infrastructure and each other‘s 
expertise and explore sharing resources to save cost. 
(Speech 2009, Mendaki Appreciation Tea) 
 
CLF marked another critical milestone in Malay leadership, for it sought to 
enhance the synergy and prevent the duplication of efforts in the Malay-Muslim 
voluntary sectors
34
. Currently about 5000 to 7000 Malay-Muslim families are 
recipients of assistance from both national and Malay-Muslim agencies (CLF 
Report 2007). In 2008, Program Bijak Belanja (Smart Spending Programme) was 
implemented to impart financial literacy and budgeting tools specifically to Malay 
applicants. 
 
5.2.2 Habitus: Brief Profiles of Informants 
My social service informants
35
 received tertiary education in polytechnics 
or universities. Placing social work as their first career choice, only two 
interviewees pursued social work degrees. Another informant entered social 
services after retirement, citing the desire to ―contribute to the community‖ as her 
primary motivation (SSP4). The remaining ten informants pursued other non-
social work disciplines initially (see Table 18). 
                                                          
34
 Four sectoral networks — Education, Youth, Family and Employability — were created to 
tackle the specific issues in these respective domains. 
35
 To recapitulate, they comprised of nine Malays and four non-Malays. 
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Whilst ―interest in helping the needy‖ was frequently cited, their entry into 
social service often coincided with the ‗urgency‘ to secure a job for various 
reasons — (i) temporary measure whilst searching for better employment 
opportunities (ii) bad job market conditions (iii) dissatisfaction with other jobs: 
[Earlier] Although my boss says that I‘m overqualified for the job 
(disbursing financial assistance), I can contribute back to the community, 
so why not? [Later] I am only… a temporary staff. No, I‘m not planning 
to work a long time inside there. This is to tide me over... (SSP1) 
 
I joined this line because that time when I graduated… the economy was 
still recovering from the ‗bubble burst‘ in 2001. So it was tough finding a 
job. (SSP6) 
 
I was in civil engineering. Basically when we talk about Malay-Muslim 
kids, the fact that we are lagging behind… Perhaps with better education, 
they will do better. So after graduation, I took a year to set up a business 
model to inculcate good values in Malay kids… It didn‘t really work out. 
Probably I‘m not a good businessman... Yeah. And I‘m here [in social 
services]. (SSP8) 
 
During their stint as social service practitioners, these informants received on-the-
job training. Whilst some eventually left the profession, others remained for 
passion or occupational stability. A few are currently pursuing social work 
degrees. Except for one social service practitioner who came from a single-mother 
family, the rest were from intact families. Originating from humble economic 
backgrounds, most of my informants had achieved upward intergenerational 
mobility. For those who are married, they had two or three children at most, citing 
the high costs of child-rearing as a major reason. 
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Table 18: Distribution of Social Service Informants by Subject of Study 
 
Subject of Study Number of 
Informants 
Social Work  
Social Work Degree 
 
2 
Non-Social Work  
Business Administration or Finance 3 
Early Childhood 1 
Engineering 1 
Islamic Studies 1 
Psychology  2 
Social Sciences 3 
Total 13 
 
All of the six Malay leaders who were interviewed, had degrees or 
postgraduate degrees. Many came from humble family backgrounds in the 
kampong days, and rose to success after acquiring scholarships to pursue higher 
education. As young children, they witnessed the Malay community‘s 
socioeconomic development and the nation‘s struggles during early 
independence. Presently, they are holding important positions in their respective 
fields — state ministries, academic institutions or Malay-Muslim organizations. 
As five of my informants are members of the parliament, they can be viewed as 
part of the political elite minority in Singapore. They meet needy families from all 
ethnic groups weekly in the ‗Meet-the-People‘ sessions36. Despite Singapore‘s 
noteworthy reputation as a non-corrupt state, its political figures have been 
subjected to periodic scrutiny (14/4/2007 ST). In 2007, the public problematized 
the hike in ministerial salaries when taxes on goods and services (GST) were 
raised (5/4/2007 Reuters; 12/4/2007 CNA; 12/4/2007 Today; 13/4/2007 ST). In 
response, the state argued that the measure was crucial for retaining talent in the 
                                                          
36
 Citizens meet members of parliament to resolve their problems with the state bureaucracy. 
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public sector (16/4/2007 CNA)
37
. Broadly speaking, these six interviewees 
constitute the class of Malay educated elites in Singapore today (in view of their 
affluence, and active involvement in national and/or community organizations). 
As a collective, they constitute an empirical challenge to culturalist explanations 
of underdevelopment amongst Malays. 
By detailing their working environments (field), material circumstances 
and cultural histories (who and where they have been), one achieves a more 
refined understanding of the factors that shape the habitus of social service 
practitioners and Malay leaders. Furthermore, it illuminates the matrix of socio-
structural relations underlying the ‗field‘ of inequality in Singapore. In 
extrapolating, differences in class experiences and locations become accentuated. 
Compared to working poor Malays, social service practitioners and Malay leaders 
have achieved commendable intergenerational upward mobility in post-
independence Singapore. The latter two groups are also dominant actors within 
the social service field, controlling access to the resources for needy families 
(albeit in varying degrees). Social service practitioners act as frontline officers 
when working poor Malays seek counselling or financial aid. However, the 
involvement of Malay leaders extends beyond the ‗Meet-the-People‘ sessions, to 
include devising strategies and programmes aimed at helping the needy. 
With this overarching backdrop in mind, the next two sections are 
organized around two recurring issues that emerged during the in-depth 
                                                          
37
 A Minister revealed that ―it is inevitable that one makes comparisons [between public and 
private sector wages]‖ (13/4/2007 ST).  
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interviews: (i) disproportionate composition of Malays in in-work poverty (ii) 
effectiveness of welfare disbursement and policies. Each section will reveal the 
wide spectrum of ideas and belief systems that were espoused by three different 
groups of social actors, pertaining to in-work poverty and Malay 
underdevelopment. 
 
5.3 DISCOURSE (I): PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY AND ITS DISPROPORTIONATE 
 MALAY COMPOSITION 
5.3.1 Culture of Poverty 
Social service practitioners generally alluded to the ‗lifestyle‘ of poor 
families as a cause of poverty, although the extent of their emphases varied. 
Despite being cautious about generalizing the ‗culture of poverty‘ to Malays, 
many mentioned extravagance (SSP2) and the lack of interest in work (SSP3) as 
prevalent within the community: 
Frankly it‘s a Malay lifestyle. The way they live, it‘s based on what they 
want, not what they need… But at the end of the day, they can‘t afford… 
They cannot control their spending! (SSP2) 
 
They have never been in a ‗structure‘ or a ‗system‘ that enable them to 
be disciplined. For us, it‘s easy [emphasis added]. Tell us to work, we 
work... People provoke us into a fight, we be patient... But not for them! 
Their understanding is this: ―If I overslept, never mind, I just return to 
sleep… If don‘t want to study, don‘t go to school!‖ Amongst the poor, 
they develop a common culture! I have never done research on this, but I 
believe there must have been something in the culture that made these 
people the way they are… (SSP3) 
 
Here, some social service practitioners subconsciously evaluated their client‘s 
‗culture‘ against their middle-class values, paralleling Moynihan‘s (1996 [1965]) 
assessment of Negro families against middle-class White families in America. 
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School attrition or absence for instance, is reduced to flawed ‗cultural‘ habits 
amongst poor Malays. 
Others let slip their preferences for dual-income and smaller families, 
when recounting common ‗mindset‘ barriers amongst Malay clients: 
Does this mean when you work, your children will necessarily be 
delinquents? I make myself [working mother] as an example. I always 
challenge why mothers can‘t go out to work, or why wives cannot go out 
to work. (SSP8) 
 
If you talk about the problems that are specific to Malays, definitely 
[having] more children is the most common issue... For Malay-Muslims, 
there‘s this concept that children are gifts from God. And with every kid, 
comes its rezeki [gifts from God]... They do not understand the concept 
of family planning as much as other races. Although there are phrases in 
the Quran that children are gifts from God, if you explore deeper, there 
are other motivating factors in the Quran itself which are not as widely 
publicized and known. You should only have as much [children] as you 
can provide for. (SSP9) 
 
Through their middle-class habitus, several social service practitioners criticized 
full-time housewives as ‗irrational;‘ their renouncement of employment indirectly 
perpetuates the poverty cycle (SSP8). Having more children is viewed as 
incurring additional expenses, which reduce the disposable incomes available to 
poor families (SSP9). Having large families was racialized as a peculiar ‗Malay‘ 
trait, although cross-national studies have revealed that this is common amongst 
the poor. This ‗calculated‘ viewpoint of family formation contrasts starkly with 
what most social service practitioners termed as the ‗cultural-religious‘ outlook 
internalized by the Malay working poor. My social service informants claimed 
that working poor Malays lacked the foresight for long-term family planning, by 
viewing children as rezeki. 
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As opposed to their non-Malay counterparts, many Malay social service 
practitioners tended to reduce economic underdevelopment amongst Malays to 
religion-based factors: 
The people are usually pasrah [surrender everything to God]... At the 
end of the day, it‘s their own mentality… The religious outlook is an 
easily satisfied mindset... If got problem, remember God. If no problem, 
forget. (SSP2) 
 
Religion is a very important entity. All religion teaches you to do good 
things for yourself. Don‘t depend on people. But if you don‘t understand 
these things, then you don‘t even love yourself... So religious orientation 
is very important, right? As long as you have keimanan [devotion to god] 
and you do what has been mentioned in the Quran, everything is there! 
(SSP4) 
 
From the Malay social service practitioners‘ standpoint, backward Islamic 
orientation obstructed economic advancement in two ways. By being resigned to 
their fates, working poor Malays were easily satisfied by mediocre progress 
(SSP2). Furthermore, the lack of ‗proper religious values‘ led to ‗deviant‘ 
lifestyles — out-of-wedlock pregnancy or becoming loan shark runners — that 
depressed their life-chances (SSP4). By racializing these two attributes as an 
‗innate‘ part of the Malay working poor behaviour, several Malay social service 
practitioners uncritically reduced in-work poverty amongst Malays to a ‗cultural‘ 
factor. 
Amongst social service practitioners, their specific uses of culture — 
‗pathological traits‘ and ‗way of life‘— parallel the culturalist perspective of 
poverty. These unanimous allusions to ‗culture‘ can only be meaningfully 
appreciated within the context of the social service working environment: 
Social workers are really overworked people because we have a lot to 
handle. Sometimes, the worst part of the job is that when you have given 
your best to help the family and try to get solutions to the problems, 
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these families just decide to get up and leave. And all our effort goes 
down to waste. Yes, do you know that on average a social worker has to 
process about thirty cases a day? That is really a lot of work, and 
sometimes there‘s only so much we can do if these families themselves 
are not interested. (SSP3) 
 
The overwhelming workload clearly compromises the efficacy of social service 
practitioners to manage their clients‘ cases (SSP3). Thus, the periodic blaming of 
individual or cultural flaws serves as vital coping mechanisms, whenever they 
failed to effect positive change in their clients‘ situation. It also maintains the 
‗false‘ yet ‗necessary‘ hope that social service practitioners are able to change the 
lives of the needy (SSP4): 
If you brood over what you think you have failed to achieve, then it‘s not 
going to help you to move on. Because in social work, there‘s a lot of 
things to make you feel stressed. First, not being able to help people; 
second, not being able to change people. So if you‘re always going to be 
stressed, then it‘s not going to be easy. It‘s ok that we don‘t help our 
clients but at the end of the day, our advice will have value... It‘s about 
being idealistic but also knowing your limitations. The important thing is 
never to give up. (SSP4) 
 
Furthermore, the misrecognition of ‗culture‘ as the primary cause of 
poverty downplays the limited capacity of social services to eradicate poverty: 
If we try too much also, then we might just ‗overburn‘ ourselves or we 
realize: ―Shit ah, we are stuck!‖ You can‘t change much, so you give up. 
Instead of that, why not you define what you can change and do the best 
that you can? You might not be able to change everybody‘s life but that 
individual alone is worth it. If you can save that one family… To that 
family, it matters. (SSP7) 
 
I think there‘s something that can actually be done. Definitely nobody 
can change the infrastructure, or control it... But there are certain things 
you can do to be less affected by this structure... (SSP8) 
 
By acknowledging that they were constrained by predefined procedures and 
policies, social service practitioners were resigned to the remedial nature of social 
services in resolving poverty (SSP7 and SSP8). Implicit in the data is therefore 
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the glaring incongruity between the individual-level intervention characteristic of 
social services, and the reality that in-work poverty is a consequence of structural 
exploitation under capitalism. In this instance, social service practitioners 
ironically mirrored working poor Malays, through their anticipation of failure 
even as they were helping their clients. By misrecognizing their failures as 
stemming from the clients‘ problematic ‗cultures‘ rather than ‗structures,‘ social 
service practitioners were complicit actors in reproducing inequality. 
 
5.3.2 Pains and Joys of Large Families 
In contrast, working poor Malays proposed alternative explications about 
their family arrangements: 
After this, no more lah! Four children enough lah! I think children are a 
source of happiness but we can‘t afford anymore. (3G, F6) 
 
I‘m happy to have large families because they are sources of support 
when you grow up…Because kids are gift from God. Rezeki kan? [Are 
you going to have more children?] I have 5 kids already! How else to 
have another kid? Wait, not enough money… I stop already lah! (laughs) 
(2G, F8) 
 
The religious notion rezeki [blessings] does influence their family planning 
practices to a certain extent. Contrary to the opinions of social service 
practitioners however, second- and third-generation working poor Malay parents 
were aware of the need to limit their family sizes. Yet, most social service 
practitioners insisted that these beliefs were not translated into practice: 
Even I myself only want 2 kids. To have 4, 5, 6 or 7 children when 




The issue is not about agreeing on the need for smaller, sustainable 
families. Rather, it stems from the divergences between the middle-class and 
working-class habitus, and the corresponding beliefs about family formation. 
Clearly, working poor Malays have defined ‗small families‘ differently from 
middle-class social service practitioners. The former benchmarked their ‗ideal‘ 
family size in relation to their parents or grandparents (who previously had ten 
children or more), rather than middle-class standards. In particular, Malay-
Muslim social service practitioners were most inclined to misrecognize flawed 
Islamic beliefs as the fundamental, if not the sole, reason for large-sized poor 
Malay families. Often, working poor Malays were frustrated by the 
‗dysfunctionality‘ stigma associated with large families: 
People always like to think that if you got many children, they get 
abandoned? That‘s what the TV says, what my old neighbours say. I ever 
heard people criticize me before. They say: ―Only one husband, sole 
breadwinner, still want to keep giving birth only…‖ I never said 
anything in return. In my heart though, I go like: ―It‘s not like I‘m asking 
you for money for the milk powder, so why do you make so much 
noise?‖ (2G, F7) 
 
Beyond religious explanations, it is important to recognize that children 
are highly valuable assets for working poor Malay families, which were already 
lacking in economic, social and cultural capital: 
People see me… They only see a happy face but they don‘t know I 
repress and hide my feelings… That‘s why I like to entertain my 
children. They are the ones relieving my stress. Because of their antics, 
they make me happy… (2G, F5) 
 
I always tell my children, if we are no more, you all must take care of 
each other. With a large family, you can always count on your siblings to 
help you in times of need… For example, if we have many siblings, it‘s a 
joyous feeling to get together and go out as a family. Even my elder 
brother and sister-in-law, tangan tak pernah kosong [they don‘t come 
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empty handed]. So I rarely buy things, I get hand-me-downs and even 
new clothes sometimes! (2G, F10) 
 
Working poor Malays regarded children as a source of happiness in alleviating 
their financial woes (F5). For others, children are accumulated social capital, 
which promises prospective social support to parents and their siblings (F10). 
Responding to calls for the ‗switch‘ to dual-income families, my informants 
revealed that childcare costs far outweighed the benefits of formal employment: 
Even if I want to send my children to childcare, that also requires money 
right? $300 per head for one month. I‘ve got four kids, who‘s going to 
pay? I work and earn $800-$900 a month… And it‘s only enough to 
cover for childcare. How about the costs of travelling to work? (2G, F10) 
 
The meager wages earned by females in working poor Malay families can hardly 
offset the costs incurred when they work. Viewed from the working-class habitus, 
their decision to forgo formal employment is prudent. In Chapter 4, I have shown 
that Malay women turned to casual jobs instead, as it offered the opportunity to 
work from homes for supplementary incomes. 
 
5.3.3 Middle-Class Uses of ‘Culture’ and ‘Structure’ 
Generally, different Malay leaders placed varying emphases on 
individualist, culturalist and structuralist explanations to explain the persistence of 
Malay underdevelopment. 
Like Malay social service practitioners, five out of six leaders 
problematized the religious orientation of working poor Malays: 
I mean it‘s very ‗funny‘ [weird] because when you look at Islam, it is 
very progressive in terms of knowledge. Why is it not motivating the 
Malays? Either the religious outlook is backward… Or basically 
religious learning has not ‗gone in‘ [been internalized]. And you see 
these people, they are very religious, they perform their prayers, they 
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fast... So my suspicion is that the religious outlook that has been imbibed 
in them, does not pay emphasis on the worldly... So whatever you do, 
don‘t forget it‘s about Jannah [heaven]... I suspect along the way, they 
resigned to that fact: ―I just do good, I don‘t have to excel.‖ They adhere 
to the religion, but very ritualistic… There are a lot of mystical beliefs 
associated with it... As a consequence, the outlook is not rational, it‘s not 
progressive. (CL1) 
 
In contrast, non-Malay social service practitioners were inclined to highlight other 
‗cultural‘ impediments unique to working poor Chinese and Indians as well: 
Actually, you must acknowledge got different cultural differences. If 
Malays, it‘s almost automatic that they have large families. If you ask 
them why so many children, they will scold you because to them it‘s 
normal. But there are also unique cultural differences with Indians and 
Chinese. Like for Indians who come here for assistance, they usually 
have one gold chain or bracelet, you cannot ask them to pawn it. Because 
for them, having one gold chain is a norm. And for Chinese, especially 
the old persons, they may have 15K set aside in their bank, but you 
cannot question them because they will scold you. That money actually, 
is for their coffin money... Yeah, you see. There are many things to note 
in social work... (laughs) (SSP9) 
 
Ironically, like working poor Malays, middle-class Malay leaders and social 
service practitioners have developed a habitus, which perceives ‗race‘ rather than 
class, as a more fundamental impediment to the community‘s progress. 
Consequently, structural explanations tend to pale in comparison. However, the 
difference between the two groups is this. Whereas the former opined that 
negative racial stereotypes hindered their upward mobility, the latter argued that 
the ‗otherworldly‘ interpretation of Islam curbed the advancement of their less 
fortunate counterparts. 
Compared to social service practitioners however, Malay leaders 




In some sectors, it‘s the language used, the nature of work, which will 
give opportunities to certain groups of people. It may not be 
discrimination; it is the nature of the work [italics added]. If you‘re a 
small factory, or a small workshop, serving a Chinese clientele, your 
clients are mostly Chinese. You may employ foreign workers, but the 
basis of your manpower will be ethnicity. Let me summarize on this 
point, employment opportunities wise, in semi-formal sectors, there will 
be less opportunities for Malays. So their target for employment will be 
low-paying, low-skilled jobs, which they can‘t keep up for sustained 
periods of time if they want to maintain the family, thereby hindering 
continuous income, remaining in the low-income trap. (CL2) 
 
Every primary school has produced one student in the top 5%... The 
problem comes with secondary school because you post them according 
to their results and then you end up stratifying. The top end, the middle-
end usually have no problems... But the bottom end schools, nobody 
wants to go there… [So, you‘re saying that policies beget inequality?] It 
does! Of course it does! The question therefore is what you can do for 
the bottom end... The market will take care of itself. You can’t be a 
socialist... [italics added]. (CL4) 
 
Echoing my earlier claims (Chapter 3), ‗racially‘ selective employment practices 
(CL2) and meritocracy (CL4) indirectly aggravated the plight of the working 
poor, who are disproportionately Malays. If one were to scrutinize the italicized 
data, it is highly interesting to observe how several Malay leaders subconsciously 
neutralized the negative experiences of working poor Malays, whilst legitimating 
the principles of stratification in employment and education. These interviewees‘ 
frank admission — (i) market principles take precedence in Singapore‘s political 
economy (ii) stratification is an inevitable consequence — strongly echoes 
neoliberal ideas. Neoliberalism‘s overemphasis on the efficient market tends to 
gloss over the distribution of power and wealth between different collectivities, 
and the processes that sustain these relationships. 
Through their middle-class habitus, Malay leaders and social service 
practitioners were inclined to adopt a functionalist view of inequality. For the 
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former, structures denoted neutral market mechanisms. For the latter, structures 
referred to predefined welfare policies and programmes, or the list of objective 
criteria in means-testing. In both instances, ‗structures‘ are misrecognized as 
solely disembodied entities. Three implications necessarily result from this. First, 
the notion that structures are also embodied by different groups in the field of 
power, is largely absent in the habitus of Malay leaders and social service 
practitioners. Second, their implicit roles as dominant social actors who indirectly 
contribute to the reproduction of inequality are often glossed over. Third, these 
narrow definitions and misapplications of ‗structuralist‘ explanations, as shown in 
the case of social service practitioners and Malay leaders, counterintuitively 
buttress culturalist and individualist discourses of poverty. 
 
5.4 DISCOURSE (II): WELFARE DISBURSEMENT AND POLICIES 
5.4.1 ‘Soft Spots’ and ‘Hard Spots’ 
On one level, all social service practitioners cited cultural factors to 
explain Malay underdevelopment. However, a critical difference emerged 
between those were trained in social work and others who were not. The latter 
was more likely to suggest individualistic defects — ‗crutch mentality‘ or 
‗entitlement mentality‘ — amongst working poor Malays: 
Sometimes, it‘s really due to attitude problems... They don‘t want to 
work but will never ever say that they are lazy. Rather, they will say that 
other people are in the wrong... It‘s very interesting because God made 
us in different batches... So maybe, it‘s because these people are born 





They are very good at manipulating to get the food rations. Sometimes, 
they go to the extent of getting influential people like the MPs, to write 
in to us... But you see, these people have been in the system for so 
long… They have gone to so many places to seek for help until people 
can recognize them. (SSP4) 
 
It‘s people‘s mindset. They look at Malaysia, the government supports 
the Malays and they feel that Singapore should do the same thing. As 
long as my income is less than $1500, [that] means I‘m entitled. I should 
be entitled, who are you to stop me? That‘s their mentality. (SSP9) 
 
Here, Malay welfare applicants were characterized as inherently pathological 
(SSP3), cunning (SSP4) or exceedingly reliant on welfare (SSP8). In comparison, 
those with social work training tended to privilege structural factors as 
engendering poverty amongst Malays: 
It‘s a question of whether they [the poor] know where to go and how fast 
they get it. Once, there was this assistance for transport. It came out in the 
Chinese newspaper; it came out in the English news. But it was published 
later in the Malay newspaper, so by the time our people came for help, it 
was gone! Right now, the challenge is whether the information is being 
disseminated fairly, regardless of race and religion. For those who are 
really in need, it counts you see... So right now, we emphasize to our 
clients to share information once they get it so that our people can benefit 
together! They act as our antennas! (SSP5) 
 
Companies keep hiring Bangladesh workers, China workers, and they 
are cheaper than hiring locals! My clients used to do a lot of overtime. 
Even when the income was small, the overtime can cover it up? But 
now, by employing foreign workers, the overtime is cut off. They are 
displaced. That‘s another policy, that‘s another structural issue! The 
dependency on foreign workers! (SSP6) 
 
There are cases that they [working poor Malays] didn‘t know they can 
apply for financial assistance from the schools. After all, the system is not 
foolproof and it doesn‘t mean that everyone knows where to get the 
information. Some of them [may] have difficulty, they may lack the skills 
to ask, to find out, because they may not have as much access to 
information... (SSP8) 
 
In particular, foreign labour policy and informational barriers to accessing welfare 
were highlighted. SSP6 confirmed my prior assertions that local low-skilled 
employees were increasingly displaced by inexpensive foreign labour. Whereas 
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SSP9 cited the lack of cultural capital as causing the social exclusion of the 
needy, SSP5 problematized the differential dissemination of information in 
disadvantaging poor Malays. 
 
To extrapolate, social work instruction critically alters the habitus of social 
service practitioners, and regulates the ‗weight‘ that they attributed to 
individualist, culturalist and structuralist discourses of poverty. Whilst this 
appears to be a superficial observation at this juncture, such personal inclinations 
directly influence the outcomes of welfare applications: 
I think ‗gut feeling‘ plays a part... Instincts play a part in telling which 
are the poor, and the genuine from not so genuine ones. If someone 
walks in and has shared everything that you need to know, you know 
he‘s genuine... If you have another case, where you need to push to get 
this or that form, you know something‘s amiss... But still we must abide 
by our protocol. We must check our standard procedures and the 
objective criterion. (SSP5) 
 
Although all social service practitioners adhered strictly to ‗objective‘ criteria38 
during means-testing, they clearly engaged in the ‗subjective‘ assessment of their 
clients‘ attitudes, usually without their conscious knowledge. For SSP5, ―gut 
feeling‖ — arguably the layman‘s acronym for ‗habitus‘ — informed her 
differentiation of the ‗deserving‘ from ‗non-deserving‘ poor. Furthermore, social 
service practitioners disclosed their ‗soft spots‘ or ‗hard spots‘ for some clients: 
I‘m sad that our community (Malays) is like that... I‘m quite surprised 
that some of these people are actually very young, and they are not 
embarrassed to ask for help, when this is actually public money! Some 
are younger than me and [are] already married! (shakes head) (SSP1) 
 
                                                          
38




[Earlier] I have a ‗soft spot‘ with single-mothers, because I know they 
really suffer… They commit themselves to two or three jobs at once, but 
still don‘t make enough money. How do you then say that they are not 
eligible for assistance? But if you look at those who leave their children 
in the lurch, I have a ‗hard spot!‘ (laughs) [Later] It‘s not the ‗hard spot‘ 
or the ‗soft spot‘ that determines the amount of assistance given, but the 
objective criteria of assessment... But still, you know better what kind of 
persons they are... (SSP3) 
 
 
I know I tend to help elderly persons. Everybody will always have ‗soft 
spots‘ lah... (laughs) I think what‘s difficult is to avoid imposing [your] 
own value. Like imposing what they should do and shouldn‘t do... 
Putting that aside can be very difficult. (SSP8) 
 
Whereas single mothers and elderly persons were more likely to incur pity due to 
their perceived vulnerable status (SSP3 and SSP8), young welfare applicants 
faced greater initial prejudice (SSP1), which in turn affected their access to 
assistance. 
 
5.4.2 Battling Stereotypes of the Poor 
The influence exerted by the habitus of social service practitioners on the 
outcomes of welfare appeals, is corroborated by the ‗bitter‘ experiences of some 
working poor Malay families: 
You see all the household items in my house are complete. But I never 
bought a single thing! They are hand-me-downs… Yes, during home 
visits, when the workers come and check, they question so much… It‘s 
like they stare at everything in your house, when clearly, I‘m telling you 
they are hand-me-down(s). (2G, F7) 
 
Working poor Malays, especially those who were younger or had body tattoos, 
were frequently interrogated or viewed with suspicion whenever they sought aid. 
Faced with these stigmatizing undercurrents, many were tongue-tied. Some 
merely submitted, in the hope that their applications for assistance will be 
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approved. Others retracted their welfare applications altogether, often as the last 
means of preserving the remnants of their dignity. Here, my informants‘ ‗silent‘ 
withdrawal can also be interpreted as stemming from their lack of cultural capital 
to deal effectively with covert forms of institutional prejudice against the poor.  
Interestingly, some social service practitioners revealed the role of 
discretion during welfare disbursement: 
A couple of days ago, a rejected applicant created a scene somewhere 
and finally, my boss just decided to approve. [Really?] Yes, they just 
approved. That is my superiors‘ discretion to give or not. Because they 
may have ‗balance‘ money that they can use to give to others based on 
their discretion or not lah. (SSP1) 
 
If you have a problem, don‘t make it [just] your [own] problem… Make 
it everybody‘s problem, and then you start something [get what you 
want]. What I mean is make the problem big ah! (SSP7) 
 
These social service practitioners let slip that whilst ‗silence‘ normally begets no 
positive results in one‘s welfare application, creating ‗commotion‘ does 
otherwise. For working poor Malays, the more ‗aggressive‘ they are with their 
demands, the more likely they are to be successful in claiming their welfare 
benefits. For social service practitioners, it appears that discretionary 
disbursement sporadically occurred to diffuse ‗troublesome‘ applicants and 
contain the problem of poverty, shoving it into ‗invisibility.‘ 
 ‗Race‘ is also an important underlying principle, which affected the 
habitus of different social actors, across varying situations. For instance, several 
working poor Malays revealed their experiences with welfare rejections: 
Sorry to say for Malay social workers, there‘s this one. She like want to 
help, don‘t want to help [us]... That’s the weird thing. Even though she’s 




When we switched social workers from Malay to Chinese, our financial 
help [Straits Times School Pocket Money Fund] was stopped. The 
[Chinese] social worker we met was okay, but she said: ―Don‘t you want 
to switch your daughters from madrasah [religious school] to secular 
schools?‖ From then on, we already know something was ‗there‘ 
[amiss]… She continued: ―You already know it‘s expensive, so why 
didn‘t you change? I told my wife: ―Forget it. We are not here to fight.‖ 
Formally, they [Chinese social workers] keep repeating to ask help from 
Mendaki and that they cannot help. It‘s like I‘m Malay, I should ask for 
help also from Malay organizations. If Malay [social worker], this 
problem won’t happen. (2G, F8) 
From the data, there are two plausible explanations as to why working poor 
Malays are denied help. First, it may be caused by the divergences between the 
habitus of Malays and non-Malays. To put it simply, non-Malay social service 
practitioners may be less willing than Malay social service practitioners, to 
disburse national-level educational aid to poor Malay-Muslim students from 
madrasah (F8). Second, it may be due to the tendencies of working poor Malays 
to interpret the rejections of individual social service practitioners in racial terms. 
In Chapter 4, I have shown that the Malay working poor have acquired a habitus, 
which heightens their consciousness of their ‗ethnic minority‘ status. Here, F6 
construed the rejection as a ‗puzzling betrayal by a fellow Malay‘ whereas F8 
read it to be a ‗discriminatory act by a non-Malay.‘  
Whilst F6 and F8 may be dismissed as the isolated grumbles of the 
working poor, a few Malay social service practitioners have made similar claims: 
We have worked with other non-Malay social workers who say: ―You 
give them help ah? Their house so big, you know?‖ But how do you 
know that‘s their furniture? It could be hand-me-downs. Some refused to 
give them financial assistance because of their ‗wealthy‘ projection... 
Because during home visit, rumah class [the house is well-off]! Maybe 
low-income Malay homes are well furnished and very clean... But for the 
houses of other ethnic groups, it can be piled up with newspapers, giving 
the impression of poverty... Maybe Malay social workers are more 
empathetic to this, we can contextualize why this is common for our own 
people. With other FSCs, there are non-Malays… It may not be 
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discrimination per se, but it could be a cultural difference and perception 
of what‘s happening. (Malay, SSP5) 
 
SSP5‘s statement indirectly sheds light on the problematic shortage of Malay 
social service practitioners, and its unintended repercussions. In lacking the 
cultural capital that is relevant for their Malay clients, non-Malay social service 
practitioners were likely to misunderstand the peculiar circumstances framing 
their ethnic practices as a ‗cultural‘ deficit (through no fault of their own). As 
SSP5 aptly illuminated, the graver problem occurs when this disjuncture in 
habitus, ends up curtailing the Malay working poor‘s access to welfare. On the 
other hand, some Malay clients also resisted confiding in non-Malay social 
service practitioners due to language barriers or unfamiliarity (SSP8): 
For me, the challenges would be how to convince them [Malay clients]. 
Because no matter what, I‘m not Malay. No matter what I say, they still 
have the difficulty [to trust me]. They will think: ―You are not Malay, 
you don‘t understand my culture.‖ (non-Malay, SPP8) 
 
Similarly, social service practitioners problematized the ‗inward-looking‘ 
tendencies of working poor Malays to approach Malay bodies or officers for help: 
Sometimes, we have to blame our own Malay families. Whenever they 
want to ask for help, they go to MUIS or Mendaki. So very few actually 
come to ask for help from other places... If at PA (People‘s Association), 
those who come are usually Chinese! If our people, can count with your 
fingers! This is the thing with Malays. They don‘t ask for help when 
actually got a lot of sources available. Easy said, maybe Malays are 
stupid... Oops! (laughs) (Malay, SSP2) 
 
In addition, other Malay social service practitioners also castigated their Malay 
colleagues for imposing their middle-class values when assessing a welfare 
applicant: 
Actually, I am very critical of the way Malay-Muslim organizations give 
out welfare to our own community... I mean when you hear these people 
(welfare officers) saying: ―We can‘t give too much face to our own 
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people. Wait they will climb all over your heads!‖ Seriously, what do 
you mean by that? It‘s really about ‗colour‘ [discrimination] lah... Our 
own people don‘t help their own community. (Malay, SSP2) 
 
A few Malay leaders extended this claim, as reflecting a larger concern — the 
growing social distance between middle-class and working poor Malays: 
Another problem I see is that those who have moved up don‘t want to 
come back. Sometimes when you have moved up, you think you‘ve 
made it and think this is applicable to all and you become sort of 
patronizing… You want to help, you are genuine… This is the trend I‘ve 
been seeing for the last two years. I met a Malay boy and he said: ―I 
don‘t play soccer.‖ And I‘m was thinking: ―What are you talking about?‖ 
Then suddenly it dawned on me, he doesn‘t want to be associated with 
the Malay community because soccer is Malay… So I composed myself 
and said that back then, I played soccer for the engineering faculty. I was 
the goalie, and represented my faculty. Then he said: ―When I grew up, I 
didn‘t have Malay friends.‖ So, you realize that it is to signal that I‘m 
different from this kerak [decadent group]... It‘s a dissociation. (CL1) 
 
A common thread cutting across these statements is the pervasiveness of 
the multiracialism ideology, and the accompanying community ‗self-help‘ 
discourse, and how they have influenced the habitus and practices of social actors. 
Leveraging on racial ties (social capital), my Malay informants, across divergent 
class backgrounds, placed greater expectations on Malay social service 
practitioners or leaders rather than non-Malay ones, to help needy Malays. 
Furthermore, it also appears that some non-Malay social service practitioners 
were predisposed to relegate welfare responsibility to Malay-Muslim bodies 
rather than national organizations, when particular ‗Malay-Muslim‘ issues were 
raised (ie. helping needy madrasah pupils). 
By subscribing to these discourses, my interviewees have generally 
developed a habitus, which is inclined to misrecognize poverty as a ‗community‘ 
problem, rather than a ‗class‘ issue. Although mainstream financial schemes were 
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available, at the level of practice, welfare assistance was primarily channelled 
and/or sought through community ‗self-help‘ organizations, which were already 
strained by the dearth of funding and manpower. This mismatch between the 
undersubscription of available national resources (field) and the oversubscription 
of welfare from Malay organizations (habitus), coupled with the rhetoric of 
multiracialism and community ‗self-help‘ (discourses), indirectly worsen the 
existing bottleneck in social services for poorer Malays. 
 
5.4.3 Varying Optimism about Welfare Policies 
In comparison to social service practitioners, Malay leaders were more 
optimistic about the effectiveness of welfare policies in combating poverty: 
In Singapore, there are a lot of opportunities for you to get out of that 
[poverty]. It‘s all up to you because there is enough support system. 
Basically in America, there‘s hardly any. You‘re on your own… Over 
here, even if you fall through the cracks, there‘s a social system that 
oversees and helps you to get out. The onus lies on the working poor, 
whether they want to get out of it, first from their desire. I think the issue 
is whether you are prepared to be helped... (CL1) 
 
By framing inequality within the context of a comprehensive welfare system in 
Singapore, the inability to escape poverty is interpreted as the individual‘s lack of 
―desire… to be helped‖ (CL1). From the habitus of social actors who are actively 
involved in policy decisions, the onus now lies on poor Malays to escape poverty. 
In contrast, several Malay social service practitioners voiced their 
skepticism about the effectiveness of the Malay leadership in combating the 
community‘s underdevelopment: 
I don‘t know why National Day Rallies must problematize the Malay 
community. There‘s always a negative stereotype about the Malay 
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community. I think there‘s an agenda for us to be distracted. It‘s 
distracting us from advancement. Every time our community resources 
have to be channeled to solve the problem. There is this problem, the 
state defines it, we [the Malays] must solve it. There was a drug problem 
in the 1980s and 1970s, community resources [went] there; education 
problem, resources [went] there; family problem, resources [went] 
there... (SSP7) 
 
In fact, there is a contradictory message in the papers. They encourage 
the Malays to save through Program Bijak Belanja [Smart Spending 
Programme] and they also blame the Malays for not being able to 
manage their finances properly. But in Berita Harian, when the stalls in 
bazaar Geylang are empty, they actually advertise that the Malays are not 
taking up the opportunities to make money. Yes, it‘s really contradictory. 
I mean on one hand, you‘re told to save... And the next minute, you‘re 
told to spend and be a consumer. I mean how do you make sense of that? 
(shakes head) (SSP12) 
 
Some criticized Malay leaders for failing to question the state‘s racialization of in-
work poverty and social dysfunctionality as a ‗Malay problem‘ (SSP7). Others 
problematized Program Bijak Belanja for degrading the dignity of poor Malays 
(SSP12). Many Malay social service practitioners also felt excluded from 
community engagement platforms, arguing that the policy recommendations were 
eventually monopolized by Malay leaders: 
Yes, they have sharing sessions like the CLF [Community Leaders 
Forum], but usually they already have their agenda. So called, it‘s a 
sharing session but actually it‘s not... Sometimes, I question the objective 
of these sessions. What’s the use of going when they don’t really hear 
you? [italics added] (SSP6) 
 
Their decisions to withdraw from ‗public‘ platforms have the consequence of 
creating a wave of defeatism about the community‘s mobility outcomes 
(ironically even amongst middle-class upwardly mobile Malays). In response, 
Malay leaders were frustrated with such criticisms: 
Assuming ‗that‘ [that welfare programmes are patronizing towards the 
poor] is true, [then] we don‘t need any programme at all... Because they 
are intelligent, smart and resourceful enough to seek help from their 
families, and own support networks. They realize what their challenges 
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are, and they can take action on their own... Make sure their children 
don‘t loiter at night, play guitar at void-deck... or courting girls and boys. 
But that‘s not the situation. Assuming all these criticisms are correct, 
then the same argument can be applied to all other programs... That is 
my response to that criticism... I‘m willing to counter argue, but no, we 
are not debating. It‘s easy to belittle an effort... At best, it is an effort. It 
is not a cure, it is not meant to belittle. I hope it doesn‘t sound belittling. 
I spoke of the need to help people to manage their resources. As far as 
low-income [persons] are concerned, they need budgeting help. (CL2) 
 
Taken together, the data illuminated the peculiar set of socio-structural relations 
underlying ‗self-help‘ assistance within the Malay community. First, it mirrored 
the longstanding ‗sandwiched‘ positions of Malay leaders, who continued to 
juggle national goals with community demands since independence. Second, the 
emerging group of middle-class social service practitioners, is generally 
demanding for greater inclusion and engagement in the community‘s ‗self-help‘ 
efforts. 
For working poor Malays however, although they valued any help given, 
their economic hardship, in certain instances, is at odds with the aims of welfare 
programmes: 
For Program Bijak Belanja, at times we can use the system. At other 
times, I think it is not… (hesitates) that relevant. For instance, they say: 
―If you get your pay, don‘t spend first. Save immediately.‖ Now, maybe 
that‘s applicable to people with high pay, like $1000 plus or $2000 plus. 
For us with pay of $700, how to save eh? They say must save 10%, so 
we keep $70. If $10, maybe I can save. Not that I don‘t want to… But 
for $70, I can use that money to pay my bills. Our budget is so tight, how 
else to tighten? Money still have to go out! (2G, F8) 
 
As working poor families are structurally incapacitated to save, the middle-class 
‗practical‘ tactic of deferring consumption to prioritize savings becomes obsolete. 
Struggling to meet their basic needs, my working poor Malay informants hardly 
deliberated on the efficiency of Malay leadership (At times, they were not aware 
138 
 
of their names!). Within the social service field, they were mere recipients of 
financial aid. Structurally, they exerted negligible influence on welfare policies 
and programmes, which were ironically meant to help them in the first place. As 
middle-class social actors are entrusted with the mandate to enact or devise 
policies, coupled with the simultaneous lack of engagement with the needy 




To summarize, this chapter has detailed how working poor Malays, social 
service practitioners and Malay leaders, have responded and contributed to 
discourses of in-work poverty and Malay underdevelopment in Singapore. The 
ethnographic insights gained, are relevant for refining our understanding of the 
mechanisms of cultural reproduction, and the discursive uses of ‗structure‘ and 
‗culture.‘ 
With regard to cultural reproduction, the disparities in the habitus and 
structural locations of working poor Malays, social service practitioners and 
Malay leaders are evident. Whereas poor Malays directly faced the prejudice of 
some social service practitioners, social service practitioners indirectly evaluated 
their clients‘ practices against their middle-class values. There are also concurrent 
social and class tensions within the Malay community. Whilst several Malay 
social service practitioners appealed for greater inclusivity in self-help efforts, 
Malay leaders lamented about successful Malays who have ‗disassociated‘ from 
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the community. Working poor Malays on the other hand, were inclined to first 
consult Malay social service practitioners and organizations for assistance, before 
approaching mainstream platforms. The fact that non-Malay social service 
practitioners shied away from discussing issues pertaining to Malay leadership, 
partly reinforced the community self-help discourse and practice. Jointly, these 
intricate processes ended up affecting the field of social service — the 
formulation, administering and access to welfare schemes. By illuminating the 
tensions that transpired when the habitus of social actors encounter, or are 
translated into, institutionalized standards of evaluation, I have addressed an 
oversight of the cultural reproduction theory, which concentrated on either the 
upper-class or lower-class stratums. Contrary to culturalist theories of poverty 
which solely faulted the poor, I have demonstrated that middle-class actors — 
social service practitioners and Malay leaders — are implicitly involved in the 
reproduction of inequality. 
With regard to the interrelationships between ‗structure‘ and ‗culture,‘ I 
have revealed that my informants oscillated between individualist, culturalist and 
structuralist explications of poverty. Employing (and conflating) three definitions 
of ‗culture‘ — (i) culture as ‗race‘ (ii) culture as religious orientation (iii) culture 
as the habit of welfare dependency, many of my informants echoed culturalist 
theories of poverty. I have also shown that social service practitioners and Malay 
leaders were inclined to view their middle-class ‗culture‘ as the ‗ideal‘ for 
working poor Malays to aspire towards. With the exception of working poor 
Malays, the other two groups of informants primarily understood ‗structure‘ as 
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neutral and objective instruments for assessing merit or welfare eligibility. In 
extrapolating, within everyday discourses of in-work poverty and Malay 
underdevelopment, the concept ‗culture‘ denoted random individual choices or 
independent values, whilst the notion ‗structure‘ referred to disembodied entities. 
Running parallel to the other, these two discourses indirectly shaped the habitus 
of middle-class actors, such that they frequently failed to recognize their implicit 
roles in preserving the status quo. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE INTERPLAY OF CULTURE AND STRUCTURE IN IN-
WORK POVERTY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this concluding chapter, I will summarize the arguments made in 
preceding chapters, and critically appraise them in relation to the literature and 
theories reviewed in Chapters One and Two respectively. I will conclude with a 
conceptual model which categorizes the multifarious, but interrelated ways in 
which ‗culture‘ and ‗structure‘ link to each other, to influence intergenerational 
poverty. Beyond writing about ‘structure’ as political and economic processes 
(structural dynamism) and ‘culture’ as habitus (cultural milieu), I propose that 
‗culture‘ and ‗structure‘ are also interrelated as discursive distortions of reality 
(everyday ideologies), and a matrix of unequal socio-structural positions 
(relational matrix), which jointly contribute to the reproduction of 
underdevelopment. 
 
6.2 REVISITING KEY THEORIES  
6.2.1 Perspectives on Malay Underdevelopment 
To recapitulate, there is a gaping dichotomy between the cultural and 
structural explications of Malay underdevelopment in Singapore. Although they 
straddled between the two perspectives, Li‘s and Lily‘s analyses lacked adequate 
theorizing of the interrelationships between culture and structure. By 
conceptualizing Malay household practices as an independent entity, Li leaned 
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towards the analytic mode of cultural autonomy, and neglected to acknowledge 
that they were located within, and as part of, the family‘s whole material and 
social life. Lily‘s overemphasis on the social reproduction of inequality on the 
other hand, neglected the mechanisms of cultural reproduction. 
To bridge the theoretical gap between the cultural and structural 
perspectives, I synthesized the structuralist perspective of poverty and the cultural 
reproduction theory in my operating analytical framework (Chapter 2). Whilst the 
former encapsulates the dynamism of institutional processes in regenerating 
poverty, the latter considered how social actors culturally inhabit and mediate 
these structures. The concept ‗habitus‘ was used to illuminate how social actors 
possessed dispositions (developed within a cultural milieu) which had close 
affinities with their structural locations. Applying this analytical lens, I have 
shown that the practices of working poor Malay families were constrained or 
facilitated by the volume and quality of economic, cultural and social capital that 
were structurally accessible to them (Chapter 4), rather than by an autonomous 
‗Malay culture.‘ Through the positive and negative manipulations of family 
narratives about intergenerational poverty, Malay families actively attempted to 
change or justify their depressed mobility outcomes (Chapter 4). This is certainly 
a far cry from claims that they were passive bearers of structural inequalities. 
Although the structuralist standpoint challenged culturalist arguments that 
solely blame the poor, it lacked a nuanced historical understanding of the barriers 
to Malay mobility. To address this lacuna, I applied the political economy 
approach (combination of statist historical institutionalism and social conflict 
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perspective) and buttressed the long-standing claims of proponents of structuralist 
arguments with statistical analyses of secondary sources. In Chapter 3, I have 
revealed that the impediments to Malay mobility and the political economies 
framing Malay economic development varied across historical periods. Under 
British Indian rule, involvement in the opium, pepper and gambier trades was 
important for upward mobility. When Singapore became a Crown Colony, to 
enter the top echelons within the civil service necessitated English proficiency. In 
industrializing Singapore, technocratic expertise was emphasized whereas 
innovative knowledge is highly sought after, after the Asian Financial Crisis. I 
have shown that the collectively owned resources (economic, social and cultural 
capital) of working poor Malays were persistently incongruent with the main 
stratification principle in each of the four phases of Singapore‘s evolving political 
economy since 1819. With the exodus of the professional Malay middle-class – 
top civil servants, lawyers and doctors – in the early years of Singapore‘s 
independence (Chapter 3), it is clear that this gap was filled by Malay 
schoolteachers, journalists and trade unionists. The shift in the characteristics as 
well as capacity of the Malay middle-class in the post-separation era is another 
important structural factor affecting Malay socio-economic development, which 
warrants further research. 
Studies of Malay underdevelopment have also tended to assume that 
Malays were a homogeneous community. I have revealed that socio-economic 
tensions existed between, and within, the middle-class and working poor Malays, 
and had ramifications for Malay underdevelopment (Chapter 5). With regard to 
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the links between habitus and aspirations, Malays have generally cultivated a 
habitus which internalized racial factors, rather than class, as the biggest obstacle 
to the economic development of the community. The critical difference is this; 
whilst working poor Malays in my study opined that racial stereotypes associated 
with being Malay hinder their upward mobility (Chapter 4), middle-class Malays 
tended to view the ‗otherworldly‘ interpretation of Islam as the dominant factor 
curbing the advancement of their less fortunate counterparts (Chapter 5).  
With regard to welfare disbursement practices, the daily operations of the 
social services sector were influenced by the strength of racial ties and ethnic 
‗self-help‘ discourse. The ‗moral‘ desire to request aid from, or to help, fellow 
Malays in the community is deep-seated. Working poor Malays tended to 
approach Malay social service practitioners and organizations first, before turning 
to national avenues. For some, covert prejudice was a significant structural barrier 
to accessing welfare. In other instances, structural gaps in welfare programmes 
led to the regression of the family‘s poverty. Often, many of these families 
possessed limited cultural capital to either deal effectively with these structural 
impediments or source for assistance. Whilst Malay social service practitioners 
desired greater inclusivity in the conceptualization of community self-help 
programmes, Malay leaders lamented about ‗disassociated‘ successful Malays. In 
extrapolating, there is a clear disjuncture between the community‘s structural 
oversubscription to assistance schemes, and the acute undersupply of Malay 
social service practitioners, and a lack of funds within Malay-Muslim 
organizations. Whilst the ‗inward-looking‘ tendencies of the community formed 
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the first half of the issue, the tendencies of non-Malay social service practitioners 
to misunderstand their Malay clients and believe that certain cases involving 
religion (linked to family planning practices or the decision to let children pursue 
their education in a madrasah) should only be handled by Malay-Muslim 
assistance networks, constituted the second half of the problem. 
 
6.2.2 Poverty Theories 
Although vulnerable employment is the common thrust underlying cross-
national studies of in-work poverty, the case of working poor Malays in 
Singapore underscores the need to be perceptive to historical peculiarities and to 
conceptually differentiate local from global structural factors. Whereas 
institutionalized racial discrimination and slavery were the main causes of poverty 
amongst American Blacks and Australian Aborigines (Chapter 1), Malay 
underdevelopment in Singapore is a historical accumulation of the intersections 
between residential, occupational, political, economic and educational 
arrangements, since the founding of Singapore in 1819 (Chapter 3). Under 
colonial rule, the development of the poor Malay masses was neglected and 
distorted as a ‗habitual‘ problem of laziness. Although their socio-economic status 
wavered under colonial rule, Malays had demonstrated substantial readjustments. 
In post-independence Singapore however, Malay socio-economic position 
deteriorated with their widespread proletarianization. As local state policies of 
meritocracy and multiracialism largely turned a blind eye to unequal starting 
points, Malay relative poverty became entrenched. Today, working poor Malays 
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are increasingly vulnerable to global trends — regionalization and the structural 
transition to service jobs.  
 Essentially, the institutionalization of the working poor (including Malays) 
as an enduring facet of modern Singapore extends Engels‘ assertion that in-work 
poverty escalates, and becomes ingrained, with industrialization. With more than 
four decades of industrial expansion to its name, the Singapore example 
challenges the U-hypothesis, which predicted a continued narrowing of income 
inequalities (see p.31). The dramatic plunge in absolute poverty rates was 
replaced by the structure of class inequality in Singapore, which increasingly 
rigidified in the later years of capitalist development. Although this thesis began 
with a cultural framing of the problem of in-work poverty, I have shown that the 
structural transformations of Singapore‘s political economy, has posed particular 
consequences for an ethnic minority group — the Malay working poor. Clearly, 
the intersections between the institutions of ethnicity and inequality throughout 
these periods were mutually reinforcing, such that one can hardly be divorced 
from the other. In doing so, this dissertation has unveiled the contradictions that 
arise when a class-based phenomenon of in-work poverty, which has come to 
assume an ethnic dimension over time, is situated within a context that espouses 
the rhetoric of ethnic equality. 
In Chapter 2, I rejected the individualist and culturalist theories of poverty 
as unsociological, and opted for the structuralist perspective of poverty to form 
the first half of my analytical lens. Chapter 5 contrastingly revealed that all three 
groups of social actors — working poor Malays, social service practitioners and 
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Malay leaders — oscillated between the structural, cultural and individual-level 
explanations, to make sense of in-work poverty and Malay underdevelopment. 
My middle-class informants tended to privilege individualist and culturalist 
arguments, the very perspectives which I had initially dismissed. Their limited 
understanding of structures as supposedly impartial and disembodied principles of 
evaluating merit or welfare eligibility, counterintuitively buttressed individualist 
and culturalist explications of poverty (deemed to be the theoretical opposites of 
the structuralist perspective). These ethnographic insights raised two theoretically 
pertinent points about the roots of poverty. On one hand, conceptual models of the 
causes of poverty are not as clear as they appear. Contrary to scholarly discourses 
which neatly delineated poverty theories into three mutually exclusive categories, 
discourses by social actors do not necessarily make these distinctions. On the 
other hand, such convoluted uses of individualist, culturalist and structuralist 
explanations in everyday discourses support Neisser and Schram‘s (1994) claim 
that discursive patterns are equally powerful forces in engendering poverty (see 
p.26), for they ideologically distort structuralist diagnoses of poverty. 
Throughout my fieldwork however, the ethnic ‗tendencies‘ of poor 
Chinese and Indians likewise kept emerging in the accounts of non-Malay social 
service practitioners. Although poverty remains largely invisible and carefully 
concealed in Singapore‘s case, the community ‗self-help‘ discourse at the very 
least, grants some measure of recognition to the plight of the Malay working poor 
(although this comes at a high cost of racializing the class-based realities 
governing in-work poverty). Overshadowed by the successes of their ethnic peers, 
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the double marginality of the Chinese and Indian working poor remains 
underexplored. It would be interesting to examine whether similar social tensions 
transpire between the working poor and middle-class strata in these communities. 
Future research within Singapore studies may address these lacunae by 
investigating the unique historical circumstances that induced in-work poverty in 
other ethnic groups. Studies of early Singapore have suggested that different 
ethnic groups had distinct occupational niches that possibly affected their mobility 
outcomes (K.J. Lee 2006), which was also corroborated by the case of the Malay 
working poor. Further investigation on this subject will significantly depart from 
studies which have racialized underdevelopment as a ‗Malay problem.‘ 
Empirically, it provides an excellent comparative case study for stumbling upon 
other significant categorical principles which may govern in-work poverty (ie. 
ethnicity, gender, age or sexuality). Theoretically, works that explicate how and 
why ‗structural‘ inequalities may take on a ‗cultural‘ quality, contribute to the 
narrowing of the contrived conceptual distinctions between ‗structure‘ and 
‗culture.‘ 
 
6.2.3 Cultural Reproduction Theories 
To recapitulate, Bourdieu maintained that the dearth of capital depressed 
the ambitions and mobility outcomes of the poor. As opposed to the structuralist 
perspective of poverty which conceptualized structures as disembodied entities, 
Bourdieu conversely argued that structures were also embodied by social actors 
through habitus (cultural milieu) — knowledge, dispositions and values obtained 
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through one‘s cultural history. Investigating the mechanisms of cultural 
reproduction in working poor Malay families, Chapter 4 helped to clarify the two 
crucial links between capital forms and mobility outcomes. First, the upward 
mobility of working poor Malays was directly constrained by the lack of each 
capital type — economic capital (money, wealth and educational resources); 
social capital (contacts for better employment prospects); and cultural capital 
(knowledge of school expectations of students). Second, the differential 
combinations of capital forms in these families yielded qualitative variations in 
their habitus, to indirectly influence their aspirations and the ways they made 
sense of poverty. 
With regard to the second point, I have revealed that family narratives 
were vital instruments of cultural reproduction, in addition to MacLeod‘s 
emphasis on the role of peer networks in reinforcing levelled aspirations. Viewing 
poverty as a moral code or a form of intergenerational continuity, some families 
misrecognized their poverty as a ‗natural‘ condition. Others strategically reframed 
the experience of poverty in the form of fables, to direct the upward mobility of 
ensuing generations. Bourdieu‘s classist conceptualization of habitus, however, 
was inadequate for explicating these heterogeneous strands in how working poor 
Malays interpreted their own poverty. Here, applying MacLeod‘s rendition of the 
cultural reproduction theory — which called for the inclusion of non-class-based 
factors — proved useful. In addition to MacLeod‘s highlighting of the importance 
of ‗race‘ in modifying the habitus of working-class orientations towards upward 
mobility, my data have shown that permanent accommodation, immediate social 
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networks and the position of a child in a family, also subtly altered the ambitions 
of individual members between and within working poor Malay families. To sum 
up, my ethnographic findings thus far demonstrated heavier empirical leanings 
towards, and largely straddled between, Bourdieu‘s and MacLeod‘s theoretical 
models of cultural reproduction. 
In Chapter 2, I also pointed out that Bourdieu, MacLeod and Willis 
generally lacked empirical support for the divergences in the habituses of working 
poor and middle-class persons, and the ensuing repercussions for structural 
inequalities. Scrutinizing everyday discourses of in-work poverty and Malay 
underdevelopment, Chapter 5 addressed this gap, by implicating middle-class 
actors (social service practitioners and Malay leaders) in the reproduction of 
inequality. I have argued that the fallacious discursive uses of the terms 
‗structure‘ and ‗culture‘ amongst middle-class actors were another important 
mechanism of cultural reproduction. First, by misrecognizing ‗structures‘ to be 
disembodied and neutral entities, they often failed to recognize their implicit roles 
in formulating or administering welfare programmes for the poor. Second, 
middle-class persons subconsciously assessed the working poor based on their 
‗cultural‘ ideals. This insight led me to conceptually problematize the middle-
class ideals inherent in MacLeod‘s concept of ‗levelled aspirations.‘ In neglecting 
to consider the starting points and ending points of their clients‘ mobility 
outcomes, many misrecognized working poor Malays as having absent or 
moderated aspirations.  
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Like working poor Malays, middle-class social actors were heterogeneous. 
Various factors within the social services field — social work training or working 
environment — also subtly modified their habitus. Compared to Malay leaders, 
social service practitioners tended to be less optimistic about the effectiveness of 
welfare policies. Amongst the latter, those trained in social work were more likely 
to allude to structural factors. The social service practitioners‘ anticipation of 
failure even as they were helping their clients, and the leaders‘ conviction that 
existing ameliorative welfare programmes were adequate, inadvertently clouded 
the structural causes which systematically engendered in-work poverty. As their 
job scopes necessitated direct contact with poor clients, the subjective dispositions 
(‗soft spots‘ and ‗hard spots‘) of social service practitioners bore immediate 
consequences for welfare disbursement practices. When such encounters triggered 
the clash in habituses, leading to the rejection of welfare applications, I have 
shown that a minority of the Malay working poor who were more ‗aggressive‘ 
about their rights received discretionary assistance occasionally. Other working 
poor Malay informants however, withdrew their applications for financial 
assistance altogether. Under these circumstances, discretionary welfare payouts 
became a useful middle-class strategy for diffusing class conflict, and shoving 
poverty into invisibility. Here, my fieldwork only lends limited support for Willis‘ 
claim that resistance amongst working-class persons ironically reproduced their 
subservience. I have shown that working poor Malays resisted racial stereotypes 
of lazy Malays (Chapter 4) and resented stereotypes of the poor (Chapter 5), albeit 
in their ‗private‘ domains. Partially conscious of their status as an ethnic minority 
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group, and partly due to their lack of cultural capital to articulate their 
frustrations, working poor Malays eventually revealed their ‗public‘ resignation to 
the status quo. 
In relation to the long-standing structure-agency debate, my ethnographic 
findings point to the conclusion that ‗habitus‘ offers ample space for individual 
contestations and subjectivities. This becomes clearer when one returns to my 
analytical framework (Chapter 2), which conceptually distinguishes the social 
reproduction of roles, relationships and forms of domination, from the cultural 
reproduction of beliefs, values, language and practical knowledge of social 
groups. Thus, although the matrix of unequal structural positions and outcomes 
was socially reproduced through economic and political processes (Chapter 3), 
my findings have shown that different groups of social actors across and within 
varying categorical spaces (class, race and occupations) and time (cohorts), 
culturally inhabited, negotiated and eluded those regularities, in diverse ways 
(Chapters 4 and 5). To summarize, ‗culture‘ is not simply a map of behaviour 
amongst social actors. As habitus (cultural milieu), it is a fluid, yet principled 
interface which mediates between individual practice and unequal structural 
outcomes. 
 
6.3 TOWARDS A TEXTURED UNDERSTANDING OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT: 
 CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CULTURE 
 AND STRUCTURE 
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Earlier in Chapter 2, I had combined Hays‘ (1994) metatheoretical model 
of ‗structure‘ with Kane‘s metatheoretical model of ‗cultural autonomy.‘ Jointly, 
they illuminated the overarching ontological principles guiding the 
interrelationships between ‗culture‘ and ‗structure‘ in my two-pronged analytical 
framework: (i) structuralist perspective of poverty (ii) cultural reproduction 
theory. Instead of viewing structure and culture as separate, Hays postulated that 
structure referred to systems of social relations whereas culture, as part of social 
structure, denoted systems of meanings. Kane‘s distinction between analytic 
autonomy and concrete autonomy helped to illuminate the distinctive traits of 
culture. The former countered cultural reductionism by positing that culture is 
structural, and established the independence of cultural forms before they can be 
assessed. The latter accounted for the historical specificity of the cultural forms, 
and consequently avoids determinative and hierarchical analyses of culture. 
Whereas the structuralist perspective of poverty echoed the first half of Hays‘ 
proposal, the cultural reproduction theory echoed the second half of Hays‘ 
arguments and established both modes of cultural autonomy under Kane‘s model. 
With these principles in mind, I have purposefully organized the three 
empirical chapters in this dissertation (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) around one 
overarching theme: the interrelationships between ‗structure‘ and ‗culture‘ in 
affecting in-work poverty and Malay underdevelopment. Whilst Chapter 3 
discussed the social reproduction of the structural impediments to mobility 
amongst working poor Malays, Chapter 4 detailed the cultural reproduction of in-
work poverty in working poor Malay families. Chapter 5 on the other hand, 
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examined how the divergences in layman discourses of culture and structure 
indirectly contributed to underdevelopment. Beyond writing about ‘structure’ as 
political and economic processes (structural dynamism) and ‘culture’ as 
habitus (cultural milieu), I propose that ‗culture‘ and ‗structure‘ are also 
interrelated as discursive distortions of reality (everyday ideologies), and as a 
matrix of unequal socio-structural positions (relational matrix), which jointly 
contribute to the reproduction of underdevelopment. Whilst the structuralist 
perspective of poverty and theories of cultural reproduction had highlighted the 
first two aspects respectively, they lacked empirical support for the social 
‗clashes‘ that occur when different groups embodying different structural 
positions, compete for scarce resources and articulate their belief systems. More 
often than not, these divergences had dire ramifications for practice and the 
reproduction of inequality. Therefore, my thesis sought to address these gaps and 
further refine the conceptual links between culture and structure. As culture and 
structure are internally linked, I will demonstrate that each concept achieves it full 
analytical potency only in tandem with the other. 
First, culture and structure are interrelated when disembodied structural 
inequalities take on cultural meanings for social actors (categorical realities). 
Under this typology, institutions constitute the units of analysis. In line with the 
political economy paradigm, I have consistently referred to ‗structure‘ as evolving 
political and economic processes or institutions, which engendered the systems of 
roles and relations between the dominant and dominated classes, throughout 
Chapter 3. Far from being rigid, structure is dynamic and evolves across time. In 
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my institutional analysis, the class-based institution of inequality in Singapore 
came to assume an ethnic dimension, as a disproportionate number of Malays 
were in in-work poverty. 
Second, culture and structure are interconnected as habitus (cultural 
milieu), which reproduces the systems of beliefs, values, language and knowledge 
of social groups. Social actors therefore come to actively embody and inhabit 
structural inequalities. The units of analysis under this typology are categorical 
actors and their practices. Notwithstanding the regularities imposed by structural 
inequalities, this conceptual typology acknowledges that individual actors are 
active social agents who unwittingly regenerate social inequality, through their 
habitus. In line with the cultural reproduction theory, I have shown in Chapter 4 
that the ways in which intergenerational poverty is reproduced varied across 
working poor Malay families based on their differential ownership of resources. 
In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that the habitus of middle-class social service 
practitioners and leaders varied according to their occupational positions and 
working environments, to affect their understanding of the roots of Malay 
underdevelopment. 
Third, culture and structure are also linked as ideological concepts which 
are discursively used by social actors in their everyday lives. Beyond actors, 
practice and processes, this typology considers the role of everyday ideas in 
contributing to underdevelopment, and underscores the need to differentiate 
scholarly discourses from those of the layman. Borrowing the concept 
‗misrecognition‘ from cultural reproduction theories, I have shown in Chapters 4 
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and 5 that the discursive uses of structure and culture, in the discourse of those 
who are not sociologists, often clouded the structural causes of poverty. Whereas 
culture commonly assumed three different definitions: (i) culture as ‗race‘ (ii) 
culture as religious orientation (iii) culture as the habit of welfare dependency, 
structure came to mean disembodied and neutral mechanisms in their talk. 
Essentially, the conceptual separation of culture and structure, and misuses of 
these terms, indirectly legitimated the status quo. 
Fourth, culture and structure are also interlinked as a relational matrix of 
unequal socio-structural positions. Hence, habitus is not just a subjective system 
of perception schemes shared by individual members of the same class; it is also 
played out in a field of contesting social actors from different classes. This 
typology is useful for it extends the empirical focus from the poor to non-poor 
actors in the study of underdevelopment. At this juncture, it is timely to explain 
how ‗relational matrix‘ refines Bourdieu‘s conception of the ‗field.‘ To 
recapitulate, Bourdieu first established the ‗field‘ as a battlefield where agents and 
institutions attempt to preserve or transform the distribution of capital. However, 
it is important not to confuse mechanisms with theoretical claims. While 
providing mechanisms is not necessary for a theory to be useful or correct, such 
provision often raises its plausibility. Although Bourdieu claimed that the field is 
characterized by struggles, he lacked empirical support to demonstrate how these 
‗tussles‘ transpired in everyday interactions to reproduce inequality. In Chapter 5, 
I have shown that when ‗habitus‘ is translated into institutionalized standards of 
evaluation, which is followed by contradictions in the views and practices of 
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social actors from different socio-structural positions, access to welfare is 
indirectly or directly restricted. Clashes in habitus, which are frequently misread 
as misunderstandings between individual actors, in actuality, reflect the 
contradictions emanating from structural inequalities. Furthermore, in The State of 
Nobility, Bourdieu largely focused on the ‗struggles‘ between the dominant 
(teachers) and dominated (students) classes
39
. However, he neglected to document 
the response of the dominated class and primarily assumed a dual-oppositional 
relationship between the two groups. In contrast, my study documented the 
complex ‗relational matrix‘ of power between, and within, three different groups 
of social actors within the field of social services. 
To conclude, this dissertation began with two key research objectives. 
Empirically, it sought to explain the spectrum of structural factors constraining 
Malay mobility in Singapore, and to illuminate how the cultural milieu of 
working poor Malays, social service practitioners and Malay leaders, influences 
the concentration of in-work poverty amongst Malays today. Conceptually, it 
aimed to investigate how ‗structure‘ and ‗culture‘ interact to affect in-work 
poverty. To answer these queries, this thesis had combined political economy 
analysis with empathetic ethnography, two genres normally thought to be 
incompatible. However, I believe that this method and epistemological pluralism 
has produced textured data, which helped to (i) unpack the plurality of meanings 
associated with the concepts ‗structure‘ and ‗culture‘ both within and between the 
                                                          
39
 Bourdieu revealed that students from wealthier background had better assessment cards because 
they possessed similar cultural capital to the teachers, which was generously graded (see p.36). 
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scholarly and everyday discourses (ii) make the intricate relationships between 
‗culture‘ and ‗structure‘ much clearer (iii) introduce refreshing insights into 
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Status Attainment Model 
Theories of intergenerational mobility may be classified broadly into two 
spectrums, based on their selection of methodology. The status attainment model 
primarily employs quantitative tools, whereas the cultural reproduction theory mainly 
utilizes qualitative analysis.  
The status attainment model measures intergenerational mobility or ―status 
differences between parents and children in a family‖ (Chiew 1991: 184). Studying the 
American occupational structure, Blau and Duncan (1967: 165–172) concluded that an 
individual‘s social origin affected his occupational achievement, independently of his 
education and first job experience (Ibid: 402–403). The so-called Wisconsin Model added 
social psychological variables that mediated the influence of a father‘s position on his 
son‘s status attainment (Sewell et al. 1969: 83; Sewell and Hauser 1992: 599). However, 
these analyses were restricted to data on males.  
Numerous cross-national studies (including of Australia, Netherlands and 
Malaysia) highlighted other ‗family-based‘ factors affecting individual accomplishment. 
These included maternal earnings (Hill and Duncan 1987), mother‘s education and 
occupation (Kalmijn 1994; Desai et al. 1989), parental characteristics in influencing 
children's ―preferences for cash versus psychic income‖ (Corcoran et al. 1976), parents‘ 
educational attainment (Lillard and Willis 1994), investments in children‘s education 
(Goldschneider and Goldschneider 1991), the economic role of grandfathers (Beck 1983), 
and differences in family structure (Biblarz et al. 1997; Boggess 1998; Pong et al. 2003; 
Musick and Mare 2004). To sum up, these works highlighted the family‘s pivotal role in 
shaping individual achievement (Bowles 1972; Couch and Dunn 1997; Duncan et al. 
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1998; Eide and Showalter 1999; Levine and Mazumder 2007), though they reduced the 
variations in mobility outcomes to economic factors. 
The status attainment model presumes that achievement is determined by 
individual attributes, including genetic factors (Leibowitz 1973; Bowles and Gintis 
2002). Without considering structural factors (Blau 1992; Savage and Egerton 1997; Ko 
2002), the mobility traits of social groups and the patterning of mobility possibilities 
cannot be fully illuminated (Borjas 1992). Premised upon statistical correspondence, the 
status attainment model also presupposes direct causality between social origin and 
achieved status. However, statistical correlation indicates affiliation at best, and does not 
necessarily explain how one variable triggers another. Stratification is also seen as an 
outcome, rather than a process (Winship 1992). Moreover, subsequent family members 
are assumed to be passive receivers of all the benefits and constraints accumulated by 
their parents. Hence, the model neglects to explain why and how upward 








**Note: This interview guide merely provides an extensive list of questions to be 
explored during the in-depth interviews. Although the questions are organized 
thematically for clarity, this does not necessarily mean that they will be put forward 
to the informants in a chronological manner. Often, I strayed from the questions to 
pursue significant points which were raised by my informants, such as their 
sentiments about being Malay and the link to their socio-economic status, as well as 
their experiences receiving financial assistance. 
 
A. General Information / Personal Details 
1. Age: ______ years old 
2. Gender: Male / Female 
3. Marital status: Single / Married / Separated / Divorced [Note: For the three 
subsequent categories, I shall enquire about the number of children (if any) and their 
respective ages.] 
4. Generational tier: 1st / 2nd / 3rd  
5. Position in the family: Grandfather / Grandmother / Father / Mother / Children / 
Others ______________ [Note: I shall also clarify their birth order.] 
6. Type of housing: 1-room / 2-room / 3-room / 4-room / 5-room / Others 
7. Highest educational attainment:  
8. Current educational pursuit (Stream/Course): 
9. Current employment and Estimate of monthly income: [Note: For those who are 





B. Geographical Origins: Neighbourhood Effects 
10. How long have you been residing in this estate? Were you originally from this estate? 
If this neighbourhood is not your first place of residence, where did you originally 
reside? Were you also living in a flat at that point of time? 
11. What were the factors that made you decide to move to this estate? When did you 
eventually move? Who were the family members who were present at time of change 
of residence? How was it like living in a new environment/neighbourhood? Did you 
have problems adjusting to your new surroundings? What were some of your 
difficulties, if you had any? 
12. What are some of the differences living in this estate as opposed to your previous 
place of residence? How were your living conditions then as opposed to now? Were 
the same family members then present now? What were some of the changes in your 
lifestyle or neighbourhood, if any? Were there some parts of your lifestyle that 
remained the same? Finally, what did you like/not like about your previous 
neighbourhood? Also, what do you like/not like about living in Bedok North estate? 
 
C. Living Arrangements & Activities 
13. Describe a typical weekday at home. What is the ‗usual‘ cycle of activities that occur 
from the start until the end of the day? Who are usually present during the different 
periods of the day? When is the time that everyone is usually home? How does this 
differ from the weekends? 
14. Describe the type of dwelling that you are living in. How many rooms are there in 
your house? What are they used for? What are the sleeping arrangements like? Do 
you have enough privacy at home? How do you feel about this? 
15. Do you receive frequent visits from any other persons? How are they related to your 
family? Do they also spend the night in your house? What are the alternative sleeping 
arrangements then? How do you feel about this? 




D. Grandparent – Parent – Child Relationships [Parenting/Mentorship/Guidance] 
17. How often do you spend time with your family members today? When you do spend 
time with your family, what were some of the common activities? Do you go 
shopping, or to the cinemas frequently? Does your family also ‗eat out‘ a lot? Where 
do you usually go to ‗eat out‘? Do you like participating in these activities? Why or 
why not? Did these activities help to foster closer bonds with your family members? 
Was this always the case in the past? If there were any changes over time, what were 
those changes? Why do you think they happened? In addition, who usually pays for 
these activities? 
18. Which family member is at home most of the time? Who takes charge of the 
household chores? Who plays the role of the wage earner? Describe the division of 
labour within the family if you are living within the same household. Do you like this 
arrangement? Why or why not? How does this in affect your occupational or 
educational performance? 
19. How strict are you with your children? How often do you monitor their activities: (i) 
television (ii) going out – curfews (iii) school homework? Do you exercise sufficient 
control over their time and activities? Why or why not? Is the treatment different for 
your daughters and sons, or for children at different ages? 
20. Who took care of you when you were growing up? Who takes care of you now? Do 
you get a lot of freedom when you were/are growing up? How did that affect the way 
you view life today? Or perhaps, how did it influence your character today? Are you 
the way you are today because of your family upbringing?  
21. How close are you with your parents? What are some of the specific activities that 
you and your parents/or one parent will usually do? How are your parents like in 
terms of discipline? Are they very strict, fairly strict or others? Which parent, of the 
two, are you closest with? Why is that the case? Who do you approach to discuss 
your problems? Do you share everything with your parents? Why or why not? Do 
you look up to your parents as role models? How did your parents influence they way 
you have turned out to be today? 
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22. How close are you with your grandparents? Are you closer to them than your parents, 
or vice-versa? Are they strict as well with you, or do they practice greater leniency as 
opposed to your parents? Who do you usually discuss your problems with? Which 
grandparent are you closest with? Do you look up to your grandparents as role 
models? How did your grandparents help to shape who you are today? In what way is 
this similar to or different from the role of your parents? 
23. How close are you with your siblings? What is your role amongst your siblings? 
Describe your relationship with them. In addition, what are some of the common 
activities amongst your siblings? Do you confide in your siblings? Why or why not? 
Do you look up to any of your sibling? Do you dote on any particular sibling? Why 
or why not? What do you think are some of advantages or disadvantages of having 
siblings? How do you delegate the household chores amongst yourself? Does 
anybody have more responsibility than the other? Why is that the case? 
24. If given the opportunity, which aspects of your family life would you retain? Which 
aspects of your family life would you change? Why is this so? For the third-
generation family members who are unmarried, if you start your own family, what 
are some of the influences from your current family arrangement that you will adopt 
or discard in the future?  Why is this so? 
 
E. Cultural Resources 
25. Do you like doing art? Can you describe to me the kinds of art work that you do? Do 
you participate in beaux arts? Do you go for plays/theatre at the Esplanade or 
Victoria Concert Hall for instance? Do you attend art exhibitions? What kind of 
music do you listen to?  
26. What are your best subjects in school? What are your worst subjects in school? What 
are the reasons for classifying them as such? Do you find it easy to help your children 
and/or get help in your studies? Why or why not? Are you aware that the school 
requires you to help out in your children‘s studies? Who else do you turn to when 
you do not know how to answer your homework questions? Have you ever felt like 
giving up? If you do well in school, how do your parents react? If you do not well in 
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school, what is their reaction? Is there any reward or sanction which follows 
afterwards? Do you go for tuition? How frequent is this? Why or why do you not go 
for tuition? Why do you do/not do well in Mathematics? Is it because you couldn‘t 
answer the question? 
27. How would you rate your mastery of English? Are you well-versed in English? When 
you wanted to go for oral examinations in school, how did you prepare for them? Do 
you find it easy to pronounce words in English? In school, who are usually better in 
English? Why do you think they are good in English? Do you prefer speaking in 
English or Malay? Why is this so? What‘s your language choice at home, and with 
friends? Do your parents place considerable importance to speak in any particular 
language? 
28. Do you watch the television frequently? What kinds of television programmes do you 
usually tune in to? Do you watch National Geographic Channel or Channel 
NewAsia? Do watch news programmes? Does watching television help you to widen 
your vocabulary? What do you usually learn from the television programmes?  
29. Do you have Internet at home? How long have you had it? What are the reasons for 
having Internet access? Why do you have/not have Internet access? How frequent do 
you go online, and for what purposes? What do you usually surf when you‘re online? 
Does having the Internet help you in your school work, or in widening your 
vocabulary? Does your family have a lot of books? What types of books do you 
usually like to buy? What types of newspapers do you purchase? Why do buy these 
books/newspapers, and not others? Are there dictionaries to consult at home, if you 
do not know the meanings of certain words? Are there assessment books for your 
children/studies? Do you take your children to the library? How frequent is this? 
Why so? Do you spend a lot of time reading? What are the materials that you usually 
read? 
 
F. Schools and Educational Attainment 
30. Which school are you currently in? If you have graduated, which schools did you go 
to? Are the schools located within the neighbourhood where you live? Are there any 
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particular reasons why you decided to select these schools? If your schools are/were 
far from your place of residence, how did you commute to school? Why did you 
select this school despite its distance? 
31. Do you like going to school in general? If yes, why? If no, why not? What makes you 
look forward to going to school? How was your school like? Describe the teachers 
and their teaching styles. How do you feel about your teachers? Which subjects did 
you like or dislike? Why is this so? If you had problems understanding your subjects, 
who do you usually turn to for academic help? Were your teachers available for 
consultation?  
32. Do you have many friends in school? What are their ages? Which classes are they 
from? Which ethnic group are they usually from? How ‗close‘ are you with your 
school friends? What are some of the common activities that you do together during 
school, before school or even after school? Do any of your family members know of 
your activities with school friends? 
33. Are you involved in any CCA in school? How frequent are your activities? Does this 
take up a lot of your time? If you do not have a CCA, why is this so? How did your 
family react to your involvement, or non-involvement in any CCA? Were they 
supportive of your activities? If yes, how did they support you? If no, why was that 
the case? 
34. Do you enjoy studying in general? How frequently did you study in a week, for 
instance? Was it easier to study at home or in school? Why is this so? If you faced 
difficulties with your schoolwork, could you consult your family members for help? 
Why or why not? Which family member did you specifically go to for academic 
help? Why is this so? Why did you not turn to other family members instead? If none 
of your family members can help you, who do you turn to next? 
35. Do you attend tuition classes? What are the subjects that you require extra help? 
Where do you go for tuition? What is the frequency of your tuition lessons? How 
much do your tuitions lessons cost? Does the expenditure on tuition affect your 
expenditure on other household items? Who encouraged you to go for tuition? Was it 




36. Have you ever thought of dropping out of school? Have you dropped out of school 
before? What were the circumstances that led to such a situation? How did you feel 
about it? Was the decision made of your own accord? What is the possibility that you 
resume your education in the future? Under what conditions will you resume your 
education? 
37. Do you intend to pursue higher studies in the future? Which field do you intend to 
enter? Why is that the case? Do your family members support your decision? In what 
way do they exhibit support (or not) with regards to your decision? How do you feel 
about this? In addition, do you see yourself taking after your father or mother and 
what they actually are doing today? Why or why not? 
38. How much pocket money did you bring to school? Is this inclusive of your transport 
expenses? Was it enough to pay for all your expenses such as food or extra books? If 
not, how did you cope as a student? Do you happen to receive any welfare benefits 
from the school? How did you get to know about the availability of these schemes? 
Who actually applied for these schemes? 
39. Do you have a computer at home? Who are the frequent users of the computer? If the 
computer is shared by many persons, how does one then allocate the time given per 
person? Were there any clashes in the time of usage?  If you do not have a computer, 
how then did you complete school assignments that were based online? Do you think 
having a computer is a necessity in your family? 
40. How involved are you with your child‘s school? Do you know other parents in the 
school? Do you know the teachers very well? Why or why not? When you meet the 
teachers during the meet-the-parents-session, what usually happens? What does the 
teacher say to you? How do you feel during the conversation, or afterwards? 
41. When you had entered any new school, who was it who helped you with the 
preparation? Is there anyone in your family or amongst your relatives who 
encourage/discourage you from schooling? Why is this so? Have you ever applied for 
any scholarships or bursaries? How did you get to know about these aids? At the 
point of time when you wanted to enter a new secondary school, who was it who 
helped you to decide which school you are to enter? If you were choosing a particular 
school, did you know anybody who was in that school? At the point of time when 
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you were choosing between the various post-secondary options, who helped you to 
decide? Did you know of any other options? Was there any other person in/outside 
your family that you could have possibly turned to for advice? Why did consult this 
person? Why not? Have you ever thought of going to any other educational 
institutions? 
 
G. Peer Networks: Neighbourhood and Beyond 
42. Who are your peers in the neighbourhood? Which ethnic group are these 
neighbourhood friends mainly from? Are they still in school? If they are working, 
what do they do for a living? How did you get to know them? How often do you 
hang out with these peers from your neighbourhood? Where do you go? What are the 
activities that you usually do with them? What do you usually talk about when you 
‗hang out‘ together? Does your family know your neighbourhood friends? Do you 
invite them over to your house? 
43. Are any of your neighbourhood friends in gangs? How did you get to know them? Do 
you also join them in their gang activities? Do your grandparents or parents know of 
them? If yes, how did they react? If no, how did you manage to keep it a secret? 
Amongst your neighbourhood peers, is there any particular person that you look up 
to? Why is that so? Do you wish to be like the person that you have cited?  
44. Are you a member of any extra-curricular or external group? How did you first get to 
know these persons? How frequent do you hang out with them this week? What do 
you usually do when you hang out with this external group? What are their views on 
life, marriage, family and job prospects or education? Do you look them up for 
advice? 
45. Who do you hang out with when you are not home? How frequent do you meet the 
person(s) in a week? What do you usually speak about to the person? Why do you 
like hanging out with this person(s)? Where do you usually hang out? Are they 
working or schooling? What are their views on education? What are their views on 




46. How many friends do you have? How many of these friends are close to you? 
Amongst these close friends, are they mostly Malay or Chinese or Indian? What do 
you usually talk about? Do you share the same dreams or aspirations? What do you 
think is the difference if a Malay person befriends only Malays, as opposed to if a 
Malay person befriends non-Malays? Is there any impact on a person‘s eventual 
status outcome? When you converse with your friends, what‘s the language that you 
usually use? 
47. Who are the major influences in your life? How has this person shaped you to be who 
you are today? Do you look up to him or her? 
 
H. Occupational Experience 
48. When you were growing up, what did you aspire to be? What were the steps taken to 
achieve your ambition? Do you know what was to be done to achieve your dreams? 
Who helped you in the process? Did your parents or grandparents help you out in any 
way to achieve your aspirations? If you did not achieve your ambition, why was it 
so? 
49. What is your current job? What are the skills that you learnt from your job? Are you 
contented with your job, or do you wish for things to be better? Is there anything 
from your working experience that you would like to pass/or have passed to your 
children or grandchildren? What do you hope for your children to be when they grow 
up? 
50. If you are still a student, why did you hold a part-time job or why are you holding a 
part-time job? Is having a job merely to supplement your allowance or is it a 
necessity? Do your family members encourage you to work? How much do you 
contribute to your house each month? What are some of the challenges of balancing 
school life with work? Did your job commitments compromise the quality of your 
school work? How did you feel about it? Ultimately, which do you deem to be more 
important? School or work? Why is this so? 
51. As a working parent, how do you then balance your working life with your parenting 
responsibilities towards your children? What are some of the difficulties that you 
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face? How do you go about resolving them? For instance, have you ever faced any 
discipline problems from your children whilst you were at work? Did any other 
family members help to alleviate your burden by temporarily taking over your role in 
your absence? How do you think your children actually view you? 
52. Have you ever been unemployed before? How long was your period of 
unemployment before you got a new job? How did this affect your family 
emotionally and psychologically? If there was no fixed source of income, how did 
your family manage to survive through the ordeal? Did you borrow or drew out your 
savings? How did other family members help you to overcome the situation? 
53. How well-connected are your parents, and how far did this influence your job 
outcomes, or educational attainment? When you wanted to get a job at any time 
before, did you get the help of your family members, friends or relatives to 
recommend you these jobs? Why or why not? How close are you with them? Are you 
unemployed now, or are in search of a job? Do you get any form of help from 
personal contacts in your job search?  
54. In your entire social contacts, name some people who are doing very well today. 
How close are you to that person(s)? Do you find it easy to ask him/her for help? Do 
you take advice from this person, or consult this person for his views and opinions? 
Why or why not? Do you think it is useful to know these individuals? In contrast, 
name some people whom you know that are not doing well today. How close are you 
to that person? In your opinion, why is it that he/she experiences that fate? 
 
I. Living Expenses – Dependence and Interdependence 
55. Who is/are the breadwinner(s) in your family? What is the monthly household 
income? Who manages the distribution of expenses in the family? What are the 
priorities in your household expenditure? How much do you spend on each 
household need? After the necessary expenditure, is there any money left over for 
savings? Do you think that having saving is a necessity? Have there been 
circumstances that led you to withdraw your savings? Could you describe them in 
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detail? If there is not enough money to go around for the month, do you disclose your 
financial problems to the other members in the family? 
56. Do you receive any financial aid from welfare organizations? Are they mainly 
Malay-Muslim organizations or do you also resort to seeking help from other 
sources? Could you site some examples? How do you feel about it? How did you get 
to know about these sources of aids? Do they exercise stringent criteria when dishing 
out welfare benefits? What did you have to go through during the application 
process? In the meantime, who helped you throughout the depressing period? Who 
(within the family) who actually applied for help? Were there persons outside of the 
family who stepped in to help? 
57. Do you have any form of savings? Why or why not? How much money do you spend 
on your household expenses each month? Could you provide a breakdown of the 
details of your expenses in these areas: food, transport, school allowance, hygiene, 
personal, bills and miscellaneous items. How much is your entire income each 
month? Is it sufficient? What do you do if you do not have sufficient money? Who do 
you look for?  
58. If you experience financial or family problems, is there anyone outside of the family 
that your family will turn to? Why or why not? 
 
J. Religion 
59. How do you view religion in your life? When you encounter any setback in your 
family, do you turn to God for help? Do you think that all setbacks are pre-ordained 
by God? Do you attend religious classes? How frequent are these classes? What have 
you learnt, and how do you apply these principles to your life? 
 
K. Aspirations 
60. Where do you see yourself and your children in five years‘ time? In ten years‘ time? 
What do you hope to achieve in your life and for your family? What are the major 
values that you wish to impart to the next generation? What are your aspirations? 
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What are your sources of aspirations? How will you go about to achieve your 
dreams? What are the setbacks that you foresee? How will you overcome them? Do 
you think you can achieve your objectives? 
61. If your can change something in your life, what is it that you would change? Why? If 
you were to go back in time, and can choose to change something which you did, 
what would that be? Why? What do you think would have happened if you pursued 
that alternative path? 
62. What are your life‘s main priorities today? How did they change ten years ago, or 
how do you think they will change a decade from now? 
 
L. Reproduction Strategies 
63. Who did you marry and why? Did you have other choices? Did your parents approve 
your choice? How has your life change after marriage? Are you happy with your life 
right now? Is there any particular part that you really like/dislike? What do you think 
would have happened if you had chosen another soul mate for instance? Do you try 
to limit the age your children marry? Did you engage in family planning? Did you 
limit the number of children you wanted to have? Why or why not? 
64. Which schools did you choose? Why? Have you ever considered other types of 
schools? Why did you choose these schools and not others? How do you think this 
choice has affected the way your life has turned out now? 
65. Do you go for nutritional supplements or brain boosters? Do you have insurance 
plans for your children‘s education, house, or retirement? Why or why not? If not, 
have you thought of having them insured before? Why or why not? Do you how to 
apply for insurance if you really have to? 
66. What would you leave your children with when you pass on? Do you plan to 
bequeath them inheritance, in any form?  
67. Did you go out of your way to know some individuals so that you can get their help 
in the future? Did this always work out? What are some of the challenges and 
difficulties? How did you manage to overcome that? 
